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A bstract
This thesis explores how career concerns and information affect organizational perfor­
mance.
Its first two chapters analyze a principal-agent model in which the agent has career 
concerns along the lines of Holmstrom (1999) and in which the principal observes the 
agent’s performance but the agent and the outside labor market do not.
The first chapter shows that the presence of career concerns with asymmetric infor­
mation creates a trade-off between turnover and incentives: in order for career concerns 
to increase, the firm must release talented workers in the future. The chapter applies 
its theoretical framework to examine the optimal level of labor market competition and 
firms’ willingness to make general and firm-specific human capital investments.
In the second chapter, the agent works for the principal for two periods, after which 
labor market competition for talent occurs. Within this environment, it explores the 
firm’s incentives to disclose the agent’s performance to the agent in between the two 
periods. It finds that a profit-maximizing disclosure policy (1) always provides some 
information to workers; (2) never identifies the worst performers; and (3) sometimes does 
not identify the best performers.
In contrast to the first two, the third chapter (joint with Michael McMahon) explores 
information and career concerns on monetary policy committees. In particular, we ask 
whether a heterogeneous committee of experts can outperform a homogeneous one. We 
find that giving voting rights to members with different beliefs can improve social welfare 
due to moderation. We then examine whether differences in voting behavior between 
internal and external members on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
are consistent with moderation, and find that they are not. In particular, some external 
members do not contradict internal ones. We present evidence that career concerns can 
explain this finding.
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Preface
Ever since Fama (1980) proposed the idea that a worker’s concern for his reputation 
could substitute for explicit incentive schemes, economists have recognized the poten­
tial importance of career concerns in explaining behavior. Today, the career concerns 
framework laid out in Holmstrom (1999) has become a workhorse model in applied or­
ganizational economics. One reason is that the prediction from Holmstrom (1979) that 
optimal explicit incentive schemes should depend on every available signal that is (con­
ditionally) correlated with output is manifestly not borne out in the real world. Instead, 
implicit incentives appear more important for explaining why workers exert effort, es­
pecially in professional service firms, which are playing an increasingly crucial role in 
modern economies.
While economists have a fairly solid grasp of how career concerns operate at the 
individual level, what is much less clear is how to design organizations in which career 
concerns operate. With explicit contracting, organizational design is not a first-order 
problem because the goal is to construct the optimal mapping from output signals to wage 
payments. In contrast, career concerns depend crucially on institutional details such as 
the quantity of information available to actors inside and outside organizations and the 
rewards that accrue to those perceived as more talented. The central goal of this thesis 
is to uncover these relationships and to show how organizations can use them to improve 
overall performance. For the most part, the analysis consists of applied microeconomic 
theory in its most literal sense. That is, the chapters use game-theoretic models to shed 
light on real-world phenomena, in many cases generating testable implications. The 
thesis is therefore a contribution to the growing field of Organizational Economics, which 
seeks to understand the forces that shape non-market institutions such as internal labor 
markets, bureaucracies, committees, and corporate hierarchies.
It is important to point out two main weaknesses in the analysis before summarizing 
the key results. First, the majority of the conclusions that the chapters reach depend 
on particular modelling assumptions, and may not hold in more general environments. 
General career concerns models are very difficult to solve, so the chapter uses simple 
functional forms for production technologies, and specifies particular distributions for 
random variables. Second, although the first two chapters generate testable predictions, 
the thesis does not provide any empirical analysis to examine them. On the other hand, 
many of the empirical findings in the third chapter (written jointly with Michael McMa­
hon) are explored informally, not with an explicit model. All the chapters would benefit 
from stronger links between theory and data.
The first two chapters essentially analyze the same environment: one in which a
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principal privately observes an agent’s output within a competitive labor market. This 
is a natural situation for career concerns to arise, because when outsiders cannot observe 
output, contracting on it is presumably not possible. The introduction of asymmetric 
information also adds more richness to the canonical Holmstrom model, in which all 
participants in the labor market have the same information at all points in time; in 
particular, it allows one to discuss a range of important human resource management 
policies about which the Holmstrom model is silent.
In the first chapter, an agent (the worker; he) matches with a principal (the employer; 
it) for an initial period, after which labor market competition takes place and the employer 
either retains or releases the worker for a second period. The equilibrium outcome of 
labor market competition is similar to that in Waldman’s (1984) well-known paper: the 
employer retains the worker whenever his expected talent is above a threshold and releases 
the worker whenever his expected talent is below it. This is inefficient because the 
employer releases the worker with positive probability even though he always generates 
more output with the employer than he does with other firms. In the first period, the 
worker exerts effort because the wage he will be paid if the employer retains him is 
higher than the wage he will be paid if it releases him. A crucial result is that whenever 
second period output is convex in worker talent, this wage difference—and therefore the 
strength of career concerns—is increasing in the probability that the agent is released. 
So, equilibrium turnover is positively correlated with equilibrium effort.
The results suggest that policies that jointly affect turnover and effort must resolve 
a basic trade-off between matching and incentives, and the first chapter presents two 
applications. The first is to competition policy. Increased labor market competition 
worsens second period social surplus by increasing turnover, while improving first period 
social surplus by increasing effort. The same tension also arises when the employer 
can choose whether to invest in general or firm-specific human capital. Both kinds of 
human capital inversely affect the ability of the employer to retain talented workers in the 
second period and its ability to motivate them in the first. The fact that the presence of 
career concerns influences optimal competition and human capital investment means that 
traditional analyses of these policy choices may be missing important incentive effects.
In the second chapter, the worker exerts effort for two periods before labor market 
competition takes place. Its goal is two-fold: first, to identify the effects of the employer’s 
disclosing performance information to the worker between his two effort choices; and 
second, given these effects, to derive the disclosure policy to which the employer would 
like to commit ex ante to maximize profit. This question is not simply a theoretical 
exercise because the problem of how to best conduct performance appraisals is one of 
the most vexing that firms face. There are two primary effects of information disclosure.
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First, it creates uncertainty for the worker about his second period effort level, which 
increases his disutility from joining the employer. Second, when the worker learns his 
performance, the employer’s belief about his second period effort choice depends on his 
first period output. So, the worker can use first period effort to influence the amount of 
effort that the employer expects him to exert in the second.
The optimal disclosure policy has three notable properties. First, it always involves 
some, but not full, disclosure. Second, the worker never learns that his performance is 
among the worst possible. Finally, in some situations, the worker does not learn that his 
performance is among the best possible. These results are important because real world 
performance appraisals tend not to identify poor performers, and to concentrate ratings 
in the center of the distribution. Observers often argue that these patterns reflect some 
dysfunctionality in appraisal systems, but in fact the rating distributions that arise from 
optimal disclosure policies have much in common with real-world distributions. This is 
not equivalent to saying that rating systems are always perfect, only that they may not 
be as bad as they first appear.
The third chapter (written jointly with Michael McMahon) is quite distinct from the 
first two. It no longer considers a principal-agent model and no longer explicitly models 
career concerns. The question it seeks to ask is whether monetary policy committees 
can benefit from having heterogeneous experts. It is pertinent because some countries 
(like the UK) appoint people to their monetary policy committees from outside their 
central banks, while some countries (like the US) do not. To address the issue, it builds 
a theoretical model to explore the dimensions along which mixed committees might out­
perform homogeneous ones. The central result is that if the committee designer knows 
experts’ beliefs about long-term macroeconomic conditions, it should appoint the expert 
with the most moderate belief as the sole committee member, and allow all other experts 
to advise him. The only rationale for having different experts on the same committee is 
if the committee designer does not observe beliefs. In this case, drawing experts from two 
different belief distributions can produce a more moderate median voter than drawing 
experts from only one if every member votes according to his personal view about what 
is the best policy.
The remainder of the third chapter explores whether the voting record of the Bank of 
England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is consistent with the theoretical rationale 
for including external members. Our first finding is that internal and external members 
initially vote for the same average interest rate, but that external members begin voting 
for lower interest rates after approximately one year on the committee. While this is not 
consistent with moderation (at least initially), it may simply be the case that external 
members are hesitant to express their views early on. A more intriguing finding is that
12
only academic external members vote for lower rates after a year; non-academic external 
members continue to vote with the internals. We hypothesize that this is due to the 
career concerns of non-academic external members, and test this idea using a natural 
experiment that exogenously changed the possibility of reappointment. During a period 
in which reappointment was unlikely, non-academic external members also voted for 
lower interest rates after a year. We interpret this as evidence that the career concerns of 
non-academic external members keep them from expressing dissent when reappointment 
is possible, and conclude that career concerns may limit the efficiency gains of mixed 
committees. Thus, while the chapter does not begin by analyzing career concerns, it 
finishes by showing that they are potentially a spanner in the works of committees of 
experts.
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C hapter 1
Turnover and Incentives in Labor 
M arkets w ith  A sym m etric  
Inform ation
1.1 Introduction
There are two important sources of value that firms enjoy from new workers: their initial 
productivity and the option value from retaining talented workers in the future. Thus, 
a firm must achieve two distinct goals to maximize the benefit from employing workers. 
First, it must provide effort incentives to motivate workers. Second, it must use the 
information it obtains after observing worker performance to make appropriate retention 
decisions. Failure to adequately address either issue will impair overall performance.
Of course, there are numerous possible frictions that may prevent optimal retention 
and limit effective incentive provision. This chapter focuses on asymmetric information 
between an employer and an outside labor market as a source of both matching and 
contracting inefficiencies. In itself, the fact that asymmetric information distorts labor 
market outcomes and creates contracting difficulties is not surprising. Instead, the main 
contribution of this chapter is to show that the ability of firms to retain talented workers 
under asymmetric information is in many situations negatively related to worker moti­
vation when effort incentives come from career concerns. In this case, firms’ ability to 
retain talented workers is inversely related their initial productivity.
The argument is the following. A worker (he) begins working for an employer (it) 
in the first of two periods within a competitive labor market. The employer privately 
observes the worker’s output, allowing it to perfectly infer his ability. Outside firms do 
not observe any information correlated with the worker’s output. Between the first and 
second periods, competition takes place between the privately informed employer and the
14
uninformed labor market. Asymmetric information implies that the 'employer can only 
pay one wage to retained ability types, and so in equilibrium it releases the worker if 
his ability falls below a threshold. This is inefficient because every ability type is more 
productive with the employer than an outside firm in period two.
As explicit contracts can only be written for publicly observable variables, they are not 
feasible when only the employer observes output. Effort incentives for the worker must 
therefore arise implicitly, and the chapter assumes they come from career concerns a la 
Holmstrom (1999). Since career concerns incentives depend on expected future earnings, 
this choice of contracting instrument creates a tight relationship between the worker’s 
period one effort and the equilibrium outcome of the bidding game between the employer 
and outside firms. In the second period, the worker earns higher wages if he is retained 
by the employer than if he is released, so his second period payoff improves discreetly if 
the employer’s belief about his ability crosses the retention threshold. He exerts effort in 
the first period in order to increase the employer’s belief about his talent and increase 
his future expected payoff—the standard signal jamming logic.
A key assumption in the model is that second period output is convex in worker tal­
ent. The implication is that raising the retention threshold increases the expected market 
output of retained ability types by more than it increases the expected market output of 
released ability types. This in turn increases the difference between the equilibrium wage 
paid to retained and released ability types, which strengthens career concerns. However, 
raising the retention threshold also increases the probability of turnover. Of course, the 
retention threshold itself is endogenous. It is primarily determined by two deep parame­
ters that measure worker productivity in the market and with the employer, respectively. 
Increasing either parameter has opposite effects on effort and turnover. When market 
productivity increases, the retention threshold increases, as does the amount the market 
is willing to pay every ability type. Both effects increase the wage difference between 
retained and released ability types, but the former worsens matching. By contrast, when 
employer productivity increases, the threshold decreases, reducing effort but improving 
matching. This is the fundamental logic underlying the chapter.
Since the model ties turnover and effort to productivity parameters, it can shed light 
on the trade-offs associated with policies that influence them. The chapter presents two 
such applications. The first assesses the desirability of competition. One can measure 
competition as the probability that the market productivity parameter takes on some 
non-zero value. With no competition, first-best matching obtains since the employer can 
retain all ability-types; however, the worker exerts no effort since wages are 0 regardless 
of observed performance. Increasing competition steadily worsens matching and steadily 
increases effort. The chapter shows that there exists a unique socially optimal level of
15
competition that can lie anywhere from zero to one, depending on the relative magnitudes 
of the distortions.
The second apphcation of the model examines the employer’s firm-specific and general 
human capital investment incentives. Increasing general human capital raises the equi­
librium retention threshold, increasing turnover along with effort. When effort costs are 
low enough, the firm is willing to invest in general human capital even though it limits its 
ability to retain talent. Firm-specific human capital presents the opposite trade-off. In­
creasing it decreases turnover and effort through reducing the retention threshold. Thus, 
investment in firm-specific skills will not occur when effort is highly sensitive to variations 
in wages—i.e., when effort costs are low.
The value added of the chapter lies not in analyzing labor market outcomes or career 
concerns per se, but in tying them together to show that two of the most basic problems 
facing firms regarding human resource management may not be possible to resolve si­
multaneously. In fact, the very popularity of adverse selection labor market models and 
career concerns models highlights the importance of combining both for a clearer picture 
of how organizations function. Doing so not only reveals an inverse relationship between 
incentives and turnover, but also uncovers new dimensions on which competition policy 
and human capital investments might have an impact.
R e la ted  L ite ra tu re  The Waldman (1984) model of adverse selection labor market com­
petition is the closest to the one presented in the chapter, although there are other papers 
that examine the consequences of strategic bidding in labor markets with asymmetric in­
formation (see Greenwald 1986, Bar-Isaac, Jewitt, and Leaver 2008, Li 2008). The crucial 
assumption is that bidding occurs sequentially, beginning with the employer and followed 
by the outside firms. The end of the chapter will discuss how the results depend on this 
bidding structure.
The career concerns literature that began with Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1999), 
has, for the most part, considered the interactions between one principal and an agent, 
or among multiple identical principals and an agent. This chapter, in contrast, considers 
the case in which an agent interacts with multiple principals that differ both in terms of 
their productivity and their information about the agent’s output.
More generally speaking, there are few models in contract theory that study the 
relationship between competition and incentives. One exception is Schmidt (1997), who 
shows that increases in competition can both increase and decrease effort, whereas in this 
chapter increases in competition only increase effort. The difference is that in Schmidt, 
the principal can choose the incentive scheme conditional on levels of competition, whereas 
here the principal cannot write output contracts and can only rely on career concerns
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to generate effort. Moreover, Schmidt focuses on product market competition, and this 
chapter on factor market competition.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) argue that an em­
ployer will only undertake general human capital investments when it can capture some 
of the associated gain in worker productivity. Here, the employer does not capture any 
of the second period surplus from general human capital investment, and yet it still in­
vests in general skills because by increasing the labor market’s valuation of talent, it 
strengthens career concerns.
Finally, Mukherjee (2008) combines adverse selection labor market competition with 
career concerns (and explicit contracting) in order to study an employer’s incentive to 
disclose information to an outside market. He does not study the relationship between 
turnover and effort under asymmetric information.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the model and 
the subsequent one presents the solution, highlighting how turnover and incentives jointly 
depend on productivity parameters. The fourth section applies the model to competition 
and human capital investments, illustrating how they create trade-offs between effort and 
matching. The final section discusses the assumptions that underlie the model, and the 
implications of changing them.
1.2 M odel
In period 1, a worker (he) matches with a firm (it) F. The worker’s first period output 
is yi = 9 +  e where 0 ~  U[ 0,1] is worker talent and e is worker effort. The cost of effort 
function for the worker is c% (e), where x  satisfies the standard properties x ' > 0? x" > 0? 
lime_>o X (e) — 0 and lim^oo x (e) =  oo. The c > 0 parameter is a measure of the cost of 
effort, and will play an important role in determining how sensitive is equilibrium effort 
to wage variation. The worker has an outside option equal to 0.
In addition to F t there is an outside labor market that consists of a large number of 
firms indexed by j  G J . A crucial assumption is that F  perfectly observes yi but that 
no firm j  does; there is thus asymmetric information. This captures the fact that since 
F  works more closely with the worker than does the outside market, it is in a better 
position to judge the quality of his output.
After F  observes j/i, it plays a bidding game with the outside firms. First, it chooses 
some wF E W F =  R+ U {0} where wF = 0 corresponds to not making the worker a wage 
offer for period 2 and wF ^  0 to offering him a wage wF for period 2. Outside firms 
observe wF and each then simultaneously chooses wj E R+ U {0}. The worker joins the
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firm that offers him the highest wage. If the maximum wage he is offered by the outside 
market equals the wage that F  offers him, he remains with F; if more than one outside 
firm offers him the highest wage, he joins each with equal probability; and if his highest 
wage offer is 0 he takes his outside option. All firms incur an arbitrarily small cost 8 from 
making wage offers, which could for example reflect the legal costs of drafting a wage 
contract.
If the worker remains with F  for period 2, his output is y.f =  f6 N and if he moves 
to an outside firm it is =  mON, where f  > m  > 1 and N  > 1. The assumption on 
the magnitudes of the productivity parameters /  and m  implies that every ability type 
is more productive with F  than with an outside firm in the second period. In section 
1.4, the chapter gives /  and m  more specific interpretations, but for now they are left as 
abstract parameters.
The assumption that N  > 1 implies that second period production is convex in 
talent.1,2 While the particular functional form for y2 is not itself crucial for the results of 
the chapter, convexity is. The exact role it plays will become clear in the next section.
In the model, there is no contracting on output since it is not publicly observable. 
Instead, all effort incentives will come from career concerns. Thus, the fact that second 
period production does not depend on effort is without loss of generality, since career 
concerns do not exist in the final period of the game.
1.2.1 D efin ition  o f equilibrium
The chapter uses the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept to solve the model. After 
observing yi, F  forms a belief 0*" on worker talent. Denote by 0 F the set of all possible 
realizations of 9F, and let wF : 0 F —► W F be F ’s strategy in the bidding game. Let fu7 
be market firm f  s belief about the strategy that F  employs, and let uft : W F —► W J 
be the strategy that each market firm j  employs. Furthermore, let eF and eJ denote the 
beliefs of firm F  and j  on worker effort.
The equilibrium set of strategies wF* U {w^*}J-=l and beliefs {wj*}j=1 must satisfy the 
following conditions:
u?* maximizes E  — w* — 1 (w7 ^  0) £ \/wF given w \  e7, and \u?* (1.1)
wF* maximizes E  \y2 \ ~ wF ~ 1 ^  0) 8 given eF and {uP*}^=1 (1.2)
wj* = wF* (1.3)
1The discussion section provides a motivation for this assumption.
2One might also wonder why, given the functional forms, some talent realizations are less productive
in the second period than they were in first. In fact, one can add a constant term to second period
output or subtract one from first period output without altering any results.
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Condition (1.1) states that the strategies employed by market firms constitute a Nash 
Equilibrium; (1.2) that F  maximizes profit given the behavior of the labor market; and
(1.3) that the belief of each market firm about the strategy employed by F  is consistent
with its actual strategy.
wF* U {^'*}j=1 implicitly defines an ability-wage schedule w Let ew be the
worker’s actual period 1 effort. Equilibrium effort e* must satisfy
ew =  arg max —cy (e) +  w  ^ (1.4)
^  = y i ~ e F (1-5)
e* = ew = eF = e-7 (1-6)
(1.4) requires the worker to maximize utility; (1.5) requires Bayesian learning on the part 
of the firm; and (1.6) requires every firm’s belief about worker effort to be consistent with 
the worker’s effort choice.
Definition 1.1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model satisfies (1.1)-(1.6).
The remainder of the chapter solves the model according to Definition 1.1
1.3 Solution
This section derives the implications of the model for turnover and effort and emphasizes 
their relationship to the /  and m  parameters. Although the model presented above is 
relatively simple, it delivers the important insight that increased effort implies increased 
turnover. The first part of the section derives properties of the equilibrium bidding 
strategies and their relationship to turnover, while the second part derives first period 
equilibrium effort as a function of the equilibrium wage schedule. The section does not 
impute any welfare implications to the findings, but instead leaves this for the applications 
presented afterwards.
1.3.1 Equilibrium  Turnover
Since the labor market bidding game is sequential, the first step involved in solving it is 
describing the behavior of the outside firms after they observe wF. Condition (1.3) implies 
that all outside firms must share the same belief about F ’s strategy, so that vP = w. 
Moreover, condition (1.6) implies that every outside firm believes that &F rsj 
While there is not a unique equilibrium, there is a unique equilibrium outcome, which 
the following lemma describes.
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Lemma 1.1 I f  wF ^  0 and E  [m9N \ wF,w ] — wF — 6 > 0, or if  wF =  0 and 
E [mQN | wF,w] — 5 > 0, then maXjWj =  E [mON | wF,ui] — 5. Otherwise, = 0 Vy.
If F  does not pay the worker a wage at least equal to the expected surplus he could 
generate in the labor market, then one outside firm will pay him a wage equal to the 
expected surplus. The result follows from Bertrand bidding, which implies that no outside 
firm can capture any surplus from the worker.
The behavior of the outside firms influences the bidding behavior of F  through setting 
the worker’s outside option. The next result describes its equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1.1 The equilibrium strategy of F  satisfies
behavior identified in Lemma 1.1 leads to two wages in equilibrium: one to ability-types 
that F  retains and one to ability-types that F  releases. The following assumption pins 
down the latter.
the surplus he creates is positive.
The reason that F  cannot pay any two retained ability-types two different wages is 
that wages cannot credibly signal private information. If F  paid two different retained 
types two different wages, and the outside market believed these wage offers credibly 
communicated private information, F  would have an immediate incentive to “lie” to the 
market and tell it that the higher ability-type was the lower one since it would save 
on wage costs. Within the set of retained workers, communication between F  and the 
outside market is impossible.3
3The intuition is similar to that in the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel 1982). Within the 
set of retained types, the sender of private information (the firm) has no preference concordance at all 
with the receiver (the outside labor market), so communication is impossible.
(1.7)
where 6* uniquely satisfies
(1.8)
In words, F  retains the worker if and only if its belief on his talent exceeds 6* and pays 
all retained ability-types a wage independent of 6F that is equal to their expected market 
productivity conditional on 6F C [#*,!]• This strategy combined with the labor market
A ssum ption  1.1 0 < 5 < E  m6N+1 \ 6F < 0* = m^ * |1—
Assumption 1.1 implies that an outside firm will employ the worker if he is released since
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The reason released ability-types earn a flat wage is costly bidding. Without costly
n  / q * \ N + 1
bidding, F  could still only retain ability-types above 0* at wage — ; however, it
could credibly communicate its private information to the market for ability-types below 
9* since providing information would be costless and not affect second period profit. For 
example, one possible equilibrium strategy for F  could satisfy wF* = 6F — e if 0* < e* 
for some arbitrarily small e. An outside firm would then hire ability-type 0^ whenever 
m9F — 5 > 0 at wage m  ^ —S. F ’s employing this strategy would lead to a different
ability-wage schedule than its employing the strategy specified in Proposition 1.1. This 
would in turn impact on the worker’s first period effort incentives. Among the different 
equilibria of the costless bidding game, the most plausible one would maximize profit. 
However, solving for the optimal amount of information provision to the outside market 
is not the focus of this chapter. Assuming costly wage offers not only avoids this problem, 
but also has a realistic interpretation.
A crucial feature of this equilibrium is inefficient matching: since /  > m, any turnover 
is inefficient. However, since (1.8) has a solution that lies within (0,1), F  releases the 
worker with positive probability in equilibrium. The basic reason is wage pooling. F  
must earn zero profit on the lowest retained ability type while paying him a wage equal 
to the expected market output of all ability-types above his. Since the output of the 
lowest ability-types is near 0, F  cannot profitably retain them.4
The following result summarizes the effect of the productivity parameters on equilib­
rium turnover.
Lemma 1.2 9* is strictly decreasing in f , strictly increasing in m, and bound between 0 
and 1.
When /  increases, F  earns more on every worker type. Since an outside firm’s willingness 
to bid for the worker is unchanged, this lowers 9* and decreases turnover. When m  
increases, the outside market is willing to pay more for every ability-type, so F  must 
raise the wage it pays to retained workers. This reduces the number of workers it can 
profitably retain, increasing 9* and lowering expected second period profit. Moreover, 
one can also easily show that lim x ^ ^  9* = 0, in which case the probability of turnover
771
tends to 0, and that l i m x -  9* = 1, in which case the probability of turnover tends to 1.
m
4The only reason F  can ever retain the worker is because it earns a rent proportional to /  — m  on 
every ability-type.
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1.3.2 Equilibrium  Effort
To derive first period effort, one needs to look at the entire ability-wage schedule. Com­
bining the results from above gives
_m_ l-(g*)N+1 qF >
N + l  1 - 9 *  u  — U
_rr^ ( d* )N+1 jf Q F  <  Q*
N + l  9* 11 V ^  U •
In other words, the worker’s second period earnings are higher if he is retained by F  than 
if he is released. There is thus a reputational reward associated with remaining with F. 
The size of the reputational reward is given by
W ( T ) =  m  1 - ( e *)JV+1 m  (6*)n+1
N  + l  1 - 0 *  N  + l  0* 
TO 1 -  (0*)W 
JV +  1 1 - 0 *  ' (1.9)
Since contracting on output is not possible, effort incentives for the worker arise solely 
from the desire to signal a high ability to his employer in order to increase the probability 
of earning W  (9*). The next result establishes the dependence of equilibrium effort on 
this quantity.
P ro p o sitio n  1.2 Equilibrium effort satisfies
* ' « ■ ) .  (1.10)c
Because 0 is uniformly distributed on [0,1], a marginal increase in effort will increase 
Pr 0F >9*\ by a constant amount 1, the probability density function for a uniform 
random variable.5 Equilibrium effort equates the marginal benefit of effort—1 x W  (9*)— 
with the marginal cost—cx'-6
Clearly, the size of the reputational reward is key for determining equilibrium effort. 
As it changes, so too will e* and first period profit for F.
Lem m a 1.3 W  (9*) is decreasing in f  and increasing in m.
This result hinges on the assumed convexity of second period output in talent. When 
the retention threshold 9* increases, the newly released types are more talented than
technically speaking, this is not true if e is large enough to guarantee that 6F >6*.  In fact, the 
proof of the result shows that equilibrium effort can never lie at such a corner solution.
6If the distribution of 9 were not uniform, then changing the retention threshold 6* would affect 
equilibrium effort not only through changing the size of the reputational reward, but also through altering 
the extent to which an increase in effort increased the probability of earning it.
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the previously released types and less talented than the newly retained types. This 
means that the expected output of both retained and released types increases following 
an increase in turnover. Convexity implies that the expected output of retained types 
increases by more than the expected output of released types. Hence, the difference in the 
wage paid to retained and released types increases with turnover. Therefore, an increase 
in /  reduces W  (9*) since it decreases 6*, while an increase in m  has two complementary 
effects: it increases W  (9*) both through increasing 0* and directly raising the value that 
the outside firm place on any ability-type.
Comparing Lemma 1.3 with Lemma 1.2 leads to the immediate conclusion that 
changes in the productivity parameters that decrease turnover reduce first period ef­
fort and vice versa. To put it another way, the model predicts that in a cross-section of 
firms, after controlling for /  (and N ), one should observe a positive relationship between 
turnover and effort, and likewise after controlling for m  (and TV).7 This is the central 
message of the chapter: under asymmetric information, the employer can either motivate 
the worker in the first period or retain him in the second, but not both.
The results suggest that policies designed to alter the /  and m  parameters will have 
to take into account a trade-off between turnover and effort. The next section explores 
this idea in more detail. First, though, it is important to discuss how sensitive is effort to 
changes in /  and m  in order to determine the relative magnitudes of the associated costs. 
As one can see from (1.10), e* is more sensitive to differences in W  (6*) the smaller is c, 
the cost of effort parameter. Essentially c measures the importance of career concerns. 
When it is large, signalling is costly, so that career concerns are weak; when it is small, 
signalling is cheap, so that career concerns play a larger role in the worker’s effort choice.
1.4 A pplications
While the results so far are useful for illustrating the inverse correlation between turnover 
and effort, it is silent about how to interpret the m  and /  parameters or why they 
might take on particular values. This section instead models m  and /  as deliberate 
policy choices. The first application is to a social planner choosing the optimal level of 
competition, and the second is to the firm choosing levels of firm-specific and general 
human capital. In both cases, the optimal policy must balance the trade-off between 
incentives and matching.
7One could also control for /  and g and find the same relationship due to heterogeneity in N ,  which 
also affects turnover and wages through determining 6*
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1.4.1 C om p etition
In order to apply the model to competition, one can write m  as the following random 
variable, realized between periods 1 and 2:
{/  — e with probability p 0 with probability 1 — p
where e G (0, / ) .  If the realization of m  is 0, then the worker has no value in the outside 
market, and F  only needs to pay the worker his outside option in order to retain him. If 
the realization of m  is /  — £, then F  must bid for the worker and pay a positive wage to 
retain him. p is therefore a natural measure of competition, since it can be interpreted as 
the probability with which the employer faces another firm in the bidding game. Here, p 
measures factor market competition, not product market competition, and when p = 0, 
F  is a monopsonist, not necessarily a monopolist. Finally, e measures the output loss 
when the worker leaves F. Such a loss might arise for many reasons, but the most natural 
motivation is firm specific human capital, broadly speaking. As e —> 0, then F  and the 
outside firms become identical. Its role in determining the optimal level of competition 
is discussed below.
A social planner that can choose the level of competition will select
p* -  argmax e* -  c% (e*) -f E  [;y2} . (1.11)
p
In (1.11), E  [2/2] refers to total expected second period output, not just expected second 
period output in F. Denote by 6* (e) the retention threshold if m  =  /  — e and W  (9*) 
the wage difference between retained and released workers when m  = f  — e 8
p* must balance two forces. Whenever m = f —e, the employer inefficiently releases all 
ability types below 9* (e), leading to an output loss of e (6*(e))N+1. Increasing p increases 
the probability that this loss occurs and so damages social welfare. On the other hand, 
one can write equilibrium effort (from Proposition 1.2) as
x ' ( O  =  P E E ! , (1-12)c
meaning that increasing p increases equilibrium effort. The reason is that, conditional on 
m  = 0, the worker’s second period wage is 0 no matter what his employer’s belief about 
his ability, so career concerns do not arise. On the other hand, when m  = f  — e, there 
is a reputational reward for signalling an ability above $*, meaning that career concerns
8When m  — 0, 9* — 0 and W  = 0.
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motivate effort.
A ssum ption  1 .2  W  (9*) < 1.
Assumption 1.2 implies that even when competition is maximal (i.e., p = 1), the worker’s 
effort is less than first-best. So, increasing p unambiguously increases first period social 
surplus.
P ro p o sitio n  1.3 A unique p* G [0,1] exists. Moreover, limc-.oop* =  0, limc_>oT* — 1; 
and ^  < 0 whenever p* G (0,1).
The uniqueness of p* arises from the fact that while the marginal decrease in second 
period output is constant in p , the marginal increase in first period surplus is decreasing 
in p since it is concave in effort. The results on the c parameter arise because the welfare 
gain from moving effort closer to its first-best level is decreasing in the cost of effort. 
The novel aspect of Proposition 1.3 is that it derives optimal competition in terms of 
its impact on the internal and external labor market. The model shows that the effects 
of competition go beyond what regulators usually consider, and that competition can 
endogenously determine firm productivity.
R em ark  1.1 lime_+0 p* =  1
When e —► 0, the employer and the outside firms become identical in the sense that 
the worker is equally productive in the second period no matter where he is employed. 
The only rationale for limiting competition in the model is to reduce the expected loss 
in second period output arising from turnover. So, when all firms are identical, the 
social planner should maximize competition in order to make first period effort as high 
as possible. The fact that maximum turnover results does not affect E  [2/2] • Loosely 
speaking, perfect competition on the intensive margin (eliminating match-specific human 
capital among potential competitors) implies the social desirability of perfect competition 
on the extensive margin (ensuring potential competitors actually compete).
1.4.2 H um an capital investm ents
The chapter now considers how a firm’s human capital investments must take into account 
turnover and incentives. In order to do so, one can model the productivity parameters 
as /  =  g +  h and m  = g, where g is general human capital and h is firm-specific human 
capital. Thus, the worker’s productivity with F  reflects both firm-specific and general 
human capital, while the worker’s productivity in the market depends only on general 
human capital. To isolate the relevant effects of human capital accumulation, this section
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allows F  to choose g and h prior to period 1 but after F  and the worker have agreed any 
period 1 wage payments.9
To simplify the presentation, the section first considers the case in which F  can invest 
in general human capital when firm-specific human capital is fixed at some level h*. 
Without investment, general human capital is g'. However, F  can pay a cost K  in order 
to increase g to some g" > g'. To examine investment incentives, one can write the 
employer’s objective function as
E[Vl + y2 ] - l ( g  = g " )K  
= \  + ( X T 1 ( ^ )  +  [l -  ( * T +1] -  1 (ff =  9") K. (1.13)
Investment in general human capital affects profit through increasing the retention thresh­
old 6 *, which increases effort but also increases turnover. As investment in g is costly, 
the firm will only ever undertake it if the resulting increase in effort is large enough to 
both compensate for the investment outlay and the associated reduction in second period 
profit. Since c measures the sensitivity of effort to changes in 6 *, its value determines 
whether investment takes place.
Proposition 1.4 F  chooses g =  g" if and only i fO < c < c * < o o .
A long-standing argument dating back to Pigou (1912) maintains that firms tend to 
under-invest in general human capital because the resulting productivity gains simply 
increase the wage payments that they must pay to retain workers. Since the rate of 
return on general human capital investment is thus 0 , firms will not be willing undertake 
them. Ignoring effort for a moment, the situation in this model is even worse. F  not 
only fails to increase the rents it earns on retained workers after investing in their general 
productivity, it actually reduces the number of ability-types it can retain. Thus, from 
the perspective of period 2 , the rate of return on investment in g is actually negative.
While much of the human capital literature ignores incentive issues, the model demon­
strates that the effect of general skills on effort is just as important a determinant for 
investment as their direct effect on future productivity. With career concerns, the value 
that the labor market places on workers drives their effort choices. By increasing its 
employee’s general human capital, F  increases the amount that outside firms are willing 
to pay for talent, increasing W  (6 *). Proposition 1.4 suggests that empirical estimates
9When wages and human capital investments are simultaneously chosen in traditional human capital 
theory (e.g. Becker 1993), the worker can finance a firm’s investments by accepting lower up-front wages 
in exchange for higher future earnings. Since the goal here is not to provide a full account of human 
capital accumulation, the chapter assumes wage payments are sunk at the time the firm undertakes 
investments.
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of the returns to general human capital investment may be underestimating their full 
impact if they fail to take into account incentive effects.
Firm-specific human capital investment presents F  with the opposite trade-off. Sup­
pose that g is fixed at g*, and that F  can increase h from h' to h" by incurring a cost K. 
Profit as a function of h is
E[yi + y2 } - t ( h  = h " )K
=  1  +  (x T 1 +  j v T I  [1 "  (0*)W+1] “ 1 {h =  h"] K ■ {L14)
Increasing h increases second period profit but decreases first period effort due to its 
lowering the retention threshold. Thus, the dependence of the optimal h on effort costs 
is the now the opposite of above.
Proposition 1.5 F chooses h =  h" only if c* < c < oo.
Again, the model highlights new margins on which human capital investments should 
theoretically depend. Traditional theory (Becker 1993) maintains that under-investment 
in firm-specific human capital arises when there is non-zero probability of worker turnover. 
However, the chapter shows that the probability of turnover is actually endogenous to the 
choice of firm-specific human capital. In fact, a firm-specific human capital investment 
motivation arises precisely to reduce turnover. Counteracting this force is the negative 
impact of firm-specific human capital on incentives. If effort is highly sensitive to wage 
differentials, investment in firm-specific human capital is not profitable in any circum­
stances. Again, the key message is that a theory of human capital investments that does 
not consider incentives can be seriously misleading.
1.5 D iscussion
This chapter has argued that the presence of asymmetric information induces a trade­
off between worker turnover and effort that should affect competition policy and human 
capital investments. To conclude, it examines the particular modeling assumptions that 
give rise to this result.
First and foremost, asymmetric information plays a critical role in the results. To 
see why, suppose instead that outside firms could observe yi along with F. Now, since 
F  can make a profit on each ability type while paying its expected output in a market 
firm, there is no longer turnover in equilibrium, no matter what are the values of m  
and / . 10 With symmetric information, therefore, there is no longer a rationale for ever
10Strictly speaking, this is only true when the bidding cost 6 is 0, since otherwise F  would release
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limiting competition even in the presence of large effort costs (so long as equilibrium 
effort at p = 1 is less than first-best). Since expected second period output is now 
independent of p, increasing p does not reduce second period welfare, but only boosts 
effort incentives. As for human capital investments, symmetric information makes both 
types less costly. Increasing general human capital no longer increases turnover, and 
increasing firm-specific human capital no longer decreases effort. Now the only margin 
that matters for the former is the creation of incentives and for the latter is the increase 
in expected second period output. In short, asymmetric information is key for creating 
the trade-offs that this chapter identifies.
A key question becomes in what circumstances asymmetric information is likely to 
arise in combination with career concerns. In some cases, there are mechanisms avail­
able that allow employers to commit to disclosing information about employees, such as 
sending consultants to work on-site for clients, allowing industrial scientists to publish 
their research, or posting authored reports on the Internet.11 However, much of the work 
done by professional service firms is not done on-site, involves some element of team 
production, and produces a subjective output. For example, associates in law firms of­
ten have little face time with clients and work with one or more partners in developing 
cases. Such factors make asymmetric information, especially for junior workers, a relevant 
consideration.
The other crucial assumption in the model is that second period output is strictly 
convex in talent. If it were linear in talent, 0* would not affect wage differentials, and if 
it were concave in talent, effort and turnover would be negatively, not positively, related. 
There are multiple plausible grounds for convexity. Suppose firms can assign workers to 
a set of production technologies in which a larger fixed cost implies a higher (constant) 
marginal productivity of talent. Then, the upper envelope of the resulting output func­
tions is convex in talent. A more organizational grounding for convexity can be found 
in Rosen (1981) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). The idea is that an individ­
ual’s output depends on his ability to leverage his knowledge, and that more talented 
people will occupy higher levels within organizations where they can better leverage their 
knowledge.
The order in which the firm and outside market bid for the worker is also important 
for the results. Greenwald (1986) shows that when the order is reversed and the market 
firms bid first, then there is no turnover without exogenous separation, and all workers
\ Nability types for whom m ldF) < 6 . So, turnover approaches 0 as 6  —*■ 0.
11 In the context of the model, disclosing output clearly increases second period profit for F. However, 
it also increases first period profit because one can show that, with symmetric information, equilibrium 
effort satisfies op' (e*) =  m  > — . Examining the general conditions under which reputational
incentives are strengthened from disclosing information is an interesting topic for future research.
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earn the same wage in equilibrium. The reason is that a winner’s curse arises: when 
outside firms bid for a worker, they will only attract him when the employer does not 
match their offers, so that they are left with the low-ability “lemons” for which they will 
have overpaid. However, it is impossible to judge what is the more appropriate model for 
describing labor markets, and in some sense the order of bids is not as important as who 
makes the last offer.12
In conclusion, the chapter identifies a novel trade-off facing organizations. Its strength 
lies in its simplicity: deriving the results using standard models and basic assumptions 
uncovers clear economic intuitions for why turnover and effort should be positively related. 
The message for policy makers and firms is that attempting to create effort incentives and 
make optimal personnel decisions may be a lost cause with asymmetric information, and 
that intelligent human resource management must at times sacrifice one for the other.
12For example, Golan (2005) has shown that turnover collapses to 0 when the employer can make a 
counter-offer after the outside market responds to its initial wage.
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l .A  Proofs
l . A . l  P ro o f o f  Lem m a 1.1
Proof. If wF 7  ^ 0 and E  [m9N | wF, w ] —wF—5 < 0, or if wF = 0 and E [m9N | wF,w] — 
S <  0 , then no outside firm can profitably employ the worker, so none makes a wage offer.
If instead wF ^  0 and E  [m0N \ wF ,w ] —wF—S > 0, or wF =  0 and E  [m9N \ wF,w~\ — 
S > 0 , then it cannot be an equilibrium for no outside firm to make an offer, since one 
firm could deviate and profitably employ the worker. Suppose the highest wage offered 
in equilibrium is wmax < E  [m 6 N | wF — S. If there is one firm not offering wmax, 
then it can offer the worker wmax +  s for small enough e and make a positive profit. If 
all firms offer wmax, then if one offers wmax +  e it increases the probability of employing 
the worker for an arbitrarily small cost, also increasing its payoff. ■
l .A .2 P ro o f o f P rop osition  1.1
Proof. Conjecture an equilibrium pure strategy wF* for F , and let
| (§^)
Now, suppose that in equilibrium 39F, 9% £ 0 F such that 9[ 7= 9% and, without loss of 
generality, wF* < w f * ft must be the case that
N  _  / _ N _  _ ar
and
~ F *
W
fie*) -55F*(F ) -5>O for§y = ^ ',^
(% ) > e \ wBn  |f5F* ( bf \ , w = ™f *1 — <5 for ^  = $[,(%.
The first condition says that the worker yields F  non-negative profits. The second con­
dition says that the worker is paid at least his outside option, since if he were not some 
market firm would bid him away and F  would have expended S for no gain.
So, regardless of whether the worker is paid wF* ^9[^  or wF* ^9F) 5 the outside market 
does not bid for him. But since
/  ( % ) N -  ( s f )  -  & > f  $ ) N -  ™F* (&r) -  s,
F  strictly prefers to offer a worker of type 9F a wage wF* ^ . So in any pure strategy
equilibrium wF* (oF j^ is constant \/9F E ©F. That is, all workers offered a wage contract 
by F  are offered the same wage. Denote this wage by w.
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There are two objects needed to fully define wF*: w and the retention rule. Clearly
w = E m$N I e*1 € e F (1.15)
is the profit maximizing wage. It also must be the case that
/  (0*)N — w — 5 = 0, where 9* = inf ©J (1.16)
since otherwise F  could profitably retain a type 9* — e for small enough e or else not 
make a wage offer to type 9* and save But if F  makes zero profit on 9*, it makes 
strictly positive profit on all types 9F > 9*, meaning the equilibrium retention rule is to 
retain all workers whose expect talent surpasses a threshold. The equilibrium value of 
this threshold can be found be plugging (1.15) into (1.16):
f m N =  e meN \e F > 6'
= m
t  9Nd0 m (19*)N + 1
1 - N  + 1 1 -
(1.17)
It remains to be shown that 6 * exists and is unique. Existence is straightforward. It 
follows from the fact that the left-hand side of (1.17) is less than the right-hind side at 
6 * = 0 and greater than the right-hand side as 9* —> 1 since
lim (9*)n = lim 1 1 -  (9*)
N
=  1
and f  > m.
Uniqueness is more involved. Instead of working with 1.17, it is easier to show that 
the equivalent expression
axN (1 — x) =
1 — x N + l
N  + 1 (1.18)
where a > 1, has a unique solution on £ € (0,1). The LHS of 1.18 is increasing on 
x  G (0, 77^1) and decreasing on x  G (77^ ,  l) , and its first derivative is increasing on 
x  G (0, and decreasing on x G ($ + j,l)-  The first and second derivatives of the 
RHS of 1.18 are decreasing on x G (0,1).
The first derivative of the LHS near x = 1—a—is bigger than the first derivative of 
the RHS near x = 1—1 . Therefore, uniqueness is guaranteed if a is large enough for 
1.18 to have no solution on x G (77^ ,  l)- Therefore, proving uniqueness is equivalent to 
proving that if 1.18 has a solution x* on x G (77^7 , l) , then x * is the unique solution. A 
sufficient condition for this to be the case is for the second derivative of the LHS to be
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less than the second derivative of the RHS on x  E  (77^;, l)- In other words, we need
aN (N -  1) x N ~ 2 -  aN {N +  1) < - N x N~ \
which holds for
a (N  — 1)
x >
a { N +  1) — 1' 
Thus, we have uniqueness if
N  a ( N - l )
N  + l a (N  + l ) - l  
aN 2 +  aN — N  > aN 2 +  aN  — aN — a =>
N  (a — 1) +  a > 0,
which holds by the assumption a > 1 .
Finally, for the equilibrium to exist, the wage specified in (1.15) must be greater than 0
1 1___m * \ J V
for the worker to remain with F. Therefore, it must be the case that 0 < 5 < 1_6)i .
l .A .3 P ro o f o f Lem m a 1.2
Proof. Let f  = f '  and m  — m', and let 9' be the corresponding retention threshold. 
Suppose f  increases to f " . It must then be the case that
„ _  ml 
1  {6) N  +1 1 - 6 ' '•
By continuity, there must then exist some 9" E (0,9') at which
N ml 1 -  (ff')N+1 
1  { J N  + l 1 - 9 "  '
Moreover, by the proof of Proposition 1.1, 9" must be unique. Thus, the retention
threshold is strictly decreasing in / .  A similar argument can be made for m. m
l .A .4 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  1.2
Proof. First, suppose that out-of-equilibrium beliefs are defined in the following way.
0 if y\ — eF < 0  
9F = {  y1 - e F i f y i - e F e  (0 , 1)
1 if yi — eF > 1 .
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The worker’s problem is
m axPr 0^ > 0* W  (0*) — c \  (e)
e L J
= max Pr [0 +  e — eF > 0*1 W  (0*) — ex (e)e
=  max Pr \ 6  > 0* — e +  eF] W  (0*) — c \  (e ).
e
Clearly, the objective function is concave in e. When e =  eF +  0*, Pr [0 > 0* — e +  eF] 
is 1, so the worker will choose some e G [0, eF +  0*]. When W  > c\[' (eF +  0*), then 
ew = eF +  0* and when W  < ex' (eF +  0*), ew satisfies
W  -  ex' (ew) =  0 .
The corner solution can never be an equilibrium since ew  ^  eF. On the other hand, 
when eF satisfies
W  -  ex' (eF) = 0 ,
then
W - c x '  (eF + 0*) < 0 , 
so that the ew = eF G (0, eF +  0*). ■
l .A .5 P ro o f o f Lem m a 1.3
P roof. One needs to show that — is increasing in 9*. The derivative is
- N  (fl* ) " ' 1 (1 -  6>*) +  1 -  {0‘)N
(1 - 0*)2
This expression is positive whenever
1 1 -  m N . 1
N  1 -6 *
which is equivalent to
E [ 0 N~l \ 6 > P ]  > 0 ^ ,  
which holds whenever N  > 1. ■
l .A .6 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  1.3 
Proof.
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Differentiating (1.11) with respect to p gives
(1 -  pW) — -  £ (0*)N+1. (1.19)
Since (1.19) is decreasing on p £ [0,1], (1.11) is concave in p. There are three possible 
cases. If
-  < e (0 - f +1,c
then p* = 0 . As c —> oo this condition clearly holds. Second, if
(1 - W ) — < e ( P ) N + 1c
then p* =  1 . This condition clearly holds as c —> 0. Otherwise, p* satisfies
( l - p ' W )  —  = e ( 8 *)N+1,c
from which one obtains
dp* 1 - p W  
dc cW
l .A .7 P ro o f o f P rop osition  1.4
Proof. Let 6 " and 6 ' be the equilibrium retention thresholds when general human capital 
is g" and g\ respectively. One can write the equilibrium threshold in general as
1 +  * W =  1g )  N  + 1 1  — 6 *
By the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1 .2 , then, 6 " > 6 '. If one denotes W"  and W ' as 
the wage difference between retained and released workers when g" and gr, respectively, 
then by Lemma 1.3, W ” > W '.
F  will therefore invest in general human capital whenever
(en)N+1 -  (0 ,) iV+1
c  /  \  c  /  iV +  1
which holds if and only if c is high enough. ■
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l .A .8 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  1.5
Proof. Let 6 " and O' be the equilibrium retention thresholds when F  chooses h" and 
/i', respectively, and let W"  and W' be the associated wage differentials. From previous 
arguments (Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3), 6 " < 6 ' and W" < W '. F  invests in firm-specific capital 
whenever
h! 1 -  {9")n \ N + 1 - b ! N + l
> K +  (x')o - i  f W ' \N  + l
Clearly, this condition will not hold for small enough c.
- ) - ( x T
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C hapter 2
The B enefits o f Lim ited Feedback in 
Organizations
2.1 Introduction
Most organizations have performance appraisal systems in place that allow managers 
to provide feedback to workers at regular intervals. Such arrangements have existed for 
centuries, and their use has grown to the point that they are now a common feature of the 
modern workplace.1 Not only are they ubiquitous, but performance appraisals consume 
vast amounts of managerial time, both for the human resource professionals that design 
and administer reviews as well as for the front line managers who actually conduct them .2
A typical firm conducts annual or semi-annual performance reviews in which super­
visors give numerical ratings to the workers they oversee. Figure 2.1 displays a rating 
distribution from a medium-sized service firm in the United States.3 In this firm, 1 is the 
rating associated with highest performance, and 5 the worst.
In this firm, almost no workers receive negative feedback: 4 and 5 make up just one 
percent of the sample. Moreover, there is a marked central tendency in the distribution, 
with fully fifty percent of workers receiving the rating 2 . At the very least, one can 
conclude that managers in this firm do not differentiate between levels of performance 
as much as the rating scale allows them to. While this distribution comes from only
1 Performance appraisal systems were in place by 300 AD in the Chinese state bureaucracy. As of the 
early 1980’s, between seventy four and eighty nine per cent of American businesses used them (Murphy 
and Cleveland 1991).
2The Chief Human Resource Counsel for International Paper recently noted that ’’...few tasks occupy 
as much time by human resource professionals as designing, implementing, monitoring, and defending 
performance appraisal systems” (Murphy and Margulies 2004).
3This figure is taken directly from Lazear and Gibbs (2008). The data have previously been analyzed 
in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b), and Gibbs (1995), 
among others.
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T y p ic a l  P e r f o r m a n c e  A p p r a i s a l  D is t r ib u t io n
50%
4 0 %
m
0 %
Source G tb s  (1995)
Figure 2.1: Example of Rating Distribution
one firm, other firms’ rating distributions exhibit similar patterns (Medoff and Abraham 
1980, Murphy 1992).
Knowing the true distribution of performance in the firm is impossible, so figure
2.1 taken by itself does not allow one to reach any definite conclusions about feedback. 
However, there is evidence that it reflects managers’ hiding private information from 
workers. Several studies have shown that the ratings that supervisors report to workers 
are significantly higher and more skewed than the ratings they report to independent 
researchers (see Murphy and Cleveland 1991, p.79, and references therein). Also, the 
same patterns emerge when rating categories have labels such as “average” and “below 
average” (Gibbs 1991).4 Finally, workers and managers themselves report that managers 
do not distinguish among workers.5
The economics and HRM literature has identified several reasons for why there might 
be limited feedback in organizations. First, managers are very often not rewarded for 
providing accurate appraisals, so they might not exert the effort required to assess and 
document the performance of their workers (Baron and Kreps 1999). Second, managers 
may exhibit favoritism and bias ratings (Prendergast and Topel 1996). Third, organiza­
tional politics may constrain truth-telling.6 Finally, worker psychology may discourage
4In one particularly stark example, Milkovich, Newman, and Milkovich (2007) report a ten-year study 
of a thousand-member social service department in which only three of the possible ten thousand ratings 
were “below average”.
5In a case study of Merck, Murphy (1992) reports such sentiments as “Tell me this, how in the world 
can 83 per cent of the people be exceeding job expectations while the company, as a whole, is doing just 
average?” and “How can I rate my people objectively when the other directors are giving all their people 
4s? A 3 isn’t acceptable. I wouldn’t mind if everyone played by the same rules, but they don’t.”
6For example, Longenecker, Sims, and Gioia (1987) write that
...it is likely that political considerations influence executives when they appraise sub­
ordinates. Politics in this sense refers to deliberate attempts by individuals to enhance or 
protect their self-interests when conflicting courses of action are possible. Political action 
therefore represents a source of bias or inaccuracy in employee appraisal.
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honesty.7 In short, many argue that either a prinicpal-agent problem between those want­
ing to use information (an HR office) and those able to gather it (front-line managers), 
or else the fallibility of human psychology and relationships, limits information flow in 
organizations.
These views implicitly assume that limited communication is necessarily the result 
of organizational dysfunction. However, without a proper understanding of the effects 
of information disclosure and their relationship to worker motivation and wages, it is 
impossible to determine what is the “right” level of feedback. The goal of this chapter 
is both to identify the effects of feedback and to derive the optimal feedback policy 
to which the firm would like to commit. It finds that in a wide variety of situations, 
optimal feedback policies never explicitly identify poor performance, but instead pool all 
poorly performing workers together. Moreover, some firms never explicitly identify good 
performance, meaning that all workers infer their performance to be in the middle of the 
distribution. However, the chapter also shows that firms would always like to commit to 
share some of their private information with workers, meaning that providing feedback 
to workers is in fact a source of value for organizations through its effect on motivation.
Performance appraisal is most relevant in situations in which output is subjective. 
Moreover, with subjective output, work incentives arise through implicit incentives since 
output is non-verifiable. The chapter therefore examines information disclosure in a 
principal-agent model in which the agent has career concerns (the chapter will hereafter 
refer to the principal as the firm and the agent as the worker). The worker (he) exerts 
effort for two periods, after which he earns a fixed reputational reward if his expected 
talent surpasses a threshold; however, only the firm (it) observes output. However, before 
the employment relationship begins, the firm can commit to disclosing a set of its posterior 
beliefs on worker talent to the worker between his first and second period effort choices. 
There are two main effects of feedback:
1. Effort risk. Feedback creates uncertainty about future effort levels. Depending on 
the feedback that the worker receives he can either find himself working more or 
less hard in the second period. If he does not receive feedback, then his second 
period effort level is equal to the average of all possible levels under feedback. Since 
the worker’s preferences over effort levels are given by his (convex) cost function, 
he would rather work some given amount for certain than the same amount in
7For example, Jackman and Strober (2003), writing about performance appraisal, state that workers
...hate being criticized, plain and simple. Psychologists have a lot of theories about 
why people are so sensitive to hearing about their own imperfections. One is that they 
associate feedback with the critical comments received in their younger years from parents 
and teachers.
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expectation. So, feedback exposes the worker to effort risk, which increases his 
disutility of effort.
2 . Coasting incentive. As in all career concerns models, signal jamming provides effort 
incentives in the first and second period as the worker seeks to interfere directly 
with the employer’s learning about his ability. Feedback introduces an additional 
motive for first period effort.8 Whenever the worker receives feedback, the firm’s 
belief about the amount of effort he will exert in the second period depends on 
his first period performance since it anticipates he will tailor his effort choice to 
the probability of promotion. But this implies that the worker can use first period 
effort to reduce the amount of effort the firm expects him to exert in the second 
period, which increases the degree to which it attributes second period output to 
his talent. In summary, the worker wants to use first period effort to trick the firm 
into thinking he will not work hard—or coast—in the second.
After identifying these effects of feedback, the chapter solves for the optimal disclosure 
policy. This derives from the firm’s profit maximization problem, and depends crucially 
on the expected future payoff from joining the firm. When it is large, the participation 
constraint never binds for any disclosure policy, and the firm extracts as much effort as 
possible from the worker through choosing a disclosure policy that maximizes coasting 
incentives. It does so by only giving feedback when its posterior on worker talent is 
sufficiently high. When the expected payoff is low, the worker needs to be compensated 
to join the firm and his participation constraint always binds. In this case, increasing 
feedback increases the up-front wage the firm must pay the worker, and the firm only 
reveals an intermediate range of talent beliefs to the worker.
The chapter then endogenizes the wage schedule and the size of the expected future 
payoff from joining the firm using a model of adverse selection labor market competition. 
The main result is that a firm offers a high payoff if the productivity of experienced 
workers in its industry is sufficiently sensitive to talent.
The chapter concludes by identifying the industries in which performance appraisal 
is most widespread using a cross-sectional survey of firms in the United Kingdom, and 
finds that professional service industries occupy the majority of the top places. While this 
evidence is consistent with the model, there are other explanations for why such a pattern 
would arise. The chapter therefore distinguishes its rationale for giving feedback from 
others, and suggests a statistical test that would allow one to identify whether feedback 
affects motivation when workers have career concerns.
8In the model, expected second period effort is independent of the disclosure policy. Hence, an 
important feature of the model is that the anticipation of feedback creates effort incentives.
39
The importance of the chapter is that it studies feedback in organizations in a fully 
micro-founded, rational choice model with standard economic preferences and technology, 
and yet shows that optimal feedback policies have properties that scholars often view as 
dysfunctional. Interestingly, it shows that if anything one should worry about certain 
firms giving too much feedback and failing to account for the social cost of their actions 
in the form of increased effort risk for the worker. In any case, a firm would never want 
to provide fully informative feedback, and one that did would face de-motivated workers 
and difficulty in attracting new talent.
R e la ted  L ite ra tu re  The chapter makes three distinct contributions to the literature. 
First, it analyzes general disclosure policies on a continuous output space and allows for 
endogenous compensation. Second, it shows that rating compression and avoidance of 
negative feedback are compatible with optimal feedback. Third, it examines how the 
worker’s information affects relationships with career concerns.
Several recent papers (Aoyagi 2007, Ederer 2008, Goltsman and Mukherjee 2008) have 
examined effort maximizing disclosure policies in two period tournaments with two com­
petitors. Aoyagi (2007) relates the optimal disclosure policy to the cost of effort function 
and finds that if the marginal cost of effort is convex, no disclosure is optimal; if the 
marginal cost is concave, full disclosure is optimal; and if the marginal cost is linear, all 
disclosure policies yield equivalent expected effort. Ederer (2008) uses a similar frame­
work, but adds ability into the production function. In this environment, information 
disclosure can provide effort incentives because it allows a worker to signal his ability to 
his competitor. When ability and effort are complementary in production and costs are 
quadratic, full information disclosure is optimal under certain distributions. Goltsman 
and Mukherjee (2008) restrict production to only taking two values. They find that the 
optimal disclosure policy reveals no information to the contestants unless both produce 
a low output in the first period, in which case this outcome is told to both of them. A 
limitation of these papers is that they do not endogenize the tournament prize, nor the 
agents’ initial compensation. Both ex ante and ex post compensation play an important 
role in this chapter.
Lizzeri, Meyer, and Persico (2 0 0 2 ) study optimal disclosure in a two period moral 
hazard problem in which the principal can offer output contracts. With full disclosure, 
first period effort is always higher whenever the wage function is non-linear, but expected 
second period effort costs are higher, like in this chapter. When the principal can choose 
optimal compensation, the second effect dominates and it never reveals information to 
the worker. This result stands in contrast to the empirical observation that some, albeit 
limited, feedback appears in most organizations.
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MacLeod (2003) looks at how a principal optimally uses its subjective assessment of 
worker output with static relational contracting. He shows that the provision of incentives 
entails social waste, and that the waste-minimizing contract pays the agent a fixed wage 
for all output signals except the one most informative about low output. Fuchs (2007) 
extends these results to a repeated relationship. He finds that when the principal-agent 
relationship is finite, the principal gives no feedback to the agent until the last period, 
and then only if the agent produces a low output in each period. When he is kept in 
the dark about his performance, the agent attaches a higher weight to being in the bad 
state, so he keeps working hard to avoid money burning .9 The focus in both these papers 
is how to sustain work incentives while keeping social costs low. In this chapter, signal 
jamming incentives induce effort, and do not entail waste. Moreover, the chapter assumes 
the principal commits ex ante to a disclosure policy, so does not impose truth-telling 
constraints.
The chapter also builds on the career concerns literature initiated by Fama (1980) 
and Holmstrom (1999). Several papers have found circumstances under which more 
information about an agent’s behavior harms the principal. For example, in Holmstrom 
(1999), increasing the precision of the principal’s belief on the agent’s talent reduces his 
effort. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) provide conditions under which an agent 
can exert more effort when the prinicpal knows less about his output. In a more recent 
paper, Kovrijnykh (2007) shows that delaying the release of information about worker 
performance to the labor market can reduce oversupply of effort in a dynamic career 
concerns model. When agents care about signalling expertise rather than effort, Prat 
(2005) has demonstrated how an improvement in incentives arises when the principal 
does not observe the action the agent takes. In contrast to all these papers, this chapter 
shows that limiting the amount of information that the agent has about his action can 
help the principal when the agent has career concerns. Another related paper in the 
literature is Martinez (2008), who shows that current effort can effect the firm’s future 
beliefs about worker talent. However, he does not explore the relationship of this effect 
to information disclosure.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents and motivates 
the model. The third section solves for the equilibrium and identifies the effects of infor­
mation disclosure. The fourth section then introduces the profit maximization problem 
for the firm, derives the optimal feedback policy, discusses its properties, and examines 
robustness. The fifth section endogenizes the rewards to talent schedule through labor 
market competition and connects feedback to production technology. The sixth discusses
9The result is related to Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991), who show that delaying the accumulation 
of information about actions can improve outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring.
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the model in light of observed inter-industry variation in performance appraisal use and 
discusses possible extensions. Unless otherwise stated, all unproven results in the text 
are proved in the Appendix.
2.2 M odel
2.2.1 S etup
There are four time periods t = 0,1,2,3. A risk neutral firm F  and a risk neutral, 
liquidity constrained worker meet in period 0 to determine the contract that will define 
their relationship over periods 1 and 2. Their relationship must last two periods, and 
neither party can break from the other after period 1. In periods 1 and 2, the worker 
produces yt = 0 -1- et +  £t, where 0 is talent, et is effort, and et ~  N  (0 , of) is an output 
shock uncorrelated across time periods and with 6 . Neither the worker nor the firm knows 
0 at period 0, but they share a common prior distribution N  (0, oj) on it, where 0 > 0. 
The cost to the worker of exerting effort is g (et) =  j e ^ , 10 and he has an outside option 
of u, which can be thought of as the utility of leisure or the wage he could receive in 
another industry.
As in standard principal-agent models, the worker privately observes et . Unlike in 
the standard model, though, the firm privately observes yt . After observing {yr }J.=1, the 
firm forms belief 0[ on worker talent. After period 2 , F  continues to employ the worker 
if 0 F >  0*. The rewards to talent schedule for the worker is given by
W  it 0n >
W  if OS < 0
where W  is the utility the worker receives from continued employment with the firm, 
and W_ is the utility he receives upon release; so, W  = W  — W  > 0 is the net return 
from continued employment. The results of the chapter depend quite heavily on the 
particular structure of this wage function, so determining its plausibility is important. 
In fact, the previous chapter provided a microfoundation for just such a wage function: 
it is the outcome of adverse selection labor market competition. Moreover, because the 
firm observes output and the worker does not, it is consistent to assume that outside 
firms can also not observe worker outcome, meaning that adverse selection labor market 
competition is a natural to think about the rewards to talent. The chapter later returns 
to discuss this issue in more detail.
10The robustness of the model to this cost structure is discussed in section 2.4.4
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A contract in period 0 consists of two objects. The first is a payment w that F  offers 
the worker to attract him into employment. Because the worker is liquidity constrained, 
this payment must be non-negative.
A ssum ption  2 . 1  w > 0.
The second is a disclosure policy that gives the worker information about before 
his choice of 6 2 - In fact, disclosing 6 [  is equivalent to disclosing yi, but since 6 [  is more 
important for the strategic effects in the model, the chapter chooses to focus on it.
D efinition 2 .1  A disclosure policy is a mapping ip such that
where the firm discloses 6 [  to the worker if  and only if 6 [  G 0 .
The structure of a disclosure policy is that the firm communicates to the worker 
exactly its belief about his talent (in which case ip =  ^T)> or e s^e says nothing at
all (in which case ip =  0) -11 Choosing a disclosure policy is equivalent to choosing 
0 , the set of beliefs revealed to the worker. Since disclosure policies that differ at points 
with measure zero are equivalent, choosing 0  is equivalent to choosing a set of the form 
Uj ( x ^ X i )  such that ( x ^ X i )  C R and Xi < x i+ l. In other words, 0  is a union of non­
overlapping convex subsets of the real number line. While more general specifications of 
ip are possible, this definition does allow for flexibility in the sense that the full disclosure 
policy 0  =  (—0 0 , 0 0 ) and the no disclosure policy 0  =  0  are just two extremes of a 
continuum of admissible forms oi 'ip. 12
An important assumption is that F  commits to a disclosure policy in period 0  that it 
cannot overturn after observing y\. This ensures the most favorable conditions possible 
for communication between the firm and the worker. If performance appraisals were 
limited in their informational content because of difficulties the firm had in credibly 
communicating its private information, then this would constitute a problem for the firm 
and limit its profit. If on the other hand the firm wants to actively commit to limiting 
information flow, then performance appraisals with limited communication are actually 
best for the organization.13
n Of course, the outcome 0 still has informational content, since the worker learns that the firm’s 
beliefs do not he in 0 .
12Section 2.4.4 analyzes more general disclosure policies.
13The chapter later shows that F  would indeed like to he to worker after observing y\. One possible 
avenue for deriving © as the equilibrium of a strategic communication game between the firm and the 
worker would be to introduce more periods into their relationship, so that the firm’s lying could be found 
out by the worker and suitably punished.
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Definition 2.2 The informativeness of a disclosure policy 0  is Pr G 0 J .
Informativeness is a measure of how much feedback a disclosure policy provides. Be­
cause F  discloses Of completely or not at all, a natural measure of the quantity of feedback 
a disclosure policy gives is the probability that Of falls in the set of disclosed beliefs.
The chapter also distinguishes between two kinds of disclosed interim beliefs.
Definition 2.3 Positive feedback is
{ £ f  | 0 f  e e . e f  > 0 *}
and negative feedback is
\ef  & e ,e f  < 0*} .
When the disclosure policy reveals to the worker that Of > $*, the worker finds out 
that earning the reputational reward W  is relatively likely, while if he learns that Of < 0*, 
he learns that it is not.14 Positive feedback thus constitutes good news about the worker’s 
future prospects of working with F , and negative feedback bad news. These two different 
kinds of feedback will have important implications for the optimal disclosure policy.
One important assumption is that only F  and the worker observe ip ^ . This 
essentially rules out a contract that depends explicitly on output, since there is no way 
for a court to enforce such a contract if it cannot observe any information about y\. In 
periods 1 and 2 , therefore, only implicit incentives exist for the worker, and the chapter 
assumes that these come from career concerns.
F  chooses 'ip and w to maximize expected profit, given by E  \y\ + y?\ — w. To sum­
marize, the timing of the game is the following.
1 . F  offers the worker ip and w.
2. The worker chooses e\.
3. The outcome of 'ip is revealed to the worker.
4. The worker chooses e2.
5. If Of >0* the worker continues to work for F  and earns net reward W .
14In equilibrium, knowing Of > 9* leads the worker to estimate that his probability of earning W  is 
greater than one half, while knowing Of < 0* means the estimated probability is less than one half.
44
2.2 .2  M otivation  for setup
The model provides a natural description for a professional service industry such as man­
agement consulting, law, or accounting. Maister (1993) describes the defining character­
istics of these industries in detail, and the chapter uses his analysis as a benchmark with 
which to compare the model. Most professional service firms are partnerships with two 
or three layers. On top, there are the partners themselves, who engage in high-value ac­
tivities, enjoy high earnings, and have relative job security, while the bottom layer(s) are 
composed of less experienced workers engaging in lower value tasks. These firms “make 
few, if any, performance differentials in their compensation of junior staff” (Maister 1993, 
p. 196), and work incentives for juniors derive from the desire for promotion to partner. 
Moreover, most service firms operate an up-or-out system (either implicitly or explicitly), 
in which junior workers leave the firm if they have failed to reach partner within a fixed 
time frame. The assumption that career concerns are the main motivator for workers, 
and that there is a final period in which reputational rewards accrue to the most talented 
workers is thus highly realistic.
The chapter eventually models the period 3 reward for the worker as the outcome of 
labor market competition for talent, yet assumes that a particular firm extracts surplus 
from him in period 0. The motivation for this assumption is that junior staff in service 
industries “do not join professional firms for jobs, but for careers” (Maister 1993, p.6 ). 
Entry level positions in service firms give workers valuable experience and training that 
allow them to move on fairly quickly to prime positions in a wide variety of industries. 
As long as the number of entry level positions in service industries is smaller than the 
number of potential entrants, firms have all the bargaining power with junior workers. 
However, after junior workers serve their apprenticeships, their employers must compete 
with other firms in other industries to retain top talent.15
The fact that outsiders do not observe the outcome of a disclosure policy could arise 
from several circumstances. First, although many firms provide feedback to their em­
ployees, not all firms provide a hard copy of the outcome of performance reviews to their 
employees. Workers thus may not always be able to prove they did or did not get positive
15In a discussion of the scarcity of young, educated workers, Maister (1993) writes:
Most professions provide attractive initial career opportunities relative to other indus­
tries. Law school graduates will probably continue to join law firms, accounting graduates 
to join accounting firms, and business school graduates will continue to fined consulting 
and investment banking attractive first jobs.
The real impact of the people crisis will be felt in absorbing the high costs that will result 
from competition for educated young workers, and continuing to make the professional-firm 
career path attractive in an environment when mid-level employees will receive numerous 
“head-hunting” calls (Maister 1993, p.192-3).
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feedback to potential employers. Second, outside firms may not know whether a worker 
was or was not given feedback in a particular job or company, and so may not even re­
quest information on feedback during interviews. Finally, even if outsiders are informed 
of the outcome of a particular employee’s performance review, they cannot always clearly 
interpret the information. Using performance appraisal information to infer a worker’s 
talent requires information on what job he did, who his supervisor was, and what targets 
were set for him, and these institutional details are often not known by those outside an 
organization.
2.2 .3  D efin ition  o f equilibrium
Let e f be F ’s belief on period t worker effort, and Fff be the worker’s actual period t 
effort. Let 9 f  — E 9 \ {Vt^ t Yt=i be -^ ”s belief on worker talent after observing a
given history of output realizations, and 9 =  E  9 | {V> (yT), e ^ Y  = 1  be the worker’s 
belief on his talent after observing a history of disclosures. Define 9q = 9 for i G {F, W}. 
Using notation for precisions of the normally distributed variables rather than variances 
is more convenient in defining equilibrium effort levels, so let h£ =  (of)-1, he =  (of)-1, 
and At =  hethE+h$
D efinition 2.4 Equilibrium efforts e\ and e\ satisfy the following conditions (for t £
ewe 2
W
e,r
e!
£T > w
ei =
o f  =
arg max — g (e2) +  Pre%
arg max - g  (e1) -  E  [g (e^)] +  Pr
(yt ~  e f ) +  (1 — At) 9f_x
9? >9*
= E At (yt — e{ )^ +  (1 — At) | V>
w= el = e
W
(2 .1)
(2 .2)
(2.3)
(2.4)
(2.5)
These conditions together constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The first two 
require the worker to maximize utility in all periods, the next two require Bayesian 
learning on the parts of the worker and the firm about the worker’s talent, and the final 
requires the firm’s beliefs about worker effort to be consistent with the worker’s effort 
choices. (2.3) also shows why disclosing 9(  is equivalent to disclosing y i: the former is 
simply a linear function of the latter. On the equilibrium path, F  holds the belief about 
worker talent consistent with his actual effort choices, and in this case 9[ = 9 ^  — 9t . The 
distributions of ^  | 9\ and 6*f are important for interpreting equilibrium effort levels, so 
they are given below.
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Lemma 2.1 Let a\ =  and a\ =
| $i ~  iV +  A2 (e.2 — e f ) , a^j
0 f  ~  A (0  +  Ai (e: -  e f ) ,  crj) .
Global concavity of the problems in (2 .1) and (2.2) is necessary for equilibrium ex­
istence. The parametric restriction guaranteeing global concavity for (2.1) is used in a 
later proof, so it is explicitly stated as an assumption.
Assum ption 2.2 ^  < 1 .
With the elements of the model completely described, the chapter turns to solving it.
2.3 Effects o f Feedback
This section solves for the worker’s equilibrium effort levels according to Definition 2.4 
via backward induction, and studies how they depend on feedback. The goal is not to 
study optimal disclosure, but to identify its primary effects. It first considers second 
period effort along with effort risk, then turns to first period effort along with coasting 
incentives.
2.3.1 Second period  effort and effort risk
The second period is the last period of the game in which the worker exerts effort. If the 
game is on the equilibrium path, and the firm holds belief d\ on worker talent (notation 
that was introduced in the previous section for equilibrium beliefs) then, by (2.3), the 
firm’s second period belief as a function of y2 is
& 2  ~  ^ 2  (2 /2  —  e - 2  )  +  (1 —  A 2 )  O i  ( 2 . 6 )
From (2.6) one can see the source of effort incentives in the second period. By in­
creasing e2 the worker can increase 0<f and improve his chance of earning W  in period 3. 
This signal jamming incentive appears in all career concerns models of effort supply. In 
equilibrium, the firm correctly infers that the worker exerts an effort level that equates 
the marginal benefit of increasing 0f  with the marginal cost of effort. The next result 
shows how the strength of signal jamming incentives depends on the information that 
the disclosure policy has revealed to him. Throughout this section and the rest of the 
chapter, </> will denote the standard normal probability density function.
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Proposition  2 .1  Suppose the game is on the equilibrium path in period 2. Given As­
sumption 2.2, e*2 exists and is unique. I f  'if [9 = 9\,
and (? i)
e*2 = E
i -
W \2  
C (72 <*2
(2.7)
0 i £ 0 (2 .8)
The easiest way to understand the proposition is to consider figure 2.2, which plots 
out second period equilibrium effort as a function of 9\ . The top graph gives equilibrium 
effort under the maximally informative disclosure policy © =  (—oo, oo), and the bottom 
graph shows equilibrium effort under some disclosure policy © = (x , x) where x  and x  lie 
equidistant from 9*.
*
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Effort with Full and Partial Disclosure
Under the full disclosure policy, the worker exerts the most effort when 9\ — 0*.16 In 
this situation, whether or not the firm will retain the worker is still highly uncertain, so 
the worker’s future payoff is sensitive to y2. In contrast, if Q\ is either very high or very 
low the worker’s period 3 payoff is practically a foregone conclusion: he is almost certain 
to earn W  or IT so his payoff is not sensitive to y2. In this case, the worker exerts little 
effort. In terms of period 2 effort, positive and negative feedback exhibit symmetry. As
16This is also the reason it is important for the firm to commit to 0 . Without this commitment, it 
would always have an incentive to he to the worker in order to increase his second period effort.
one can see from 2 .2 , a worker who learns that his expected talent is x works just as 
hard as worker who learns his expected talent is x. What matters for effort incentives is 
how far the feedback is from 6*, not on which side of 6* the feedback falls. In this sense, 
negative feedback is no more demotivating than positive feedback.
The bottom graph in figure 2.2 shows another important property of a disclosure 
policy. When the worker does not receive feedback, second period equilibrium effort does 
not depend directly on first period performance. Instead, he takes the expectation over 
all possible undisclosed talent types in selecting effort. Although the firm’s belief about 
the worker’s talent changes when y\ changes within @c , the worker’s belief about his own 
talent does not change, so his effort is independent of yi. This property is important for 
analyzing first period effort.
Depending on the disclosure policy, the worker can exert more or less effort for any 
particular 6\. Under the disclosure policy © =  (£,£)> a worker for whom 6 \ is either 
very high or very low works harder than he would under © =  (—oo, oo) since he does not 
learn that his talent type is far from 0*. Conversely, a worker for whom 6\ = x or 6\ = x 
works less harder under © =  (x,x)  than under © =  (—oo, oo) since he infers his talent 
to be further away from 9* than it actually is. An important question is therefore how a 
disclosure policy affects expected second period effort over all possible realizations of 9\ . 
The next result shows it has no effect at all.
Lemma 2.2 E  [e^ ] is independent o/©.
The result is a straightforward application of the law of total probability. It arises be­
cause with quadratic effort costs the marginal cost of effort is linear, as is the expectation 
operator. The assumption of quadratic costs is crucial here. Using Jensen’s inequality, 
one can show that if the marginal cost function were convex, © =  0  would maximize 
E  [ej], and if it were concave, © =  (—oo, oo) would. The quadratic cost function is thus 
the only reasonable cost specification for which there is no effect of information disclosure 
on E  [e^].17 The reason for making this assumption is to limit the effects of information 
disclosure to two. With non-quadratic costs there would be a third effect of feedback as 
well, but effort risk and coasting incentives would remain.
While information disclosure does not impact the expected value of second period 
effort, it does impact the worker’s second period disutility of effort. This is the first 
major effect of information disclosure.
Lemma 2.3 (Effort Risk). Suppose there exist two disclosure policies © and ©' such 
that 0  C ©'. Then E  [(ej) 2 | 0 ']  > E  [{e l f  \ ©].
17This result echoes those in Aoyagi (2007) and Ederer (2008), who show that with quadratic costs 
and separability of talent and effort in production, all disclosure policies yield equivalent expected effort 
in dynamic tournaments.
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Mathematically speaking, this result is an application of Jensen’s inequality, which in 
standard form states that E  [(e sn> (E [e^])2. The proof applies Jensen’s inequality to 
0 '\ 0 ,  the set of interim beliefs that 0 ' discloses but © does not. Economically speaking, 
the result is simply risk aversion, although over effort rather than wealth levels. The 
worker’s preferences over second period effort are given by — ^  (ejj)2, a concave function. 
Since E  [ej] is the same on any interval regardless of the disclosure policy, the worker 
prefers a fixed effort level rather than the same effort level in expectation. Information 
disclosure thus subjects the worker to effort risk through exposing him to uncertainty 
about how hard he will have to work in the future. Ceteris paribus, the worker strictly 
prefers the uninformative disclosure policy 0  =  0. Moreover, since information disclo­
sure increases the worker’s expected disutility of second period effort without raising his 
expected output, 0  =  0 maximizes second period social surplus.
2.3.2 F irst period  effort and coasting  incentives
To explore the incentives the worker has to provide first period effort, it is again useful 
to examine (2.3), which one can alternatively express as
— A2 (yi — e f ) +  A2 (2/2 — ) + h )  -e. (2.9)
2 h e +  flQ
Just as with second period effort, there are signal jamming incentives in the first 
period since the worker can increase yi through exerting effort. While there is nothing 
that the worker can do to affect 2/2? this section will show that he can affect e f conditional 
on receiving feedback, e f is relevant for the worker because what matters for his period 
3 payoff is not his second period output as such, but the portion of second period output 
that the firm attributes to his talent. The next result makes more precise the relationship 
between the disclosure policy and first period effort.
P ro p o sitio n  2 . 2  For high enough C, first period equilibrium exists and is unique, and 
is given by
e; (0) =  E
where
W  Xo
G <72
+ E
c 2 ~3
w 2 (0  \91 e @ Pr 01 G © (2 .10)
h - 0 '
The two terms in (2.10) reflect the two sources of first period effort incentives. The first 
arises from signal jamming. In fact, this expression is equal to second period equilibrium
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effort with the disclosure policy 0  = 0. The reason is that in the first period, regardless 
of the disclosure policy, the worker does not have any information about his talent, so 
is in exactly the same informational environment as if he were choosing second period 
effort under 0  = 0.
The second term reflects coasting incentives, and does depend on the disclosure policy. 
Regardless of the worker’s actual first period effort level, the firm will expect the game to 
be on the equilibrium path in the second. One can therefore use the results of Proposition
2.1 to derive the expression for e%. As discussed in the previous section, when the worker 
does not receive feedback, e% is independent of first period performance. So, coasting 
incentives arise only when the worker receives feedback from the firm. Conditional on 
receiving feedback, the firm expects the worker to exert effort
(2 .11)
The worker therefore has an incentive to increase 0[ when 6f  > 6* and to decrease 
91 when 6^ < 6*. In other words, the worker always wants to push away from 0*, 
where ef is highest, and into the tails of the distribution.
Corollary 2 .1  (Coasting incentives). Removing negative feedback and adding positive 
feedback to 0  increases e\.
= -77 —</>
Removing Negative Feedback Adding Positive Feedback
Eliminating this feedback increases effort Adding this feedback increases effort
Figure 2.3: The Effects of Feedback on First Period Effort
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Figure 2.3 plots out the relationship between Of and e f  under various disclosure 
policies. The top two graphs are both for the disclosure policy © =  (x, x), where x 
and x are equidistant from 6 *. For the feedback (x, 0) there is a positive relationship 
between Of and e f. So, the worker has an incentive to work less hard in the first period 
in order to reduce e f  and make it easier to signal a hight talent in the second. In this 
case, coasting incentives counteract signal jamming incentives and discourage first period 
effort. Eliminating this negative feedback thus increases e\.
Under the disclosure policy © =  (x,x), e f  is flat for ()f € (T, T +  1). If instead the 
firm offers the disclosure policy © =  (x ,x  + 1 ), there is a negative relationship between 
two in this region. Under this disclosure policy, there are extra work incentives because 
when the worker receives feedback in (x ,x  + 1), increasing e\ decreases e f  since it pushes 
Of into the upper tail of the distribution where the firm believes the worker exerts less 
effort. In this case, coasting incentives complement signal jamming incentives and provide 
an additional motive for exerting effort.
This section has now identified two primary effects of information disclosure. Feedback 
exposes the worker to effort risk and creates coasting incentives. The next section shows 
how these combine in an optimal contract.
2.4 O ptim al D isclosure
The trade-off between effort incentives and risk in contract theory dates back at least to 
Holmstrom (1979). So, in some ways, the present model has analogies with previous work 
in principal-agent theory, although effort and risk obviously arise for different reasons in 
this environment. As this section shows, the way the firm optimally resolves them is also 
quite different. Its problem is to select a contract (w, ©) to maximize
such that
and
w +  Pr 0 2 >On
e-, — w
w > 0
VF +  Pr 92 <9* W - g ( e l ) - E \g ( e % ) \> u .
(2 .12)
(2.13)
(2.14)
(2.12) is the part of firm profit that the disclosure policy affects. It has a relatively 
simple form because the retention rule the firm uses is exogenous, and by Lemma 2.2, © 
does not affect E [ef\. The firm faces two constraints in choosing a contract: (2.13) is the 
worker’s liquidity constraint and (2.14) is his participation constraint. The left hand side 
of (2.14) reflects the two sources of utility that the worker derives from joining the firm.
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The first is the initial compensation w and the second is the expected third period payoff 
net of the first and expected second period effort costs. A useful result is the following.
Lem m a 2.4 Pr 02 > 0' VP + Pr 02 < B' W  — g (ej) — E [g (ej)] is unbounded above.
One way to demonstrate this is to note that as W  becomes large, the expected third 
period wage is unbounded. At the same time, Assumption 2 .2  places a bound on effort 
costs.
When the expected payoff from joining the firm is large, the worker will accept any 
contract terms offered him in period 0. When it is smaller, the firm will have to be 
more disciplined in its choice of contract since the worker will take his outside option if 
he is not offered enough up-front compensation. The chapter thus classifies employment 
relationships into two types: when the participation constraint does not bind for any 
contract, there are high rewards; when the participation constraint binds when w =  0  for 
any disclosure policy there are low rewards. 18 The rest of this section derives the optimal 
contract in both cases.
2.4 .1  O ptim al contract w ith  high rewards
Let denote the optimal contract with high rewards. Its structure is straight­
forward to derive.
P ro p o sitio n  2.3 w*H = 0 and 0*H = (0*,oo).
Proof. With high rewards, the worker will accept employment regardless of the up-front 
wage, so F  optimally chooses the lowest possible compensation and sets w*H = 0. Since 
the wage is fixed, the firm chooses the disclosure policy to maximize coasting incentives, 
so the firm chooses 0 *H = (0 *, oo). ■
With high rewards, the goal of the firm is simply to extract as much effort as possible 
from the worker, and the instrument available to it for doing so is positive feedback. The 
fact that positive feedback exposes the worker to effort risk is not relevant for the firm 
because it does not have to compensate the worker for it since the participation constraint 
does not bind.
One interesting feature of the result is that it gives a potential explanation of why 
an organization would want to create a culture of giving only positive feedback. The 
human resource literature has found that criticism can harm productivity and praise can
18These two cases are not a complete classification of the possible parameter values of the model. 
There are cases in which the participation constraint binds for some but not all disclosure policies when 
w =  0. However, the chapter does not study them since they add little additional insight.
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boost it (Meyer, Kay, and French 1965), but has not pinned down any sharp intuitions 
explaining why. In this model, coasting incentives explain why a firm that only cares 
about maximizing worker motivation should always identify good performance and never 
identify poor performance.
2.4 .2  O ptim al contract w ith  low  rewards
W ith low rewards (2.14) will bind in the optimal contract since the worker must receive 
some compensation for working for F. Denote by (w*L,Q*L) the optimal contract in this 
situation. F  chooses w*L to make the participation constraint bind, and chooses 0£ to 
maximize 19
e \ - g { e \ )  + E [ e l - g { e l ) \ .  (2.15)
Expression (2.15) is simply social surplus. maximizes social surplus rather than 
effort because now F  internalizes the effort risk to which the worker becomes exposed 
when he receives feedback. It does so because it must increase the up-front compensation 
he must provide to attract the worker into employment. Unlike the case of high rewards, 
Q*l  must now trade-off effort incentives and risk. The efficient first period effort level is 
given by C efB = 1 . The incentive of F  to provide feedback depends on ej ( 0 ) ,  the level 
of first period effort with no feedback and just signal jamming incentives. If Ce\ ( 0 )  < 1 , 
then giving positive feedback raises first period effort closer to its first best value, raising 
first period social surplus. However, it also decreases second period social surplus because 
of effort risk. Thus, the trade-off is between increasing first period effort closer to its first 
best level and exposing the worker to excess risk. The same trade-off arises if Ce\ ( 0 )  > 1 , 
but for giving negative feedback. The next result shows how ©£ resolves it.
Proposition 2.4 {w*L,0*L) satisfies
I f  Cel (0) < 1, ©I =  (0', 0"), where 0* < O' < 0" < oo;
I f Cel (0) > 1, ©£ =  (^, O"), where -  oo < 0' < 0" < 6 *;
and if  Cej (0 ) =  1 , =  0 .
and
w*T =  u — Pr 02 > 6>* W - P t h < W  + g{e\ (01)) +  E  [g (el) |0  =  01].
19One obtains this expression through taking (2.14) as an equality, plugging into (2.12), and dropping 
the terms that the disclosure policy does not influence.
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One only needs to consider the case Ce\ ( 0 )  < 1. The argument for Ce\ ( 0 )  >  1 
works in exactly the same fashion, and when Ce\ ( 0 )  =  1 feedback can only harm social 
welfare so 0 £  =  0  is optimal. Clearly, when Ce\ ( 0 )  < 1, including feedback anywhere in 
(—oo,#*) is not optimal. In order to understand the particular form that ©£ takes, it is 
useful to consider figure 2.4, whose origin is set at (9*,0). The dark line traces out the 
marginal cost of disclosing talent beliefs , 9\ +  A^ for an arbitrarily small A given a 
fixed © that does not include (—oo,0*). The lighter line traces out the marginal benefit 
of disclosing ( #i, 9\ +  A ) given the same ©.
Figure 2.4: The Marginal Benefit and Cost of Information Disclosure
The most notable feature of the marginal cost curve is that it is single-troughed. To 
understand why, let e2 be the effort the worker exerts when he receives no feedback. 
Because the disclosure policy does not include (—oo, 0*), £ 2  lies strictly between 0 and 9*. 
The magnitude of the effort risk from disclosing (0i>0i +  A^ is proportional to how far
away is e2 ^9^ from e2. For 9X large and for # 1  close to 0*, effort risk is high since these
are circumstances in which e*2 reaches extreme values. On the other hand, there
exists a unique 6\ at which e2 =  e2. Disclosing beliefs (0\,6\ +  A^ is therefore 
riskless, and does not harm social welfare.
The marginal benefit curve is single-peaked. The marginal benefit of including beliefs 
(Ou Bi +  A^ in © is proportional to the strength of the coasting incentives that this 
feedback creates. There are two clear regions where e2 does not vary much with e\. For 
9[ close to 0*, the firm is convinced that the worker will exert high effort to earn the 
reputational reward W: e2 is flat in 9[ in a neighborhood around 9*. Also, when 9[ is 
very high, the firm believes the worker will hardly exert effort at all since earning W  is
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nearly guaranteed, and so an increase in e\ has little effect on e f  when Of grows large. 
For these reasons, the marginal benefit curve approaches 0 as x —> 6 * and x  —> oo. It is 
instead for intermediate talent beliefs that coasting incentives are strongest.
One can see from figure 2.4 that for any disclosure policy 0  not including (—oo,0*), 
there exists an interval (O' , 0") in which the marginal benefit of disclosing beliefs around 
6 1 6  (O', 0") exceeds the marginal cost. The marginal cost of disclosing beliefs around 
any 0\ that lies outside this interval exceeds the marginal benefit. Therefore it must be 
the case that the optimal disclosure policy reveals a convex set of beliefs that He strictly 
within (0 *, oo).
2 .4 .3  Features o f O ptim al D isclosure P olicies
This section discusses the properties of Q*L and 0*H in light of the features of real-world 
rating distributions featured in figure 2 .1 . Importantly, both feature some information 
disclosure (except when Ce\ (0) =  1 with low rewards). Thus the model provides a 
rationale for why firms invest in performance appraisal systems at all.
Another important feature of both disclosure policies is that neither provides full 
information to workers. Thus, observing that a firm does not have very informative 
rating distributions should in no way lead to the conclusion that its performance appraisal 
system is somehow dysfunctional.
The disclosure policies are uninformative in a particular way. Neither one explicitly 
identifies the worst performers; instead, they are always pooled with other types.20 More­
over, ©^ does not identify top performance. With low rewards, all workers infer their 
talent to be in the middle of performance distribution. In short, the model shows that 
leniency and concentration are compatible with optimal feedback.
Of course, these features arise within a specialized model with numerous simplifying 
assumptions. This section concludes by examining the robustness of the findings to these.
2 .4 .4  R obu stness
One objection one might raise about is that workers at the top and bottom of the 
performance distribution are pooled together, whereas it is perhaps more natural to think 
that workers know in which end of the distribution their performance lies. However, unless 
the firm would like to commit to sharing this information with the worker, there is no 
way for him to know. The next result shows that the firm cannot benefit from disclosing 
this additional information.
20Even when ©£ gives negative feedback, it does not inform the worst performers of their output.
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Proposition 2.5 Let ©i be the set of all beliefs Of and let P  be a partition of ©i. 
The profit maximizing disclosure policy satisfying Definition 2.1 is also profit maximizing 
within the class of disclosure policies with the form ip ( o f )  ► Pi where Of G Pi-
Proof. Suppose ip  is a disclosure policy with the form ip Pi where Of G Pi.
From the arguments used in Proposition 2.2, coasting incentives arise over the set of 
exactly revealed beliefs ©i =  \ip — Of j. Since e f  is flat in Of conditional on 
Of G  Pi C  © i \ © i ,  coasting incentives do not arise over © i \ © i .
Now, suppose 3 0 u , 0 i j  G © i \ © i  such that ip  — P i  a n d  fp =  P j  where
Pi ^  Pj. Modifying ip  so that ip  (Oij = Pi U Pj V 0 i  G Pi U Pj does not alter coasting 
incentives, but (weakly) reduces the effort risk to the worker, so cannot reduce profit. ■ 
Unless information contributes to improving effort incentives, the firm should suppress 
it because of effort risk. Coasting incentives arise whenever first period effort affects the 
amount of effort the firm expects in the second period. Unless the disclosure policy reveals 
Of directly to the worker, e f  does not depend on e\. In order to see this more clearly, 
one can easily adapt Proposition 2.1 to show that e f  satisfies
e f  = E
which does not depend on y\ when Pi contains a positive measure of beliefs. So, coasting 
incentives only arise over the range of exactly revealed beliefs. While breaking the range 
of beliefs that are not exactly revealed to the worker into more than set does not improve 
first period effort, it does expose the worker to more effort risk since it increases the 
variance of second period effort. Hence, pooling all the beliefs that are not exactly 
revealed to the worker into one message cannot make the firm worse off, and the optimal 
disclosure policies derived in this section are optimal within a general class.
While the assumption of quadratic effort costs makes the exposition of the results 
clear, examining how the results depend on it is obviously important. Suppose the worker 
has effort costs given by g (et) =  As discussed in section 2.3.1, whenever (d ^  1
there is a third effect of feedback as well since the disclosure policy affects expected second 
period effort as well as effort risk and coasting incentives.
Proposition 2.6 Let g (et) = ^ j e f +1 and suppose that (3 > 1. Then the effort max­
imizing disclosure policy takes the form  0  =  [Of 0") where 0* < O' < 0" < oo and the 
social surplus maximizing disclosure policy takes the form given in Proposition 2-4-
When P > 1 the disclosure policies with high and low rewards both feature avoidance 
of negative feedback and concentration. Qualitatively, then, the results do not depend on
— — 0
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the assumption of quadratic costs. However, the results do depend on convex marginal 
costs, so are not robust to general cost functions.21 Nevertheless, since the assumption 
of non-negative third derivatives on the effort cost function is common in the mechanism 
design and contract theory literatures, the conditions under which the results arise are 
not unduly restrictive.
The form that 0 #  and Q*L take is also dependent on the shape of the period 3 wage 
profile. While effort risk and coasting incentives are presumably general effects in career 
concerns models, how they combine in an optimal contract is specific to their relative 
magnitudes. They key qualitative features of the disclosure policies derive from the fact 
that equilibrium effort in the second period is single-peaked in expected ability. Any wage 
function that generates this relationship between effort and ability will lead to similar 
results on optimal disclosure; the rewards to talent schedule proposed in this chapter is 
just one such function.
2.5 Feedback, C om petition, and Technology
The goal of this section is twofold. The first is to endogenize the period 3 wage function 
assumed in the basic model. For this, one can simply re-use the results from Chapter 1 . 
The second is to provide a microfoundation for high rewards via a particular third period 
production function.
Suppose the worker’s output in period 3 with F  is = k +  kO +  e3 where k > 1 
and k > 0, and his output with a market firm is 2/3 =  k 6  + e3 . The worker’s output is 
therefore potentially more sensitive to his talent in period 3 than in periods 1 and 2, and 
F  earns a rent on every worker type. The first feature captures the fact that more senior 
workers usually occupy positions of higher responsibility in firms, so that their skill is 
more important in determining the value they create. The second captures firm specific 
human capital accumulation. The fact that y3 does not depend on effort is without loss 
of generality since final period effort is zero in career concerns models.
After observing yi and y2 , F  chooses some w£ G =  M+ U { 0 }  where w£ =  0  
corresponds to not making the worker a wage offer for period 3 and w% ^  0  to offering 
him a wage w \  for period 3. Outside firms observe w£ and each then simultaneously 
chooses w3  G M+ U { 0 } .  The worker joins the firm that offers him the highest wage, but 
takes his outside option if no firm makes him a wage offer that exceeds it. All firms incur 
an arbitrarily small cost 5 from making wage offers, which could for example reflect the 
legal costs of drafting a wage contract.
Denote by ©2 the set of all possible realizations of 9.f , and let w£ : ©2 —> W f  be F ’s
21For example, when 0  < 1 the effort maximizing disclosure policies does identify the worst performers.
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strategy in the bidding game. Let w3 be market firm f  s belief about the strategy that 
F  employs, and let w3  : W 3 —► W 3 be the strategy that each market firm j  employs.
D efinition 2.5 An equilibrium of the labor market competition game is a set of strategies 
w3* U { ^ 3*} ._i and a set of beliefs { ^ 3} ■_! that satisfy the following conditions:
w3  maximizes E  [yj] — wJ3 — 1 (w{ ^  0) 5 \/w3 given w{ and {w 3 } J^ = 1  \w 3 ] (2.16)
w3* maximizes E  [y^] — w3 — 1 (w3 ^  0) 5 given { ^ 3*}^= 1 5 (2-17)
^■j —F *wi — Wo . (2.18)
In addition, one needs outside firms’ beliefs about the worker’s effort choice in period 
t to equal ef, so that they believe that 0f ~  N  (6 , af +  &%). This chapter will not 
discuss the solution of the labor market competition game because the strategic effects 
are identical to those presented in the previous chapter. Instead, it goes directly to the 
result. Readers interested in a discussion of the result are referred to section 1.3.1.
P ro p o sitio n  2.7 The labor market competition game has a unique equilibrium outcome 
in which the rewards to talent schedule takes the following form:
[ E \ k 6  \0 ? > 0 * } if  e l  >0*
w {6 2 ) =  < •- r -L 1 >1 ^
I m a x |u ,£  k 0 \ 0 $ > 0 ' } t / 0? < 0 *,
where 6 * uniquely satisfies
k; +  kd* =  E k 6 § r > (2.19)
One can now turn to providing a microfoundation for high rewards. The following 
(unessential) parametric restriction is particularly useful for providing a clean character­
ization of the expected future rewards the worker enjoys from joining the firm in period 
0 .
A ssum ption  2.3 The parameters of the model are such that E k 6  I < 6>* > u
The main result is the following.
Lem m a 2.5 High rewards arise if k is high enough.
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P roof. Given Assumption 2.3, the expected period 3 payoff for the worker is
Pr * r > E k 0 1 e f  > + Pr * r < E he \ (% < = kE  [0] = k0.
Therefore, as k —> oo, the expected return to employment grows without bound. ■
In period 3, the worker earns his expected output in the market conditional on being 
retained or released by the firm. The worker’s expected period 3 wage is therefore his 
unconditional expected output in a market firm, or k9. The worker’s expected earnings 
are high whenever the productivity of senior workers in market firms is sensitive to talent. 
For example, one might imagine a group of consulting firms that works on highly complex 
and novel problems, and another one that works on more routine ones. If these groups 
compete within themselves for workers of high ability, beginning employment in the 
former group would yield higher future rewards since the output of its senior workers is 
presumably more sensitive to talent.
The previous section showed that in the high reward case, a firm maximizes effort, 
while in the low reward case it maximizes social surplus. Lemma 2.5 leads to the conclu­
sion that firms in industries in which future output is sensitive to talent either provide 
too much positive feedback (if signal jamming incentives alone provide less than first best 
effort incentives) or not enough negative feedback (if they provide greater than first best 
effort incentives).
Since the typical concern with signal jamming is too little rather than too much effort 
provision, it is worth considering this case in more detail. In the model, information 
has a limited social value. When the firm chooses a disclosure policy to maximize effort, 
it creates effort incentives that go beyond what a welfare maximizing contract would 
provide. This is not to say that e\ (0#) > e fB > e\ ( 0 ) ,  although in special situations 
it may be the case that maximizing coasting incentives drives effort above its first best 
level. Even if e\ (©#) < e fs , 0 ^  still motivates the worker too highly. From a social 
standpoint, there always exist intervals of positive feedback for which the social cost of 
effort risk outweighs the social gain from effort incentives. Moreover, when e{ ( 0 )  < e fB, 
the effort maximizing disclosure policy is too informative since it provides feedback in 
situations where the social surplus maximizing policy would not.
Lemma 2.6 As C —► oo and 6* —► —oo; the informativeness of 0 #  approaches 1 , and 
the informativeness of the social welfare maximizing disclosure policy approaches 0 .
This result shows that the difference between the informativeness of 0 #  and the social 
welfare maximizing disclosure policy can be maximal. When C —► oo and 6 * —» — oo, firm 
H  always provides feedback, although a social planner never would. The reason is that
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when C is high, equilibrium effort in the second period is low. This in turn means that 
coasting incentives are weak, and from a social standpoint feedback is never justified. 
However, firm H  always offers positive feedback in spite of the fact that it may only add 
a small amount of extra effort.
Finally, when e\ (0) is greater than e fB, an effort maximizing firm uses feedback to 
generate even higher levels of effort, whereas the social welfare maximizing policy would 
give negative feedback to dampen effort incentives. In this situation, feedback worsens a 
pre-existing rat race.22
2.6 D iscussion
This chapter has argued that professional service firms with up-or-out promotion con­
tracts can benefit from giving feedback because workers respond with higher effort. If the 
model is correct, then firms in which career concerns are important have a motivation 
for investing in performance appraisal systems that other firms do not have. The goal 
of this section is to identify what industries use performance appraisal the most, and 
to assess how closely they correspond to the kind of industry modelled in the chapter. 
The chapter takes data from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) from 
2004, a cross-sectional survey of 2,295 workplaces in the United Kingdom that collects 
information on numerous establishment characteristics.23 The chapter considers the sub­
set of private sector firms, since public organizations are likely to have bureaucratically 
controlled human resource practices. This leaves 1,557 workplaces in the dataset.
The chapter divides firms into two groups: those that formally assess the largest non- 
managerial occupational group and those that do not. It focuses on appraisals for this set 
of workers since it is the group for which career concerns are probably most important. 
For each five digit industry, it computes the percentage of firms that formally assess the 
performance of their core non-managerial employees. In order to generate sufficient inter­
industry variation, it drops those industries that have fewer than five firms in the dataset. 
This leaves ninety five industries, twelve of which have one hundred percent performance 
appraisal use. These are listed in the table 2.1, along with the twelve industries with the 
lowest use of performance appraisal.
The majority of industries with universal use of performance appraisal provide pro­
fessional services, while at the same time, professional services do not appear at all
22Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996) have found that junior workers in law firms exert inefficiently 
high levels of effort. This chapter shows that human resource practices as well as reputational rewards 
can contribute to the over-provision of effort.
23Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix, and Oxenbridge (2006) gives a detailed description of 
the dataset.
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H IG H E S T  PA  U SE LO W EST PA  U SE
Publishing of journals and periodicals Other meat and poultry processing
Collection, purification and distribution of 
water
Manufacture of bread
Retail sale via mail order house Freight transport by road not elsewhere 
classified
Non-life insurance Other transport via railways
Activities auxiliary to insurance and pen­
sion funding
Other construction work involving special 
trades
Other letting of own property Dispensing chemists
Software consultancy and supply Independent public houses and bars
Legal activities Printing not elsewhere classified
Accounting and auditing activities Forging, pressing, stamping and roll form­
ing of metal
Business and management consultancy 
activities
Storage and warehousing
Private sector hospital activities Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Non-charitable social work activities Manufacture of other builders’ ware of 
plastic
Table 2 .1 : Performance Appraisal Use by Industry
among those industries in which which performance appraisal use is low. Of course, there 
are many reasons why professional service firms might provide feedback. Performance 
appraisal might allow a central HR office to more readily identify the most talented indi­
viduals and to appropriately reward them. It might also allow workers to identify training 
needs.24 A more direct test of the model would be to examine data from a professional 
service firm that began to provide more feedback to workers, and to examine whether 
workers began exerting more effort at the same time. Whether such data are currently 
available is unclear, but the point is that the chapter presents a perspective on feedback 
in organizations that is empirically distinguishable from other stories.
C oncluding rem arks. This chapter began with the basic question: is more feedback 
always better? The answer is “no” for two different reasons. First, in many situations 
a firm would like to commit to limiting the amount of information that workers receive 
about their output. Full information disclosure would strictly reduce firm profits be­
cause negative feedback reduces effort and effort risk causes wages to rise. Second, firms
24However, in the absence of legal restrictions, it is unclear why supervisors could not give feedback 
on worker performance to an HR office and not the worker. Moreover, firms can provide information to 
workers about training needs without giving them information about the probability of future promotion 
(Beer 1987).
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that offer more feedback than others could very well be providing too much information 
from a social standpoint and lowering surplus. The fact that such firms might be more 
productive cannot be taken as evidence of their adopting better management practices.
While the chapter has shown how one can capture characteristics of real world feed­
back systems in a model with standard preferences and technology, there is still much 
to understand. One area for future research would be how to implement the optimal 
disclosure policy in an organization that could not commit ex ante to disclosing certain 
beliefs. One avenue to explore would be having the firm share information with a con­
tinuum of workers, because through communicating with each other, the workers could 
detect deviations from the firm’s announced disclosure policy. Even if no informative 
communication could ever arise in equilibrium, the results of the chapter imply that this 
may actually be better for the firm than forcing managers to disclose all information to 
workers.
A second pertinent extension would be to combine career concerns with other forms 
of contracting. As the literature review discussed, information disclosure in other con­
tracting environments has quite different effects than in the case of career concerns. One 
issue likely to arise with multiple periods is that the contracting instrument chosen by 
the firm would reveal information to the worker in addition to the disclosure policy. For 
example, the wage paid to the worker under a piece rate contract would indirectly reveal 
output to the worker.
Finally, information in firms has uses beyond incentive provision. For example, in­
formation disclosure potentially allows the worker to learn how to do his job better. 
Exploring the trade-off between withholding information because of effort risk and dis­
closing it to build human capital would be another natural extension.
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2.A  Proofs
2 .A .1  P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.1 
P roof. By Bayes’ Rule
02 —  ^ 2  {0 +  2^ + £2  —  e f) d~ — ^2) 0\
and
0 i — Ai ( 0  +  t\  +  E\ — ef) +  (1  -  Ai) 0  
Since Of is a linear combination of normal random variables, it is itself normal with
mean E = 0  +  Ai (ei — e f ) and variance
V = K
2 / h o  +  h £
h dh £
Ai
ho
A standard result in Bayesian statistics (DeGroot 1970) is that 0\0i ~  N  ^ 1, ,
so 0 %\0 i is normal with mean 6 \ +  A2 (e2 — ef) and variance
V  [A2 (0 +  e2)] — A2
1 1
h e  +  h o  h €
As
h e  +  ho
2 .A .2 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  2.1
The following result is used in the proof and is stated separately.
Lem m a 2.7 Suppose there exists a random variable X  ~  N  (p>(y), g 2 )  where /i (y ) is 
continuously differentiable and let <f> be the standard normal density. Then
d f°°
d i L } { x )
dx = h '( y ) , (  a ~  v  (y )
a ■4> G
P roof. Using the transformation v = x ^  one can write
d r°° „ , v . d f°°
dy
r oo
/  f ( x )
J  a
dx = I 6 (v) dv.Oy / q-M(y)
Applying the Leibnitz Rule for differentiating integrals gives
h' (y) , (  a -  ix (y) -0
G G
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Proposition 2.1 can now be proved.
P roof. First, suppose that 0\ £ ©. The worker’s problem can be written as
arg max — g (e2) +  W  Pre2 0?  > 0 *
c= arg max —— +  W  
62 2
dfi%.
1  > ( % * ' )
Applying Lemma 2.7, the first order condition for the maximization problem is
A, / V - ^ - A j f e f - e r i A- C e f  +  W — <t> --------  ^ ------ 2J- I =  0 .
0 2
For global concavity of the objective function, it must be the case that
_c+„,g)V(?
holds for all e f  and e f . Since </>' < 1 this condition is satisfied as long as
As' 2
- C  + W ^ y J  < 0 ,
which holds by Assumption 2.2. Plugging in the equilibrium condition e f  =  e f  gives the 
result.
Now, suppose 6 i ^ 0 . The worker’s maximization problem is
C1 r i
arg max ——e\ +  W  Pr $f > 6 * e2 2 L
=  arg m ax—^ -e^ +  jP r  j^ §f > 6 *\&i \9\ ^ 0  j .
Applying the previous steps to the Pr 0 f  > 0*|0 i term completes the proof.
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2 .A .3 P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.2  
P roof. Expected second period effort is
i0ig© C a2 \  02
+E
01 dd 1
w \ 2 . ( o z - o 1
— — $ 1 z
- 1
C a2 \ o"2
00 w  a 2 , ( e i - e 1
-00  C a2 y 02
which is independent of ©1. ■
2 .A .4 P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.3  
Proof.
|0 i ^ ©i
9i) dOi)
Pr 0 i £ 0 ]
^  [(e^)2 1©'] =  P r ^ e ' "
+  Pr
E
+ Pr
X g e'\el e
X e e
\ 0^ 2
|0 i g e '\©
E ?  [ t d h ,  
\  02
Pr ft t  & E ^ f — ) \ X i &L J . V /
+ Pr 
+  Pr
e1 g © ' \ 0
G ©
E <t>1 f t  e  e'\e
02
E
02
\9i G ©
> Pr X E <t>
02
\0 i t e
+ Pr 0i G 0 E < p ( - X  e e
. V a2 J
= E [{el)2 \ 0 ] ,
where the first inequality comes from probability version of Jensen’s inequality, and the 
second from the discrete version. ■
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2 .A .5 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  2.2
In order to solve for e\ it is necessary to  draw on the following claim, which is presented 
without proof.
C la im  2.1 Suppose a uniformly bounded function h ( x , y )  has a countable number of 
discontinuity points { (^ i,2/i)} that satisfy Xi = f  (yf) where f  is continuous. Then
^  J  h (x, y )dx  = J  d k ^  V^dx +  ^  f '  fa )  (  lim + h (x, y) -  lim _ h (x, y)^j .
Below is the proof of the proposition.
P ro o f. If eff  7  ^ e f  then one can apply Lemma 2.7 along with equations 2.3 and 2.4 to 
derive
e 2 =
W \ 2J e * - e ? - \ 2 ( ( e r  -  e f)  +  ( e f  -  e f ) )  
'2 C u2 <?2
if Of  =  +  Ai (e f ' — e f  ) € © and
W X t J r - i * - ) *  ( (e?  -  ef) +  ( e f  -  e f))  \  |Sw
e™ = E
C o f <?2 K  +  Ai (eT -  «f) t  ©
if 0f  i  ©.
Moreover, from Proposition 2 .1,
F w
e 2 =  ——-G 02 V CT2
if Of G O  and
e f  = E 7 7 — ^ G 0 2 |0i G ©
if o f  i  0 .
and eY  ^0]*^ are discontinuous in but continuous within the regions 0 ^  +  
Ai ( e f  — e f ) G 0  and 6 ^  +  Ai (eY  — e f ) ^  0 . One can separate the objective function
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into two regions along the following lines
+ J -  \ [ f  ( * )  d d ! ~ ^  (er (^))1; ^
C 2 
^  ~ 2 *  + QW+A1(ejv - c f ) e © X”/ ( « )  - 1K  (O)2] / («r)
‘ L , , , ,  L f '  ( « )  -  ?  ( • • « ) ’] '  w  < ■L(er-ef)^©
One issue that arises when differentiating the above expression with respect to e\ is 
that the boundary points separating the sets © and R\@ depend on ei, and these bound-
is discontinuous.ary points are precisely where 
Claim 2 resolves this difficulty.
Using Lemma 2.7, one finds that the first order condition for ej^ is
CeY =
I ,tjy+Xl (ejv-ef)ee
w h l  ( r - s r - ^ ( ( e r - e f ) +(ey-ef))
/To l 0 2
\
+ /
J e ™ + A i ( e ^ - e f )£©
-<*4T (*T)
0-2^ \ y
\ de' J w/  e i = e p
IVe i= e p
/ (sr) ^
i + 3ei
e i = e f
' a e f(^ )
9ei
_ Ce5r (g v )
we i = e f
we i = e f
V ^ h -A i(e r-e f)]
Pr > e -\ei =  e™
' (oZ\e?) > 9 ^  = el
where {a*} is the set of all finite points q  and Xi. One can verify that for high enough C 
the problem is globally concave, but the details are omitted for the sake of space. The
above expression simplifies to
C e f  =
cw+A,(eJl' - ef)ee
<72 \ '-r°0-2 X
1 /  9ef (» n
9ei
e i = e l
/ (*r)
+  I  W — 4>
Jd™+Ai(e^-ef)^© ^2
A. / >  -  g f  -  A, ( ( e f  -  e f ) +  ( e f  -  e f  )) \  ,  /Sha  j 2w
02
j  /  (g f )  ^
-A.E
llmer'^[a(-AI(elv-ef)]+ P l gf |g f  )  > 0 *|ei =  ef '
- UmeT -h -A ,(e r-= r)]"Pr > 0 *lei = e
Conditional on 6 ^  +  Ai (ef" — e f ) G 0 ,
3ef ( g f )
de\
e i - e :
d C <T2 \ <72
<9ei
V /  e 1=e}''
W AiA2 / >  -  g f  -  Ai ( e f  -  e f)
C cr? ^
Plugging in the equilibrium condition ef" =  e f  into the first order condition yields
02
C e f = /•Me©
WA2jl 
C  02
+ /Jdite
VPAo 
G cr2
02
0 * -  0 i 
02
x ^  AlA2 ^, ( 0 * ~ 0 1
C a 2
/  01 d0L
02
01)d0]
The result follows from the fact that </> satisfies 4>' (x) = —x(f) (x). ■
2 .A .6 P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.4 
P roof. One can write
Pr
> min jP r
02 > 6*
02 > 6*
W  +  Y>Ae2 < e * \ W - 9 ( e X ) - E [ g  (e*)]
,P r >2 < 0*] } W -  (0) -  (G) (2.20)
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where k\ (0) and fc2 (0) are bounded above for all 0 . Moreover, by Assumption 2.2, 
is bounded above by Therefore, as W  —> oo (2.20) grows arbitrarily large. ■
2 .A .7 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  2.4
Proof. Expected second period effort costs under an arbitrary 0  are
2
W 2 / % \ 2 I Pr
2 C \ a 2j  | + p r
0 ! i  e] ( e  [4 > (^r) |3i i  e]) 
y  ( ^ )  i»i e  ©0 i G 0
The derivative with respect to of the expression is equal to
W 2 f \ 2\ 2 £
2c |  0 ( ^ )  |«i i  e ) /  fe )  -  <j>2  (9- ^ )  f  fe )
4  ( ^ )  & i  ©] <> i ^ f )  /  (s)
W 2 ( \ 2 ' 2
=  “ / f e ) 2 c U £  I 1 — — i  I &  £ © | -  <A0 2 0 2
with a corresponding expression for the derivative with respect to re*.
c 
2The derivative of first period social surplus e\ — j  (e^ )2 with respect to xi is
f T V A i ( A 2) 2 ( x t -
C )  (0 2 )' o 2
<t>2
0 * - X j
0 2
f  f e )  (
where
e =  [1 -  Ce\  (0)]
with a similar expression for the derivative with respect to T*.
A necessary condition for 0 J  to maximize social surplus is that it satisfy the following 
three sets of conditions:
v x i e i .
Conditions (2.21) say that the marginal gain (loss) in second period welfare equals 
the marginal loss (gain) in first period welfare at all points x t (xi). Next, conditions
(2.22) say that for all disclosed beliefs, the marginal gain from disclosing information 
must exceed the marginal cost. If there were some x' that did not satisfy this condition, 
then the disclosure policy 0 # \  (x‘, x ' + A) would strictly dominate @£ for small enough 
A. Finally, conditions (2.23) say that for all undisclosed beliefs, the marginal cost of 
disclosure must exceed the marginal gain.
Suppose that
1 > W
so that Cei (0) < 1 (the proof works identically if the opposite is true). Clearly (—oo, 0*)n 
0* — 0. Now, for an arbitrary 0  not containing (—oo, 6 *) there exists a unique point x' 
such that
since
and
l i m  4 , ( A - J :  ] =  0 .
Clearly
is decreasing in x  for x G (9*, x') and increasing in x for (xf, oo). 
Now, for an arbitrary ©
equals 0  when x = 9*, is strictly increasing in x for x G (9*,x")J strictly decreasing in x 
for x G (x'\ oo), and tends to 0  as x —*■ oo. From these observations one can conclude 
that for any 0  not containing (—oo, 9*), the points x that satisfy
form the set (xi ,X2 ) C  (9*, oo). For this reason, any 0  that satisfies (2.21), (2.22), and
(2.23) must be convex and he strictly in (9*, oo). To prove that one can always find a 
0  that satisfies (2.21), (2.22), and (2.23), consider some © =  (2/1, 2/2) and let X2 be the 
highest X2 at which (2.24) holds with equality for all such 0 . Define
Consider the mapping h : A  —► A  that gives the points x\ and X2 at which (2.24) holds 
with equality as a function of the points yi and 7/2 - Because h is continuous and A  is a 
convex, compact subset of R2, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem there is some point 
(y'i^y'2) ^ A  such that h (y fi , y r2) = (y[,  2/2)- Hence there exists some © =  (yi, y2) C (#*, 0 0 ) 
that satisfies (2.21), (2.22), and (2.23). ■
Proof. Second period equilibrium effort conditional on receiving feedback 92 is
2
(2.24)
A = {(&!, 0>2 ) 19* < a,\ < 0, 2 ^  3?2 , (fli, OL2 ) G R2} .
2 .A .8 P ro o f o f P rop osition  2.6
and conditional on not receiving feedback is
First period equilibrium effort is
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Including an interval of disclosed beliefs ^ , 9\ +  A^ for small A in a disclosure policy 
0  decreases second period effort by an amount approximately proportional to
- U 6 * - 0 X
° 2 V  —  ) E
W e
0 * - 0 x
° 2
I M ©
1 - 0
(2.25)
Whenever (3 > 1 this expression is positive. Since giving negative feedback reduces 
first period effort and expected second period effort, the effort maximizing disclosure 
policy will not contain any negative feedback. In the range 9i G (0*, oo), one can verify 
that 2.25 is single troughed and achieves a minimum value of 0 at point 6 i satisfying
° 2
I M ©
Including an interval of disclosed beliefs , B\ +  A j  for small A in a disclosure policy 
0  increases first period effort by an amount approximately proportional to
One can easily show that this expression is single peaked in 6 \ and that it approaches 
0 for Oi —> 6 * and 9i —> oo. Thus one can apply exactly the same argument as in the 
proof of Proposition 2.4 to show that the effort maximizing disclosure policy when (3 > 1 
will take the form 0  =  {6 r, 9") where 9* < 9' < 9" < oo.
Similar arguments show why the form of the social welfare maximizing disclosure 
policy again takes the form of Proposition 2.4. ■
2. A .9 P ro o f o f  P roposition  2.7
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 1.1. One need only show that 6 * exists and is unique. 
Two helpful results are that (1) if X  ~  N  (fi, a2) then E [ X  \ X  > a] = fi +  <77 (s^ £) 
where 7  is the normal hazard rate, and (2) 7 ' G (0,1) over the entire domain of 7  
(Greene 2003, p.759). Therefore, the derivative of the left hand side of (2.19) is bigger 
than the derivative of the right hand side. So, if a solution to (2.19) exists, it is unique.
Now, as 9* —» —0 0  the left hand side of (2.19) is clearly less than the right hand side. 
One can also show that
' 1 = 0lim 0* -  E
?*—»oo
9 1 > r
so that
lim ac +  k6 * — E e\  e% > 9 ’
Therefore there is a 6 * that solves (2.19).
2 .A .10 P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.6
P roof. By definition, ©£ is the social surplus maximizing disclosure policy. The equa­
tions that defines x  and x under 0 J  are 2 .2 1  evaluated at x =  x  and x = x. The cost of 
effort parameter C does not play a role in defining 6 *, so one can vary it without changing 
the right hand side of 2 .2 1 . As C —» 00  the left hand side of 2 .2 1  approaches 0 for any © 
and x since becomes arbitrarily small and CeJ (©£) is bounded above for all C.  This 
implies that x — x  —► 0  since 2 .2 1  has a unique solution for x  is the left hand side is 0 . ■
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C hapter 3
A ssessing th e Effectiveness o f M ixed  
C om m ittees: Evidence from the  
Bank o f England M PC
3.1 Introduction
A dramatic change has occurred in how central banks around the globe determine mon­
etary policy: responsibility for setting interest rates has shifted from individuals to com­
mittees. In fact, Pollard (2004) reports that ninety percent of eighty-eight surveyed 
central banks use committees to decide interest rates, underscoring their growing ubiq­
uity. Although the trend is heavily in favor of collective decision making, some fun­
damental issues regarding the optimal structure of committees remain unclear. One of 
these is whether committee members should come from heterogeneous or homogeneous 
backgrounds. Some central banks, like the European Central Bank and US Federal Re­
serve, have committees composed solely of internal members (experts employed within 
the bank). Others, like the Bank of England and Reserve Bank of Australia, have com­
mittees that consist of internal as well as external members (experts who are not part of 
central bank staff).
The goal of this chapter is two-fold. The first is to provide theoretical arguments 
in favor of mixed committees and the second is to examine whether the voting record 
of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is consistent with these 
arguments. We build a model that allows a committee designer to select different kinds 
of experts to decide monetary policy. The model identifies two primary tasks for com­
mittee members. First, they communicate private information about economic shocks to 
each other prior to voting. We assume that members’ private information is verifiable, 
which allows us to apply an unraveling argument to show that communication fully ag­
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gregates information. If different members have different dimensions of expertise, then 
mixing them together can lead to higher utility for the designer if members are sufficiently 
specialized.
The second task for members is to use the collective information set to select an appro­
priate interest rate. We allow members to differ in their beliefs about the correct interest 
rate given a history of economic shocks, and for the committee designer to consider all 
beliefs equally likely to be correct. Thus, when two experts disagree, the designer assigns 
the probability one-half that each member is correct. Nevertheless, if members’ beliefs 
are public information, then the designer’s preferred committee structure takes the form 
of an advisory board: all members provide information to the member with the most 
moderate belief. Hence, with publicly observed beliefs, there is no justification for giving 
members with different beliefs a vote on the committee.
If the designer cannot observe beliefs, then drawing members from two different distri­
butions can improve the designer’s utility if the means of each distribution lie at opposite 
extremes. In this case, mixing types from the two distributions can lead to a more mod­
erate median voter than if the designer drew from just one distribution. Therefore, the 
justification for giving external members a voting role in addition to an advisory role 
must arise through their moderating influence on internal members.
We next turn to examining the voting record of the MPC. We begin by establishing 
cross-sectional differences between external and internal members, namely, that externals 
are: (1 ) more likely to deviate from the committee decision and from internal members; 
(2) vote for, on average, lower interest rates; and (3) have higher within-group voting dis­
persion. In themselves, these results are not surprising, and in fact have been documented 
by other authors as we discuss below.
The clearest prediction of our model concerns how voting behavior changes over time. 
We obtain more original and interesting results when we examine voting dynamics. We 
find that the probability that external and internal members vote for different rates 
increases with time, and that the entire difference in voting behavior between external 
and internal members arises from members who have been on the committee longer 
than twelve months. It is only at this point that external members begin voting for 
systematically lower rates. These results are important because they are inconsistent 
with the rationale for giving both externals and internals voting rights since they fail to 
moderate each other’s views initially.
We then delve deeper into the sources of external behavior and find an intriguing 
result: the entire drop in externals’ voting levels arises from academics. We argue that this 
provides evidence of career concerns which influence the voting behavior of non-academics 
as they face more future career uncertainty than academics, all of whom joined the MPC
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from tenured positions. To push the results further, we examine how externals’ voting 
behavior changed in response to an exogenous change in the probability of reappointment. 
External members who served during periods in which reappointment was unlikely all 
began voting for lower rates after twelve months. This evidence is consistent with a story 
in which external members with career concerns mimic internal members through their 
tenure on the committee in order to increase their chances of reappointment.
Another possible cause of the voting differences, and one that is often discussed in 
the monetary literature, is that external members may have asymmetric preferences over 
inflation and output. In particular, external members may be more recession-averse 
meaning that they cut rates by more than internal members during downturns. We 
examine the evidence for this and find that although tests in isolation appear to provide 
evidence in favor of such preferences, we conclude that it is more likely that career 
concerns are the driving force.
We next set out a brief description of previous research on MPC voting behavior 
before we explore our model more fully in Section 3.4. We then turn our attention to the 
data and the empirical analysis in the remaining sections. We conclude that the inclusion 
of external, together with internal, members on the MPC would create an unambiguous 
welfare gain if each group has specialized knowledge that it shares with the other, and 
that allowing external members to vote can also improve welfare under certain conditions. 
However, the evidence suggests that career concerns and the resulting failure of external 
members to moderate opinion, mean that these gains may be limited, or even negative. 
Our chapter, therefore, highlights the need for a more complete model of reputation, 
taking account of its effect on the optimal design of mixed committees.
3.2 Previous Research on M PC  Voting
There has been a great deal of research interest in committee behavior. Blinder (2007) 
provides an excellent coverage of the issues relating to monetary policy committees. In the 
analysis below, we take for granted that there is transparency of voting behavior of MPC 
members and that MPC meeting minutes are published; without such a design structure, 
the nature of our empirical work would be impossible. As a result our chapter is not 
contributing to general discussion of whether having a committee influences monetary 
policy outcomes (interested readers are pointed toward Sibert (2006), Sibert (2003) and 
the references therein), or on the debate about optimal degree of transparency (see, for 
example, Geraats (2006) and Sibert (2 0 0 2 )).
Using an experimental set-up, Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli, Proud- 
man, and Talbot (2005) both conclude that committee decision making improves on the
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behavior of individuals; although neither paper explicitly examines the behavior of exter­
nal members. Gerlach-Kristen (2006) constructs a model of monetary policy committee 
voting to formalize the idea that groups can outperform individuals, but does not ex­
plore strategic voting or communication. Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) have studied the 
two-person committee voting problem in which members can report their non-verifiable 
private information strategically. They show that when members disagree about the cor­
rect decision, there is less than full reporting of private information. In this chapter, 
committees fully aggregate information due to the verifiability of private information, 
which allows us to apply unraveling results (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981).
Numerous recent papers examine empirical differences in voting behavior among 
MPC members. Gerlach-Kristen (2003), Spencer (2006), Harris and Spencer (2008), 
and Gerlach-Kristen (2009) all document the tendency of external members to dissent 
more often and to favor lower interest rates than internal members. Bhattacharjee and 
Holly (2005) and Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) consider member heterogeneity more 
broadly, and find that there are systematic voting differences across members. None of 
these papers uncovers the growth of conflict on the MPC ,1 nor do they explore the nor­
mative implications of including internal and external members on the same committee. 
By and large, these papers assume member preferences derive from a weighted sum of 
inflation and output, with different members having different weights. However, such 
preferences alone are unable to explain our empirical results.
Unlike Spencer (2006) and Harris and Spencer (2008), we do find evidence of career 
concerns on the MPC. Our chapter is also complementary to Meade and Stasavage (2008), 
who have found evidence of career concerns on the Federal Open Market Committee in 
the US.
3.3 M PC  Background
Until 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the government official in charge of the Trea­
sury) had sole responsibility for setting interest rates in the UK. One of Gordon Brown’s 
first actions on becoming Chancellor in the government of Tony Blair was to set up an 
independent committee for setting interest rates in order to make monetary policy less 
arbitrary and susceptible to election cycles. The MPC first convened on 6  June 1997, and 
has met every month since. Majority vote determines the rate of interest. Its remit, as 
defined in the Bank of England Act (1998) (h ttp : / / www.bankofengland. co .uk /abou t/ 
leg is la tio n /1 9 9 8 a c t .pdf) is to “maintain price stability, and subject to that, to sup­
1However, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) does mention a delay in a member’s first dissent: on average, it 
occurs after nine months.
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port the economic policy of Her Majesty’s government, including its objectives for growth 
and employment.” In practice, the committee seeks to achieve a target inflation rate of 
2 %2, based on the Consumer Price Index. If inflation is greater than 3% or less than 
1%, the Governor of the Bank of England must write an open letter to the Chancellor 
explaining why. The inflation target is symmetric; missing the target in either direction 
is treated with equal concern.
The MPC has nine members; five of these come from within the Bank of England: 
the Governor, two Deputy Governors, the Chief Economist, and the Executive Direc­
tor for Market Operations. The Chancellor also appoints four members (subject to 
approval from the Treasury Select Committee) from outside the Bank. There are no 
restrictions on who can serve as an external member. According to the Bank of England 
(http://w w w .bankofengland.co.uk/m onetarypolicy/overview .htm ), the purpose of 
external appointments is to “ensure that the MPC benefits from thinking and expertise 
in addition to that gained inside the Bank of England.” Bar the governors, all members 
serve three year terms; the governors serve five year terms. When members’ terms end, 
they can either be replaced or re-appointed. Through June 2008, 25 different members 
have served on the MPC -  11 internal members and 14 external members. Each member 
is independent in the sense that they do not represent any interest group or faction. The 
Bank encourages members to simply determine the rate of interest that they feel is most 
likely to achieve the inflation target.3
The MPC meets on the first Wednesday and Thursday of each month. In the month 
between meetings, members receive numerous briefings from Bank staff and regular up­
dates of economic indicators. On the Friday before MPC meetings, members gather for 
a half-day meeting in which they are given the latest analysis of economic and business 
trends. On the Wednesday of the meeting, members discuss their views on several is­
sues. The discussion continues on Thursday morning; each member is given some time 
to summarize his or her views to the rest of the MPC, and suggest what vote they favor 
(although they can, if they wish, wait to hear the others views before committing to 
a vote (Lambert 2006)). This process begins with the Deputy Governor for monetary
2This target changed from the RPIX to the CPI measure of inflation in January 2004, with a reduction 
in the inflation target from 2.5% to 2%.
3According to the Bank of England website (h ttp ://w w w .b an k ofen g lan d .co .u k /m on etaryp olicy / 
overview.htm )
Each member of the MPC has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy. 
Members do not represent individual groups or areas. They are independent. Each member 
of the Committee has a vote to set interest rates at the level they believe is consistent with 
meeting the inflation target. The MPC’s decision is made on the basis of one-person, one 
vote. It is not based on a consensus of opinion. It reflects the votes of each individual 
member of the Committee.
79
policy, concludes with the Governor, and other members are selected in random order 
in between. To formally conclude the meeting, the Governor suggests an interest rate 
that he believes will command a majority. Each member then chooses whether to agree 
with the Governor’s decision, or dissent and state an alternative interest rate. The MPC 
decision is announced at 12 noon. Two weeks after each meeting, members’ votes are 
published, along with minutes of the meeting with full, but unattributed comments.
We now set out a model that captures the essential institutional details of the MPC.
3.4 C om m ittee Voting M odel
3.4 .1  A ssu m p tions and set-up
The model has an infinite number of periods t £ {1 , 2 ,...}. The period t forecast for 
inflation at the horizon4 is given by 7rt ~  N  (at +  6  — (3rt , a2) where at is a period t 
state variable that captures the history of shocks to hit the economy, 0 ~  N  (0, c^) is 
a parameter related to the non-inflationary level of output and independent of a t (for 
example, 6  could capture the effect of long-run supply) , 5 and f3 is a simplified monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.
We assume that at is persistent and is subject to two independent shocks, st ~  
7V(0,a2s) and dt ~  N(0,a%); in particular, at = pat-i +  $t +  dt where p is the AR(1 ) 
persistence coefficient. The key issue is that economic conditions are not unidimensional, 
however, for the sake of the discussion, we shall refer to d and s as temporary demand 
and supply shocks.6 This means we can write economic conditions as
t
Pl~T (ST +  dT) .
T — l
There is a group of experts, each with period t preferences given by
- E  [(*■( -  K*f] , (3.1)
4 T o  reduce notation, we define this period t forecast inflation of inflation as 7rt rather than irt +  h. 
We shall also refer to this forecast as “current inflation”.
5In the absence of transitory shocks, and assuming a constant interest rate r, inflation will equal 
9 — ftr. Thus, to meet their target, the central bank must ensure E  [0] — (3r = rr* holds. This equation 
defines the equilibrium real interest rate.
6Given our specification of how shocks impact expected future inflation, a positive supply shock would 
result in a negative s*, while a positive demand shock would result in a positive dt. Moreover, as the 
MPC members are only concerned with those shocks to which monetary policy reacts, we can think of 
st as the second round effects of supply shocks. Therefore, a positive st is the second round inflationary 
impact of the a negative supply shock (such as an oil price spike). An alternative could be to consider st 
as consumption (saving) shocks and dt as investment (depreciation) shocks which both affect the level 
of demand and inflation.
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where 7r* is an exogenous inflation target. Thus, experts share the same preferences. 
However, they disagree in the sense that each believes that 9 ~  N  (#*, a^). Thus, experts 
do not necessarily agree on the distribution of inflation conditional on an interest rate. 
We assume that the prior beliefs on 6  are common knowledge. In contrast, we assume that 
experts know g up to a constant, which can be absorbed into uncertainty about 9. While 
this assumption may seem strong, insider accounts from the MPC suggest that most 
disagreements are about economic conditions rather than the transmission mechanism .7
In every period, each expert receives verifiable private signals about the current shocks 
equal to s'it = st +  e® and dit =  dt +  ef, where e\ ~  N  (0, ofs) and e f ~ N  (0, crfd). The 
chapter will refer to the ratios 7® =  l/o f5 G (0, 00) and 7f  — l/(J?d G (0,00) as the skill 
of member % in identifying s and d shocks, respectively. For example, as 7® —> 0, member 
i has no useful private information about the supply shocks, and as 7® —» 00 he has near 
perfect knowledge of them.
The verifiability assumption on the private signals is key in the model. The motivation 
is that monetary policy experts arrive at their private views about the latest economic 
shocks through analyzing and interpreting economic data, reports and forecasts. This 
in turn means that when communicating their views to others, they can produce hard 
information to back it up. Thus, verifiability is a natural assumption given the model’s 
application.
A committee designer (who one can think of as the government) with preferences
0 0
-  J V E  [(*  -  tt*)2] (3.2)
t = 1
can appoint two experts to a committee that decides interest rates in a manner specified 
below. The designer receives no private information about the shocks. It also has higher- 
order uncertainty about the distribution of 9: it believes 9 ~  N  (9, and that 9 ~  
U[—a,a]. So, whereas the experts have a clear prior belief about 9, the designer does 
not. For consistency, we assume that for all members, — a < 9i < a, so that the committee 
designer believes each member’s view is correct with equal probability. The designer’s 
incentives to appoint experts depend on what they can do once they join the committee, 
so to complete the model we describe this.
Once on the committee, and after receiving their private signals, experts (whom we 
call members hereafter) have the opportunity to communicate with each other prior to 
voting. For both da and sh, members simultaneously choose whether to disclose their
7For example, see Barker (2007). In addition, Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) find heterogeneity in 
estimated individual policy reaction functions for MPC members, and argue that differences in the way 
individual members assimilate information supplied to them generate such differences.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Unique Votes Across Meetings
Unique Votes Frequency Percentage
1 47 35.3
2 81 60.9
3 5 3.8
Total 133 10 0
private information or not. One can characterize member i ’s strategy space with two sets 
Oft and ©ft , with the interpretation that member i withholds his period t signals whenever 
dit G Oft and s'it G Oft- These sets are choice variables for each player i in each period 
£, and we solve below for their equilibrium structure. Because private information is 
verifiable, credible communication is not an issue.8 Allowing communication is important 
in light of the extensive discussions that MPC members have with each other in the days 
leading up to the final vote. We assume that the committee designer does not observe 
what members communicate to each other, only the final decision that they take.
After sharing information with each other, the members simultaneously select an 
interest rate rit G f e ,  r*}, where without loss of generality rt < rt . Table 3.1 provides 
a motivation for this assumption. In 96.2 per cent of meetings, members all vote for 
one or two interest rates, even though there are no restrictions (legal or otherwise) in 
place that prevent them from selecting other rates. We assume that if ru =  r2t = Lt, 
then rt — rt] that if r\t — r2t =  r t , then rt = rt ; and that if r\t — 2U an(l f'2 t = or 
f'lt = Tt and r2t = Lt> then member l ’s preferred rate is chosen with probability p. This 
assumption simply says that the committee has a way of breaking ties, and that there 
is some non-zero probability that the tie could go either way. This is similar to the fact 
that the Governor of the Bank of England is charged with breaking any ties that remain 
after all other members have cast their votes.
After setting the interest rate r*, all members observe the random variable nt = 7rt + ut 
where ut ~  N  (0, aff) is again a white noise term. In other words, members receive 
information about the success they had in period t in achieving the inflation target 
before they vote in period t + 1. This information could, for example, come from national 
accounts and other data releases, as well as Inflation Report projection updates which 
are regularly done within quarters to help interpret new data.
To summarize, the timing of the game is the following:
1. Members receive signals dit and s'it
2 . Members simultaneously choose whether or not to disclose their signals to each
8One could allow members to send arbitrary messages to each other in the case where they do not 
provide verifiable information without altering the intuitions that underpin the solution of the model.
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other
3. Members simultaneously vote for r_t or rt
4. rt is implemented
5. Members observe 7rt
3.4 .2  M em ber behavior
This section solves the committee voting model laid out in the previous section by back­
ward induction. It begins by deriving the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the voting stage 
given an arbitrary outcome of the communication stage, and then solves for the Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium of the communication stage given equilibrium behavior in the voting 
stage.
V oting
There are two relevant parameters that a member needs to consider when selecting his 
vote in period t. The first is his estimate of current economic conditions at . We denote 
this estimate as %  =  E [a  | In], where In the information set of member i at time t. 
The second is his current belief about 6 . We denote this by 6 it = E  [ 6  \ Iit ].
With strategic voting, agents have to take into account not only their private estimates 
of payoff-relevant parameters when selecting an optimal action, but also the strategies 
of the other players. A strategic effect potentially arises because when agents condition 
on their vote being pivotal, they might obtain information about other agents’ private 
information. In this model, a strategic effect does not arise because each agent can 
independently influence the interest rate. For example, if member 1 votes for rt, then 
by also voting for rt , member 2 guarantees that f t is the outcome. On the other hand, 
if member 2 instead votes for rt , then r  ^ is the outcome with probability p. Therefore, 
it is a dominant strategy for each member to maximize (3.1) conditional on his private 
information only.
P ro p o sitio n  3.1 Member i votes for rt if  and only if din > Q& where a*t (@itj i5
strictly decreasing.
To understand this result, it is first important to examine what interest rate member 
i would choose if he were not constrained to choose between rt and r f. The proof of 
proposition 3.1 shows that the ideal interest rate r*t satisfies
P r i t T  a i t  +  @it =  f t *  ■ (3-3)
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That is, if he could choose any interest rate, member i would choose the one that set the 
expected mean of the inflation distribution equal to the inflation target tt* . Moreover, 
one can easily show that preferences are single peaked in the sense that (3.1) is strictly 
declining as rt moves away from r*t . To see the implications for voting behavior, one can 
examine Figure 3.1, which plots out expected utility for member i given an and 6 it, as 
well as examples of rt and rt . Member i will choose the interest rate that maximizes his 
expected utility. In terms of the figure, this entails choosing rt over f t .
r it* Lt f t 
Figure 3.1: Member Preferences
We now turn to analyzing how voting depends on an and 6 it. The top half of Figure 
3.2 depicts the same preferences as in Figure 3.1, when the ideal interest rate for member 
i is r*t . We first consider what happens when ait increases. In this case, member i believes 
more inflationary pressures have accumulated in the economy in period £, and his ideal 
interest rate increases. When ait increases by enough, member i votes for f t over 7^ , as 
demonstrated in the bottom half of the figure. One can therefore characterize member z’s 
voting rule with a single parameter a*t: whenever ait < a*t, he votes for r ,^ and whenever 
ait > a*t, he votes for f t 9
We next consider what happens when 6 it increases. Now, for fixed beliefs about the 
temporary shocks, the ideal rate increases since member i believes long-term inflationary 
pressures are higher. The effect on preferences is the same as when an increases: the 
ideal rate increases. So, the preferences in the top half of Figure 3.2 shift to the right. 
This in turn decreases a*it since member i needs less evidence of temporary inflationary 
shocks to prefer the higher rate.
9Here, we have resolved indifference in favor of f t , an unessential assumption.
r * *'it r,r t t
Figure 3.2: Member Preferences
Com m unication
Before discussing the equilibrium of the communication game, it is important to first 
discuss exactly how each member uses information in his decision-making. To begin, 
we focus on just the first period, and suppose that member 1 has a lower prior belief 
on 6  than member 2 (6 \ < 6 2 )- This means that member 1 requires evidence of higher 
temporary shocks to vote for the higher interest compared to member 2. Furthermore, 
instead of each member’s signals being private information, we suppose that they are 
public information. By Proposition 3.1, member i votes for f \  if and only if aR > a*l3 
where aR > aR.
Member 2 \  
decision rule
Conflic t
.R eg io n
Member 1 
decision rule
Figure 3.3: Decision Rules for Members 1 and 2 Given du  and Sn
Figure 3.3 graphically illustrates the decision rules of each member for fixed values of 
dn  and sR. Since both members’ signals are mixtures of normal random variables, aR is 
linearly increasing in each signal. This means that we can represent member l ’s decision 
rule (for a fixed dn and sR) as a negatively sloped line in ( g^i, sR ) space that represent
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the combinations of member 2’s signals at which a?ii = a jj. All combinations of g?2i and 
S21 that lie on or above this line lead member 1 to accept f \ , and all combinations that fall 
below lead him to accept r1. Member 2’s decision rule is simply member l ’s shifted down 
by 02 — 9\ , the amount by which their beliefs on expected inflation for any realization of 
the signals differs.
There are three distinct regions that emerge from Figure 3.3. The first is realizations 
of ^ 21, 521  ^ that lie below the line a?2i =  cc^ i- In this region, both members agree that 
r 1 is the correct interest rate. The second lies above the line «u  =  a Here, both 
members agree that Tq is the correct rate. The third region lies between $21 =  <*21 and 
<*11 =  QfJi- In this area, there is disagreement between the members: person 1 believes 
r_i is the correct rate, and person 2 believes that rq is. This is the “conflict region” in
which disagreement between the members arises. Its size is key to understanding the
equilibrium.
One can now turn to analyzing the effects of communication when members privately 
observe their signals. For expositional purposes, we consider an equilibrium in which 
member 1 withholds some realizations of his demand shock, and always discloses his 
signal on the supply shock. When member 1 observes some dn  G ©f1? he anticipates
that person 2 will vote for rq whenever
(*21  —  E (X\ | d n  £  © 1 1 , S l l ,  ^2 1 ,  521 > « 2 1 -
Figure 3.4 plots the line q2i = x above which member 2 votes for f \ .  This line is the 
one furthest to the southwest. On the other hand, member 1 believes that the correct 
decision rule is to vote rq whenever (d2i,S2i ) lies above a n  =
Member 2 
decision rule 
when Member 1 
\discloses
Member 1 
decision rule
Member 2 \  T
decision ru le \  
when Member l'' 
does not disclose
Figure 3.4: The Effect of Member 1 Disclosure on Member 2 Decision Rule
For an equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that member 1 actually wishes to 
withhold information whenever dn G Of. The inherent conflict between the two commit-
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tee members is over the threshold at which the higher interest rate becomes appropriate. 
Member 1 would like to convince member 2 that the shocks are as small as possible in 
order to get him to vote for the high interest rate less often. Consider the incentives of 
member 1 when he observes some dn  — inf 0 f  > e for e near 0. If member 1 shares this 
information with member 2 then
Oi 2i — E Oil
E a i
a 21.
In other words, when member 1 discloses some dn that is one of the smallest elements in 
0 f , member 2 forms a lower belief on a  than when member 2 withholds such a dn. This 
happens because without disclosure, member 2 forms his belief on cx\ knowing only that 
dn  € 0 f , so he takes the average over this set. With disclosure, member 2 infers di to be 
lower, and so also adjusts his belief on a down. This in turn shifts member 2’s decision 
rule to the northeast, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. For all ^d2i,S2i )  in the shaded region, 
member 2 now votes for r x instead of rq. Thus, from member l ’s perspective, information 
disclosure reduces the probability that member 2 will take the wrong action, and strictly 
improves expected utility. In this way, any equilibrium without full information disclosure 
“unravels” since there is always some type that strictly prefers disclosing to withholding.
P ro p o sitio n  3.2 In the unique equilibrium of the communication game, Qft =  0 andQsit =  
0 Vz, t.
This result that communication on committees can indeed lead information aggre­
gation, even when members have conflicting ideas about how to interpret each others’ 
information.10 It also echoes results in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), who demon­
strate similar results in exchange economies with adverse selection.
Learning
We have concluded that behavior consists of full sharing of private information followed 
by all members’ voting for their preferred interest rate in every period. One might then 
wonder what a dynamic structure adds to the model. The answer lies in the release of 
the inflation signal 7rt . While members enter the committee with heterogeneous priors on 
6, they are able to adjust their views when they obtain information on how the interest
10The verifiability of private information is crucial for establishing this result. Okuno-Fujiwara, Postle- 
waite, and Suzumura (1990) show that full information revelation need not occur if even some private 
information is not verifiable.
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rate chosen by the committee maps into actual inflation. Since the demand and supply 
shocks are not correlated with 6 , the communication of private signals does not allow for 
learning.
3.4 .3  M ixed  com m ittees and welfare
So far, we have discussed two dimensions of member behavior: communication and voting. 
We now show how each dimension provides a margin on which mixed committees can 
affect welfare.
Information aggregation and welfare
The first result of our model formalizes the idea that mixed committees can add value to 
society due their ability to draw on members’ diverse expertise.
Proposition 3.3 For small enough a, there exist numbers 0 < d < d and 0 < s < s 
such that a committee composed of solely of members with < d and 7 ?  > s or solely 
of members with 7 ^  > d and 7 ?  < s will yield the committee designer a lower expected 
utility than a committee composed of a mixture of these types.
To understand the intuition of this result, suppose there are only two types of experts, 
both of whom agree with the committee designer that 6  ~  N  (0 , ) : 11 d-types perceive
d perfectly (7 f  —> 0 0 ) but have no private information about s (7 ? =  0); 5-types perceive 
s perfectly (7 ? —> 0 0 ) but have no private information about d (7 ^ =  0). Once on the 
committee, either type will share his information with the other. When they make interest 
rate decisions, a committee with just d-types will therefore know d but know nothing 
about 5 , and a committee with just s-types will know s but know nothing about d. On 
the other hand, a mixed committee will know both d and s. Since both types agree with 
the committee designer about the appropriate interest rate, a mixed committee yields 
the designer strictly higher utility, since it has more information on which to base its 
decision.
This result is important because it shows that a committee composed of members 
with different kinds of policy-making expertise can produce a better outcome for society, 
even if the members do not agree perfectly about the right course of action. The key 
to the argument is information aggregation, since members have access to each other’s 
expertise when they vote.
11 The relationship between member information and designer utility is not clear when there is the 
possibility for members to be very far from the correct belief about 6.
Belief d iversity  and  welfare
We have said nothing so far about voting per se. The previous result shows that infor­
mation aggregation can lead to better outcomes for some level of belief diversity, but now 
we ask another question: whether there is a value to having a diversity of beliefs among 
committee members for its own sake. To isolate this issue, we assume for the moment 
that members’ identities do not affect the amount of information to which committee 
members have access.
P ro p o sitio n  3.4 Suppose that members observe public information about the d and s 
shocks prior to voting, and have no private information. Furthermore, suppose that 9\ = 
6 2  = O'. The committee designer’s welfare is strictly decreasing in
While the committee designer believes that all prior beliefs about 9 between —a and a 
are equally likely, the designer is not indifferent among members with these different be­
liefs. The more moderate the beliefs of the committee members—in the sense of distance 
from 0—the better off the designer is. To see the intuition for the result, an example is 
helpful. Suppose that a = 1 and the designer can appoint members for whom 9i =  0.5 or 
for whom 0* =  0.75. Then, whenever 9 < 0.5, the former types take the correct decision 
more often. But, since 9 < 0.5 is more likely than not given the distributional assumption 
on 9, the expected utility from the more moderate belief is higher. This has an immediate 
and important implication for committee design.
C orollary  3.1 Suppose member beliefs are public information and 9\ 7= $2 - Then the 
committee designer’s welfare is highest either as p 0  or p —*■ 1 .
p is the parameter that measures the probability that member l ’s preferred rate 
is chosen when he conflicts with member 2 . Moreover, its value does not affect the 
communication behavior of any member because as long as there is some probability 
of everyone’s vote mattering, each member would like to influence the other through 
information disclosure. The designer can thus choose p without altering the amount 
of information that each member has when selecting rates. Therefore, if the designer 
can observe member’s prior beliefs about 9, it should give full decision authority to 
the member with the more moderate belief. In other words, it can appoint members 
as advisors to the decision maker, without giving them any responsibility for decision 
making.
Corollary 3.1 has the important implication that a committee with heterogeneous 
beliefs can only benefit the designer if it does not observe members’ priors. If this is the 
case, appointing members with different (expected) beliefs can moderate the outcome.
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In order to see this, one must move beyond a two-person committee and consider the 
possibility of larger groups. Suppose that the designer can draw members from one of two 
groups. The first group has members with beliefs distributed U [—a, |]  and the second 
has members with behefs distributed U [— §, a ] . By appointing half the members from 
the first group and half the members from the second, the designer ensures moderation 
for a large enough committee size, since the median voter’s belief converges to $i = 0 
as the committee size becomes large. If it only appointed members from one of the two 
groups, the median voter’s belief converges to |0 *| = | ,  resulting in a utility loss relative 
to the mixed committee.
In terms of our application to the MPC, there would be a justification for including 
externals as voting (as opposed to advisory) members if the UK government felt that 
they balanced the views of internal members to yield a more moderate outcome. One 
might suspect that when we look at the data we will find differences in voting behavior 
between members—and indeed we do. The question is whether the differences we observe 
are consistent with moderation. Our final theoretical result provides a useful test.
P ro p o sitio n  3.5 Pr [ru ^  r 2t] ^  0.
Different behefs about 9 lead to a positive probability of members’ selecting different 
interest rates; however, after each period, members have the opportunity to adjust their 
beliefs, and results from statistical theory (Blackwell and Dubins 1962, Savage 1972) show 
that members’ beliefs about 6  converge when they are exposed to a sufficient amount of 
information about the relationship between interest rates and inflation. Therefore, the 
probability of members’ voting for different interest rates becomes negligible after they 
have sat for long enough together on the committee. In an iV-person committee, one can 
simply apply this result to each pair of members to generate the same result.
3.5 D ata
In order to test Proposition 3.5 we use the MPC voting records between July 1997 and 
June 2008 (data available from http ://w w w .bankofengland.co.uk/m onetarypolicy/ 
decisions.htm ). The data contain a record of every decision (decisiont) taken by the 
MPC, as well as each member’s vote in each meeting (voteit = Arit).u  Before June 
1998 there is information about whether members preferred higher or lower interest rates 
compared with the decision, but not about their actual preferred rate. In these cases, we 
treat a member’s vote as either 25 basis points higher or lower than the decision, in the
12We express members’ votes in terms of their preferred change in interest rates rather than their 
preferred level. This makes no difference to the results.
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direction of disagreement. The Bank website also provides information on which members 
were external appointments and which were internal. For every member we gathered 
biographical information, including previous occupation, educational background, and 
age from press releases associated with their appointment and from information provided 
to the Treasury Select Committee ahead of their confirmation.
We drop the emergency meeting held after September 11 th  2001 from our dataset 
for the programming convenience of having only one meeting per month. This does not 
affect our results: in the meeting after 9/11, voting was unanimously in favor of lowering 
interest rates, so it would not be used for econometric identification given our use of time 
fixed effects. Howard Davies served on the MPC for the first two meetings and is the only 
member who voted exclusively on unanimous committees and thus his inclusion/exclusion 
is unimportant for econometric identification; although we include him in our baseline 
regressions. Lord George, the Governor for most of our sample, always voted with the 
majority regardless of his starting position; as a result we think that these voting records 
do not represent his own views in all cases. Even under the governorship of Mervyn 
King, the Governor has only deviated twice since taking office in July 2003. Nonetheless, 
we include the observations for the Governor in the regression results presented below, 
though all of the results stand if we exclude the data on the Governor at each meeting.
In Table 3.2 we provide summary statistics of the individual members on the MPC. 
Of the 25 MPC members that we consider in our sample, 14 are external and 11 are 
internal as indicated by the variable13
I  N T  J ^ if member i is an external member 
1 1 if member i is an internal member
The average vote shows the mean of all votes cast by the member during their time on 
the MPC within our sample; this is driven largely by when a member served on the com­
mittee. The variance column reports the analogous second-moment for the voting data. 
Table 3.2 also shows that the educational background of both groups is heterogenous and 
that both groups contain members who worked as academics prior to their appointment 
(acadi =  1).
In our model, the committee has two members each of whom can choose two interest 
rates, so the probability of their not agreeing on the correct rate is the only natural 
measure of disagreement. On the actual MPC there is not just one internal member and 
one external member, but many of each. Therefore, determining the correct measure 
of disagreement is not as straightforward. We therefore explore several possibilities for
13No member has so far served as both an external member and an internal member, though there is 
nothing that prohibits this from happening in the future
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M ember IN Tj
Table
Averag
Vote
A. Sentance 0 0.07
C. Goodhart 0 0.01
C. Allsopp 0 -0.13
D. Blanchflower 0 -0.11
D. Walton 0 0.00
D. Julius 0 -0.12
K. Barker 0 -0.01
M. Bell 0 -0.01
R. Lambert 0 0.02
A. Budd 0 -0.06
S. Nickell 0 -0.05
S.Wadhwani 0 -0.11
T. Besley 0 0.07
W. Buiter 0 0.00
C. Bean 1 -0.02
D. Clementi 1 -0.04
I. Plenderleith 1 -0.03
J. Vickers 1 0.00
M. King 1 0.02
P. Tucker 1 0.03
R. Lomax 1 0.02
A. Large 1 0.07
E. George 1 -0.03
J. Gieve 1 0.01
H. Davies 1 0.25
Sample Statistics by Member
Variance Education Acad* M eetings
of Vote
0.026 Prof/PhD 0 21
0.050 Prof/PhD 1 36
0.020 Masters /  Accountancy 1 36
0.032 Prof/PhD 1 25
0.023 Masters /  Accountancy 0 12
0.036 Prof/PhD 0 45
0.020 Undergraduate 0 85
0.018 Masters /  Accountancy 0 36
0.013 Undergraduate 0 34
0.070 Prof/PhD 0 18
0.028 Prof/PhD 1 72
0.041 Prof/PhD 0 36
0.025 Prof/PhD 1 22
0.105 Prof/PhD 1 36
0.017 Prof/PhD 1 93
0.034 Masters /  Accountancy 0 60
0.034 Masters/Accountancy 0 60
0.060 Prof/PhD 1 28
0.027 Prof/PhD 0 133
0.014 Undergraduate 0 73
0.010 Masters /  Accountancy 0 60
0.016 Masters /Accountancy 0 40
0.029 Undergraduate 0 73
0.024 Undergraduate 0 29
0.000 Masters /  Accountancy 0 2
measuring conflict.
The first measure (and the one most common in the literature) is whether a member 
deviates from the majority of members on the committee. We therefore define the variable
_ . _ , , f 0 if Arit = decision*
D (Dev.MPC)-, = {
 ^ 1 if Arit ^  decisiont
However, a measure of disagreement that is closer in spirit to our model would explic­
itly measure conflict between externals and internals, not compare each member against 
the majority. We therefore construct a second dummy variable that measures when in­
ternal (external) members deviate from the modal vote of the external (internal) group. 
This variable more closely captures disagreements between internals and externals on 
the committee. Defining the modal vote of the subset of internal (external) members in 
period t as decisionItNT=l (decisionItNT=0), we can define:
D (Dev-group)it = <
0 if Arit = decision(NT=1SzINTi = 0
0  if Aru = decisionlNT=0 8zIN T i = 1
1 if Arit 7^ decision{NT=l$zINTi = 0
1 if Arit 7^  decision(NT=0SzINTi =  1
One issue that arises with this approach is that the modal vote among externals is not 
always uniquely defined; in 20 of the 133 meetings in our sample the external vote distri­
bution is bimodal. Therefore, we need to decide between these two modes. One of the two 
external modes always corresponds to the mode of the internal members (which is always 
unique). In the construction of D (Dev.group)it we set decision( N T = 0  = decision( NT=1 
whenever decision^.NT=° is multi-valued. This reduces the number of group deviations in 
the sample and so may bias us toward finding support for our model. However, we also de­
fine an alternative dummy variable called D (Dev.group.alt)#, which is defined similarly 
to D (Dev.group)iv except with decisionlN T = 0  ^  decision( N T = : 1  whenever decisionlN T = 0  
is multivalued.
Table 3.3 compares how frequently members deviate according to each of our measures. 
While the internal and external groups each contain members who deviate more and less 
often in all three senses, the tendency is clearly for external members to deviate from the 
committee decision more often than internal members. Indeed, differences along these 
lines have already been pointed out by Gerlach-Kristen (2003). The table also highlights 
that, according to the D(Devgroup).it measure, externals deviate more frequently with 
internals than vice versa. This is perhaps unsurprising given the greater within-group 
dispersion among externals combined with the fact that D(Devgroup).it equates the
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modal votes of internals and externals when the external votes is bimodal. Once we use 
the alternative group mode for external members, internal and external members have 
much more similar patterns of deviation from the other group.
Disagreement is in general quite common. For instance, in 14% of the observations 
of D (D ev.M PC)it =  1. While this number might seem quite low, we find that 65% of 
the 133 meetings in our sample have at least one deviation from the committee majority. 
Figure 3.5 shows the level of interest rate chosen by the MPC, where the markers indicate 
the votes of individual members; deviations from the majority are those that are off the 
MPC decision line. These deviations occur regularly and not just around turning points 
in the interest rate cycle (marked with shading on the figure).
t-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- i-------------------- i-------------------- 1-------------------- r
1996m1 1998m1 2000m 1 2002m 1 2004m 1 2006m 1 2008m 1
Date
* Member Votes
Turning Points -------- Bank Rate
Figure 3.5: Votes and Decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee
The fact that there are numerous disagreements within the MPC is not surprising. 
What is unclear is what generates these differences. This chapter argues that there are 
two likely candidates. The first is divergent beliefs. Even though members share the same 
access to data as each other, and communicate their views extensively with each other, 
they can still have fundamentally different beliefs about the inflationary pressures facing 
the economy. The second is preferences. Members can have fundamental differences in 
what they hope to achieve when selecting interest rates. As our model shows, these 
two stories are empirically distinguishable. If members differ because of beliefs, then
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Table 3.3: Total and Percentage Deviations using 3 Different Approaches, by Member
M em ber
INT» M eetings
D (D ev_M PC )it 
Total % D eviations
D (Dev_group)it 
T otal % D eviations
D(Dev_group_alt)-t 
T otal % D eviations
A. Sentance 0 21 5 23.8 6 28.6 6 28.6
C. Goodhart 0 36 3 8.3 3 8.3 3 8.3
C. Allsopp 0 36 10 27.8 13 36.1 13 36.1
D. Blanchflower 0 25 13 52.0 12 48.0 12 48.0
D. Walton 0 12 3 25.0 4 33.3 4 33.3
D. Julius 0 45 13 28.9 15 33.3 15 33.3
K. Barker 0 85 5 5.9 8 9.4 8 9.4
M. Bell 0 36 5 13.9 5 13.9 5 13.9
R. Lambert 0 34 0 0 .0 1 2.9 1 2.9
A. Budd 0 18 4 2 2 .2 4 2 2 .2 4 2 2 .2
S. Nickell 0 72 17 23.6 17 23.6 17 23.6
S.Wadhwani 0 36 12 33.3 15 41.7 15 41.7
T. Besley 0 22 5 22.7 6 27.3 6 27.3
W. Buiter 0 36 16 44.4 16 44.4 16 44.4
C. Bean 1 93 5 5.4 7 7.5 23 24.7
D. Clementi 1 60 4 6.7 8 13.3 15 25.0
I. Plenderleith 1 60 5 8.3 9 15.0 14 23.3
J. Vickers 1 28 5 17.9 5 17.9 8 28.6
M. King 1 133 14 10.5 19 14.3 35 26.3
P. Tucker 1 73 7 9.6 12 16.4 21 28.8
R. Lomax 1 60 5 8.3 7 11.7 14 23.3
A. Large 1 40 9 22.5 13 32.5 16 40.0
E. George 1 73 0 0 .0 7 9.6 20 27.4
J. Gieve 1 29 3 10.3 4 13.8 8 27.6
H. Davies 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
differences between members should become less pronounced.
3.6 Econom etric M odelling and R esults
The primary goal of this section is to examine the time path of individual voting be­
havior on the MPC in order to shed light on the source of conflict within the MPC. 
It first analyzes how the probability of deviating evolves, and then turns to looking at 
the actual votes that members cast. The main result is that on a variety of measures, 
conflict increases with time, leading us to conclude that members are likely to have dif­
ferences arising from their preferences; we will explore the main two potential preference 
differences.
3.6 .1  P rob ability  o f D ev ia tin g
The measures of deviation we introduced in the previous section are all dummy variables, 
so ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce inconsistent estimates. Instead, we adopt 
the regression model:
logit (D-devit) =  a 4- A • ^  4- Vh • IN Ti 4- ^ 2  ■ expit +  ^ 3  ■ (INTiexpit)
• T i m e t  T  ^  • Q t  T  ^  • C O M j  -i- S n  ( 3 - 4 )
t T  j
where:
• Djdeva is the deviation outcome variable of interest;
• IN Ti is the internal dummy variable defined earlier;
• expu is a dummy variable indicating that a member has experience on the committee 
(defined below in more detail);
• Zi are time-invariant individual characteristics;
• Tim et are monthly dummy variables (month fixed effects);
• Qt are quarterly dummies (quarter fixed effects);
•  C O M j  is a committee fixed effect
The two sets of time fixed effects control for the variation in voting behavior that is 
common to each period of time, such as variations in the business cycle. We include, in
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addition to month fixed effects, quarter fixed effects to capture the fact that some key 
information is quarter specific (national accounts data, as well as the Bank’s own forecast). 
An alternative was to include data on inflation and GDP, as well as the information that 
comes from Bank of England quarterly forecast meetings as controls; this approach does 
not alter the conclusions of our work.
As a further control, we also include committee fixed effects. In the regressions we run, 
there is a separate dummy variable for each unique combination of committee members 
in our sample. This is potentially important if a member’s vote (and the extent to 
which it conflicts with other members’) is affected by the identity of the other committee 
members. These committee fixed effects require inclusion of a separate dummy variable 
for every different committee composition that has met. Therefore, if a member leaves the 
committee and is replaced by a new member, this represents a new committee composition 
and so a new dummy variable. Also, if a member is absent and so only 8  members meet 
in a particular month, then this committee composition is also different and so controlled 
for separately.
In order to ensure that IN Ti is not capturing the effects of other variables that are 
correlated with being an internal member, we include a set of controls for individual 
characteristics. The regressions control for age as well as dummy variables for whether a 
member worked in the private sector immediately before joining the committee, whether 
a member was an academic immediately before joining the committee, and whether a 
member holds a Master’s or PhD degree.14
We allow the errors to be clustered by MPC member since it is unlikely that members’ 
errors are independent across time periods, especially if there is some systemic hetero­
geneity in member voting. Clustering corrects the standard errors of the estimates for 
this correlation, making it less likely that we wrongly fail to reject a null hypothesis of 
coefficient significance. However, our results are unchanged without clustering the errors 
by member.
The key variable of interest in our regressions is expit, the variable that distinguishes 
new MPC members from those with experience. This variable is:
J 0 if member i in time t has been on the committee 12 months or less 
expu = <
I 1 if member i in time t has been on the committee more than 12  months
The 12  month cutoff represents one-third of the term for non-Governor MPC members, 
and half the average number of meetings attended by an external member in our sample. 
Since this threshold may seem arbitrary, we shall carry out robustness tests to ensure
14The effect of the two kinds of degrees was similar in the regressions, so we combine them. Also, most 
of the professors in our sample without a PhD hold a Master’s degree.
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that results are qualitatively unchanged if we consider alternative cutoff values to define 
experience. In particular, we consider 9-month and 18-month cutoffs.
The regression output in the tables below reports the estimated odds-ratios associated 
with each variable. Interpreting the output therefore requires some care. If we define the 
odds of deviating as
Pr [deviate)
Pr(not deviate)
then the odds-ratio for the I N T i  variable is given by:
_ _ ( odds (deviate) I I N T i  = 1 )
odds — ratioiinternals) =  ——— ------- : ------ r
v ' ( odds (deviate) \ IN T i = 0 )
/  Pr(deviate)\I N T j= l  \  
yPr(not deviate) \INTi—1 J
/  Pr (deviate) \ IN Tj=0  \  
yP r (not deviate)\INTi=0 J
Therefore the odds-ratio, as reported in the tables below, will always be greater than zero. 
If it is greater (less) than 1 , this means that, holding all other variables constant, the 
odds of deviating for internals is higher (lower) than for external members. Finally, the 
interpretation of the coefficient — the coefficient on the interaction term IN Ti • expit 
— is that of the ratio of the odds-ratios. It will tell us if the odds-ratio for experience is 
different between internals and externals.
Table 3.4 reports the results from estimating equation (3.4) without the expu vari­
ables. The results confirm what was expected from the earlier examination of Table 3.3. 
Namely, for the first two measures of deviation (D(Dev^M PC)u  and D(Dev.group)it), 
internals are less likely to deviate than externals. For the third approach to measuring 
deviations (D [Dev.group.alt)a), there is no statistically significant difference between 
internals and externals. These results are robust to the inclusion of the other covari- 
ates, and all regressions include the month, quarter and committee fixed effects discussed 
above.
Table 3.5 introduces the expit variables; for each deviation variable, we estimate (3.4) 
both excluding and including the interaction term. These regression results provide a 
clear test of our model. If conflict on the committee arises because people have different 
beliefs about the correct monetary policy, then over time there should be fewer deviations 
since members’ beliefs should converge after observing enough data. In fact, the opposite 
is true. In all cases, the expit odds-ratio is larger than 1 and statistically significant at 
the 5% level. This means that, holding all other variables constant, the likelihood of 
deviating increases when an MPC member has been on the committee for more than 
12 months. In terms of magnitude, 12 months on the committee makes a member over 
twice as likely to deviate in nearly all cases. In columns (2) and (4), the interaction term
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Table 3.4: Logit Model - Basic Regression Results
(i)
D(Dev.
(2 )
-M PC)it
(3)
D(Dev.
(4)
.group) it
(5) (6 )
D [Dev .group .alt) a
IN Ti 0.287*** 0.193*** 0.340*** 0.271*** 1.338 1.150
(0.103) (0.078) (0.137) (0.114) (0.587) (0.499)
D(high education) 5.089*** 3.987*** 2.845**
(2.323) (2.046) (1.211)
D (private sector) 0.396** 0.536 0.532
(0.164) (0.249) (0.245)
Age when start 0.9359** 0.9511 0.9637
(0.0301) (0.0340) (0.0249)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.215 3.046 16.216* 6.731 6.861 434.538***
(0.231) (6.111) (26.416) (14.950) (9.966) (939.464)
Observations 763 763 754 754 754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
is insignificantly different from 1 , indicating that there is no difference in the odds-ratio 
for experienced internals and experienced externals. In column (6 ), where we use the 
alternative measure, internals that become experienced have a smaller increase in their 
probability of deviating than externals who become experienced.
The results in Table 3.6 replicate the results in columns (2 ), (4), and (6 ) in Table 
3.5 using the alternative cut-off values for experience discussed above. The variable exp% 
measures experience as beginning after 9 months on the MPC, while the exp\f uses a 
value of 18 months. The results are qualitatively unchanged, and in fact the estimated 
magnitudes on the experience variable are almost always higher. Thus, there is robust 
evidence that members do not vote more in line with each other as they gain experience.
3 .6 .2  V o t in g  L e v e ls  a n d  D is p e r s io n
So far, we have looked at members’ deviation probabilities in order to stay true to our 
model. We now turn to members’ actual votes. There are several reasons for doing 
so. First, the change in the average vote level between internals and externals provides 
another test of convergence. Second, the voting data allows us to examine the direction of 
conflict, not merely its existence. Third, we can use voting data to construct measures of 
within-group voting dispersion for internals and externals to see how it behaves through 
time.
There are three possible measures for voting dispersion:
1 . the squared deviation from the average vote in each time period (Ar^t — Art) ;
2 . the squared deviation from the committee’s decision (Ari)t — A rfec)2;
3. the squared deviation from the average external or internal vote (A r^  — Artgrp) 2.
Each of these variables measures the dispersion of member i from the group, thereby cap­
turing the underlying variance of their voting behavior. In practice, these three measures 
are highly correlated (with correlation coefficients above 0.9), so we shall report only a 
selection of the regressions focusing on the first measure.
Following equation (3.4), we now estimate the following regression model using ordi­
nary least squares:15
yit = a  +  A. Zi +  V>i • INTi +  ip2 • expit +  f t . (IN T i. expit)
Yjrt .Timet +  St .Qt  +  Ys^j-COMj +  eit (3.5)
t  T  j
15Although our data is categorical (in 25bp devisions) we proceed using OLS. Use of multinomial logit 
estimation is not feasible with seven distinct groupings in our sample (and theoretically more groupings).
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Table 3.5: Logit Model - Experience Regression Results
(I) (2) p )  (4) (5) (6)
D ( D e v - M P C ) i t  D  ( D e v , group) a  D  ( D e v . group,alt) it
INTi
D(high education)
D (private sector)
Age when start 
expu
I  N T *  e x p a
Month FE?
Quarter FE? 
Committee FE? 
Clustered Residuals?
Constant
Observations
0.171*** 0.126***
(0.073) (0.076)
5.606*** 5.460***
(2.907) (2.798)
0.405** 0.405**
(0.163) (0.164)
0.9324** 0.9323*
(0.0329) (0.0334)
2.141** 1.927*
(0.673) (0.677)
1.460
(1.072)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
1.807 2.024
(5.837) (6.501)
763 763
0.230*** 0.309
(0.108) (0.236)
4.413*** 4.512***
(2.504) (2.583)
0.541 0.540
(0.246) (0.246)
0.9469 0.9471
(0.0370) (0.0367)
2.574** 2.889**
(1.102) (1.451)
0.690
(0.491)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.702 0.616
(2.334) (2.037)
754 754
1.009 2.476
(0.475) (1.587)
3.048** 3.318***
(1.355) (1.535)
0.509 0.500
(0.235) (0.232)
0.9598 0.9607
(0.0273) (0.0271)
2.410** 4.122**
(1.003) (2.346)
0.301*
(0.189)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
0.247 0.141
(0.681) (0.385)
754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Logit Model - Robustness to Different Experience Variables
a )
D ( D e v .
(2)
-M PC)it
(3)
D ( D e v .
(4)
. g r o u p )  u
(5) (6)
D  { D e v  . g r o u p  .alt) a
I  N T i 0.179*** 0.219** 0.641 0.402 5.402*** 1.824
(0.101) (0.145) (0.507) (0.289) (3.489) (1.082)
D(high education) 5.455*** 6.197*** 4.512*** 4.920*** 3.199** 3.278**
(2.661) (3.372) (2.484) (2.971) (1.463) (1.566)
D (private sector) 0.418** 0.397** 0.563 0.529 0.538 0.492
(0.169) (0.162) (0.254) (0.245) (0.246) (0.227)
Age when start 0.9349** 0.9318* 0.9486 0.9482 0.9629 0.9616
(0.0320) (0.0339) (0.0352) (0.0368) (0.0258) (0.0271)
expit 2.134* 3.396** 4.147**
(0.873) (2.092) (2.515)
I  N T i *  expit 0.998 0.324 0.144***
(0.716) (0.260) (0.103)
exp}t 3.173** 3.509** 3.696**
(1.458) (1.721) (1.907)
IN T * exp \f 0.581 0.395 0.354*
(0.371) (0.231) (0.197)
All regressions contain the usual month, quarter and committee FE, and residuals are clustered by member.
Constant 1.807 2.024 0.702 0.616 0.247 0.141
(5.837) (6.501) (2.334) (2.037) (0.681) (0.385)
Observations 763 763 754 754 754 754
Odds-ratios reported rather than coefficient estimates 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
where yu is the outcome variable of interest, and the other variables are as in (3.4). Here, 
the interpretation of the coefficients is more straightforward. The three coefficients of 
interest are ipi, the marginal effect of being an internal member; -0 2 ? the marginal effect 
of having at least one year of MPC experience; and /A, the marginal effect of being an 
experienced, internal member. Another advantage of the OLS model is that estimation 
with member fixed effects (i.e., modelling the error terms as e# = Vi +  where Vi is 
a member-specific intercept that captures any unobserved heterogeneity at the member 
level) becomes computationally feasible. We will estimate (3.5) both with and without 
member fixed effects, since their inclusion forces us to drop all time-invariant individual 
characteristics.
The results of estimating (3.5) are reported in Table 3.7. Columns (1) - (3) report 
the coefficient estimates when yit =  A r^ . In Column (1), only time and committee fixed 
effects, the usual covariates, and the IN Ti variable are included. It is clear that internal 
members vote, on average, for higher interest rates. The three basis point difference 
between internals and externals is economically significant. Consider the conterfactual 
switching an external member to an internal member. Since members conventionally 
vote in 25 basis point increments, this would mean that such a member would vote for 
higher interest rates in 12% more meetings ( ^  «  0.12). What is rather suprising is 
that this effect arises even while controlling for individual characteristics. Internals and 
externals appear to vote for different interest rates not because of different educational or 
occupational backgrounds, but simply because one group has managerial responsibilities 
within the Bank and the other does not.
In Column (2) we include the expu variable as well as the interaction term. This es­
sentially allows us to use a differences-in-differences approach for estimating convergence 
of opinions. The results are striking. The effect of being an internal is no longer sig­
nificant, but the effect of being experienced is highly significant and large in magnitude 
(—5.3 bps lower on average). Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term is also 
highly significant and large (+5.5 bps higher on average). Thus, the effect of experience 
is different for internals and externals. Experience by itself leads people to vote for lower 
rates, but this is driven entirely by the external members; it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that internal members do not change their vote once they become experienced. 
Therefore, neither inexperienced nor experienced internals vote for different rates on av­
erage. This implies that although inexperienced externals do not behave any differently 
from inexperienced internals, experienced externals vote for systematically lower interest 
rates on average. This finding is qualitatively robust to the inclusion of member fixed ef­
fects (Column (3)). These regressions provide yet more evidence of growing disagreement 
between externals and internals on the MPC.
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Table 3.7: Level and Vote Variability Regression Results
(i)
voteit
(2) 
v oten
(3)
voteit
(4)
(ArM -  Ar t ) 2
(5)
(Ariit -  A rt)2
(6)
(Ari>t -  Ar t 9 r p ) 2
I  NTi 0.030** -0.007 - -0.006** - -0.006**
(0.014) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002)
D(high education) -0.010 -0.013 - 0.004** - 0.002***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001)
D (private sector) -0.010 -0.010 - -0.002 - -0.002
(0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002)
Age when start 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 - -0 .0 0 0 - -0 .0 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
expit -0.053*** -0.034*** 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.016) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
I N T ^  expu 0.0547*** 0.0454*** -0.0006 0.0004 0.0012
(0.0158) (0.0117) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0030)
Month FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Residuals? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Member FE? Yes Yes
Constant 0.235*** 0.257*** 0.247*** 0.007 -0 .0 0 0 0.006*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.035) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163 1163
R 2 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.22 0.20 0.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (4) and (5) repeat the regressions in columns (2) and (3) using yit = 
(Aritt — Art) . The main finding is that externals as a group display more volatility 
in their voting behavior, and that volatility does not decline with time for either inter­
nals or externals. Thus, not only do internals and externals not reach consensus with 
each other through time, but they also do not seem to reach a consensus with each other. 
Moreover, the greater volatility of external members clearly reduces the expected utility 
of a committee designer with preferences given by (3.2), so the only rationale for including 
them at all must come from some other margin. Column (6) shows the robustness of the 
findings to an alternative definition of group dispersion ((A r^  — Artgrp)2).
To summarize, the main empirical findings are that:
• There are systematic differences in the voting behavior of internals and externals;
• On numerous measures, internal and externals members display increasing conflict 
through time;
• Through their greater volatility, external members reduce the welfare of a committee 
designer with a quadratic loss function.
Our second finding is the most important. We believe that it rules out a model 
in which all members share the same preferences over interest rates. We have shown 
that such a model generates declining disagreement, but in fact the opposite is true in 
the data. Therefore, the source of conflict between members must arise for reasons other 
than conflicting beliefs, and the most likely candidate is conflicting preferences. However, 
if internals and externals have different preferences, then at least one group maximizes 
an objective function other than the committee designer’s. Thus, we also believe that 
we have identified an agency problem on the MPC. In other words, the MPC appears to 
not work as effectively as its designers might have hoped. In the next section, we explore 
what preferences underlie internals’ and externals’ behavior.
3.7 A lternative M odels
Exposure to increasing amounts of information should not drive Bayesian agents apart, 
and yet our econometric results show that this is the case on the MPC. The data also 
show that external members separate from internal members and vote for systematically 
lower interest rates. Therefore, although our regressions offer no support for the model 
of ideal mixed-committee voting presented above, we are not given an insight into why 
the model fails.
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We believe that any reasonable model with Bayesian learning and ideal behavior 
assumptions could not explain the patterns in the data. This finding is important because 
it indicates the presence of an agency problem resulting from the presence of internal and 
external members on the MPC. If we are going to reject the model of ideal voting behavior, 
however, a natural question to ask is what model we need to use in its place. Also, the 
policy and committee design implications depend on the underlying reasons for the failure 
of our ideal behavior model.
To begin with, we shall take as given the initial period of agreement and examine 
what causes the votes to change, and in particular why the votes of externals appear 
to become systematically lower. In this section we explore a number of the leading 
candidate explanations; we examine the presence of career concerns, and the possibility 
of asymmetric preferences.
3.7.1 C areer C oncerns
One possibility is that members not only want to maximize equation (3.1), but also want 
to signal their competence or preferences through their voting record. In other words, 
committee members may have career concerns. There are many reasonable career concern 
stories. For example, internals may want to signal to the government and to the central 
banking community that they are tough inflation fighters. Externals, who face more 
uncertainty about their future prospects after their terms end, may want to signal that 
they are competent economists. These concerns may lead MPC members to vote for 
interest rates that differ from those predicted by our ideal voting model.
We shall examine a particular form of career .concern that is consistent with the 
idea that MPC members reputation shall be assessed, largely, by the central banking 
community and by the government. Gordon Brown was not only the Chancellor who 
set-up the MPC structure, but he was the key person in approving the members who 
got appointed to the MPC over the majority of our sample. In setting up the MPC 
with a narrowly-defined inflation target, he made clear his belief that the correct focus of 
monetary policy is fighting inflation. He was clearly aware that attempts to try to exploit 
short-run output gains from monetary policy would quickly lead to inflation. While 
it is often assumed that internal members would worry about their inflation-fighting 
credibility, it also seems clear that in order to either build a reputation, or in terms of 
getting reappointed, external members would need to be considered inflation-averse.
Our experience effect may, therefore, already be capturing a career concern; upon 
joining, new members may wish to build a reputation for fighting inflation and so start 
by voting with the other members. Our results are consistent with this being the case 
particularly in the first year, and applying, on average, to both internal and external
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members.
However, after the initial reputation building period, career concerns may play a dif­
ferential role with different members. If career concerns explain the behavior of MPC 
members after one year, then we would expect to see the change in behavior only for 
those groups for whom career concerns do not play a major role. To test this hypothe­
sis, we divide internals and externals into groups for which reputational considerations 
should play varying roles and examine whether these different groups display the same 
divergence as they gain experience16. If they do, then signalling is not a convincing factor 
in explaining our experience results, while if they don’t, it cannot be ruled out.
We split the members according to whether, or not, they are an academic when they 
join the committee. There are substantial numbers of academics and non-academics in 
both the internal and external group. Because of the tenure system, one could argue that
academics should have less of a need to signal since they have a stronger outside option
should they fail to build a good reputation. In order to test whether non-academics and 
academics differ in voting behavior, we run the following regression with member fixed 
effects17:
yit = a + \ .z i + 'ipi.INTi + 'ip2-exPit + 'ip3 -Acadi
+ / ? i -  ( INTi.expu ) +  (32 . (INTi.Acadi) +  A -  (expit.Acadi) 
+ /ji. (INTi.expa.Acadi)
-\-'y \ t .T im et -1- ^  ^ St -Qt  +  ^  " Kj.CO M ) -\-  +  rju (3 -6)
t T j
where Acadi is the dummy variable indicating that a member is an academic, and all 
other variables are as defined above.
With two different distinguishing dummy variables (Acadi,&nd I  NTi), there are four 
different “types” of MPC member. For each type, the last dummy variable (expit ) 
allows us to calculate the effect of experience on each group. Rather than discuss the 
values of the coefficients themselves, it is easier to discuss the sums of coefficients that 
represent this experience effect for each particular set of characteristics. For example, 
the experience effect of being an internal, non-academic is A  +  A 18 and the experience 
effect of being an external academic is +  A- The results are listed in Table 3.8; the 
experience effect is listed along with the P-value associated with the null hypothesis that
16We have also carried out the same analysis for the variance of voting behavior; these results are not 
included as the variance results are less puzzling than the level results, but are available on request.
17Estimating without member-fixed effects leads to qualitatively unchanged results.
18The effect of being an experienced, internal, non-academic is ipi +ip2 + Pi while the effect of being 
a new, internal, non-academic is ip\ . The experience effect for this group is the difference of these two.
107
Table 3.8: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type: Career Concerns
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1) External Non-academic -0.01 0.57 -0.03 0.02
(2) External Academic -0.07 0.00 -0.10 -0.05
(3) Internal Non-academic 0.01 0.57 -0.02 0.03
(4) Internal Academic 0.01 0.50 -0.03 0.05
the effect is zero, and the 95% confidence intervals.
The results clearly lend support to the career concerns hypothesis. Controlling for 
whether members are academic or not can seemingly explain the entire experience result. 
Experience drives the voting of academic externals down by 7bps. Hypothesis tests 
confirm that the experience effect for academic externals is different from zero, and from 
the experience effect of other types of member (all of whom have no experience effect). 
This is surprising as the regression controls for not only the time and committee fixed 
effects, but also for member fixed effects.
Thus, our results seem consistent with the idea that career concerns, the building of 
an anti-inflation reputation, remain important for some external members beyond the 
initial period on the committee.
3.7 .2  A sym m etric  Preferences
Although the UK Treasury officially sets the inflation target and instructs MPC mem­
bers that the target is symmetric, it may be that individual members, consciously or 
subconsciously, view phases of the business/inflation cycle differently. We have assumed 
symmetric preferences in our model of voting behavior, but the results in Table 3.8 may 
be consistent with asymmetric preferences; this is our second potential explanation.
The idea of asymmetric preferences is not new in monetary economics (see Surico
(2007)). Gerlach-Kristen (2009) simulates an asymmetric preferences voting model and 
concludes that it would lead to similar patterns of voting to that of the MPC. External 
members, in her model, are assumed to be recession-averse in that they dislike negative 
output gaps more than positive output gaps. To be consistent with our findings, this 
hypothesis states that, after initially behaving as the government expected them to, 
some members reveal themselves to be less willing to fight inflation at the expense of a 
recession.
We split the interest rate cycle into a tightening phase (when interest rates are, or
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have been most recently, increasing) and a loosening phase (when interest rates have most 
recently been declining) so that we can examine the evidence for recession aversion. We 
use the variable L o o s e r i i  - a dummy variable indicating that period t is in a loosening 
phase - to distinguish the two phases. These are displayed in Figure 3.6; grey shading 
denotes the tightening cycle, and other periods are therefore considered the loosening 
cycle.
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Figure 3.6: Interest Rate Cycles in the UK
In order to test whether the behavior of MPC members differs over the phases of 
the interest rate cycle, we run a regression similar to equation (3.6) but instead of distin­
guishing between academics and non-academics, we use the variable loosent to distinguish 
between the phases of the interest rate cycle. Thus, we estimate:
yit = a  +  X.Zi +  'ipi.INTi +  fo-expit +  ipA-loosen*
+/?i. (INTi.expu) + (5a. (INTi.loosent) +  /%• {expit.loosent)
+/i2- {INTi.expit.loosent)
^ Y r t .T im e t  +  Y  $t -Qt +  y^Xj.CQAfj +  i/< +  rjit (3.7)
t T  j
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Table 3.9: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type:
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
a ) External Tighten -0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.01
(2) External Loosen -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.01
(3) Internal Tighten 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.05
(4) Internal Loosen 0.01 0.44 -0.02 0.04
The results for the estimated experience effect, analogous to the results in Table 3.8, 
are displayed in Table 3.9. The evidence is not conclusively for or against the asymmetric 
preferences story. While the experience effect is only significantly different from zero for 
external MPC members in a loosening phase, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
experience effect is the same in tightening and loosening cycles for externals. Therefore, 
while it is likely that the effect is larger in the loosening cycle, and we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that there is a different experience effect for internals and externals, 
the fact that there is an experience effect in tightening cycles, weakens the evidence for 
recession-aversion as driving our experience result.
3.7 .3  T esting b o th  together
One concern may be that the two explanatory variables may not be orthogonal. The 
results for the cycle could be driven by the academics; most inexperienced academics in 
our sample (who would be building a reputation under our story), cast their votes in 
tightening cycles.
Also, it is not clear that career concerns would be symmetric over the cycle. A 
member who is trying to build a reputation for being tough on inflation in order to get 
reappointed may require more evidence of falling inflationary pressures to cut rates, than 
an optimally-behaving member would require to increase rates.
Therefore, as we could not conclusively eliminate one story, we test for both the 
stories together in a combined regression given by equation (3.8), where the variables are 
as defined before. If we find that the importance of either the academics, or the loosening 
cycle, disappears, then it may be the smoking-gun that we are looking for in determining 
which of our stories is most likely to explain the behavior.
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Table 3.10: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by Member Type: Combined Career Con­
cerns and Asymmetric Preferences Regression
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1) External Tighten Non-academic -0.01 0.67 -0.03 0.02
(2 ) External Tighten Academic -0.02 0.27 -0.05 0.01
(3) External Loosen Non-academic 0.00 0 .88 -0.02 0.03
(4) External Loosen Academic -0.12 0 .0 0 -0.17 -0.08
(1) Internal Tighten Non-academic 0.02 0.30 -0.01 0.04
(2 ) Internal Tighten Academic 0.03 0.37 -0.02 0.08
(3) Internal Loosen Non-academic 0.01 0.62 -0.02 0.04
(4) Internal Loosen Academic 0.01 0.58 -0.03 0.05
yit =  a  +  A. Zi +  . I  NTi +  4>2 ■ expit +  ip3. Acadi +  V>4 .loosent
+/?!. (INTi.expa) +  fo- (INTi.Acadi) +  /?3. (expit.Acadi)
+/?4 . (INTi.loosent) +  /%• (expit.loosent) +  /?6- (Acadi.loosent)
-f-/zi. (7NTi.expit.Acadi) +  /z2. (INTi.expit.loosent) +  ££3 . (INTi.Acadi.loosent) 
+ /i4. (expit.Acadi.loosent)
+ 0 i- (7NTi.expu.Acadi.loosent)
+ y \ t .Timet +  ^ ^ j .C O M j  +  ^  +  Pu (3.8)
t  T  j
The results in Table 3.10 for the estimated experience effect, are reported as before. It 
is now the case that the experience effect can be attributed solely to external, academic 
members during the loosening phase of the business cycle. Thus, we are no closer to 
eliminating either explanation as both are consistent with this result; either the academics 
have recession averse preferences, or the other members are affected by a career concern 
that keeps them voting for higher interest rates.
3.8 A  N atural Experim ent
Ideally we would have an exogenous variation in the extent of career concerns which would 
help us to disentangle these two effects and determine which is driving the behavior. 
Fortunately, we have one such natural experiment. The Act that created the MPC
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allows for the reappointment of all members, internal and external. When the first group 
of externals and internals served on the MPC, they thus operated under the assumption 
that reappointment to the committee was possible, although uncertainty still existed 
about how the reappointment system would function. Then, on 18 January 2000, Willem 
Buiter wrote an open letter to then Chancellor Gordon Brown that laid down forceful 
arguments for not reappointing external members (Buiter 2000). To quote from this 
letter:
With the end of my term approaching, I have given considerable thought 
to whether I should be a candidate for re-appointment. I have come to the 
conclusion that both the appearance and the substance of independence of the 
external members of the MPC are best served by restricting their membership 
to a single term - three years as envisaged in the Bank of England Act 1998.
It seems that this letter swayed Brown’s decision; he did not reappoint a single external 
member from the original group, even though some were still among the most prominent 
monetary policy experts in the UK. A clear precedent was set: external members would 
find reappointment difficult, most likely extremely so. All external members served for 
only one term until February 2003 (almost 6 years since the first MPC meeting), when 
Brown unexpectedly reappointed Stephen Nickell to the MPC (HM Treasury 2003). Since 
then, Kate Barker has also been reappointed twice.
If career concerns play a role, one would expect different voting patterns between 
external members serving from February 2000 to February 2003 and those serving at other 
times, since the rewards to reputation presumably changed when reappointment was and 
was not possible. There are 322 votes cast during this period in which reappointment of 
external members was not possible. Of course, there is no reason to expect that this lack 
of reappointment opportunities for external member to affect internal member voting; 
during this period many external members were reappointed to the committee. To this 
end, we define a dummy variable reappointit which equals 1 before February 2000 and 
after February 2003. We then estimate the following career concerns regression:
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Table 3.11: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by External Type: Career Concerns Re­
gression from Natural Experiment
Members Experience P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect Interval
(1 ) External reappointu =  0 Non-academic -0.05 0.04 -0.09 0 .0 0
(2 ) External reappointu =  0 Academic -0.06 0 .0 1 -0 .1 1 -0 .0 2
(3) External reappointu = 1 Non-academic 0 .0 1 0.55 -0 .0 2 0.04
(4) External reappointu — 1 Academic -0.07 0 .0 0 -0 .1 0 -0.03
(5) Internal reappointu — 0 Non-academic -0 .0 1 0.69 -0.06 0.04
(6 ) Internal reappointu = 0 Academic 0.03 0.31 -0.03 0.09
(7) Internal reappointu — 1 Non-academic 0 .0 1 0.36 -0 .0 1 0.04
(8 ) Internal reappointu =  1 Academic 0 .0 0 0.98 -0.06 0.06
Vu =  ol + X.Zi +  fa .I  NTi +  fa.expn +  fa. Acadi +  fa.reappointt 
+fa. (INTi.expu) +  fa. (INTi.Acadi) +  fa. (expit.Acadi)
+fa. (INTi.reappointt) +  fa. (expu.reappointt) +  fa. (Acadi.reappointt)
+p\. [INTi.expit.Acadi) +  /^ 5- (INTi.expit .reappointt) +  Pq. (INTi.Acadi.reappointt) 
+ /i8. (expi+.Acadi.reappointt)
-\-fa ■ (IN ^ .e x p n  .Acadi .reappointt)
~l~^  \ t .Timet +  ^   ^ ^  *Kj.COM) +  z/j +  pn (^-9)
t  T  j
The results in Table 3.11 lend support to the idea that this exogenous variation has 
led external members to behave differently, while internal members have been unaffected. 
Rows (1) and (2) shows that, when reappointment was not possible, the experience effect 
was the same across types of external member; there is no longer a differential effect 
between external academics and non-academics. The effect uncovered earlier in Table 3.8 
is driven by the differential behavior when reappointment was possible.
We now attempt to distinguish between the preferences and career concerns story 
using our natural experiment and the combined effects equation given by (3.9). How­
ever, we now augment this equation with differential effects for when reappointment was 
possible; the resulting (large) equation is:
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yit = a  +  X.Zi +  ^i.IN T i +  ifj2 -expit + ft.Acad* +  ftiooserit +  5 -reappointt 
+ f t . (INTi.expu) +  f t .  (IN T{.Acadi) +  ft-  {expit.Acadi)
+ f t .  (INTi.looserit) +  f t .  (expit .loosent) +  f t  - (Acadi.loosent)
-fft. (INTi.reappointt) +  f t  - (expu.reappointt) +  f t  - (Acadi.reappointt)
+ A o -  (1 0 0 sent .reappointt)
+Mi- (INTi.expa-Acadi) +  M2- (INTi.expit .loosent) +  M3- (INTi.Acadi.loosent)
+M4. (expu.Acadi.loosent) +  Ms- (INTi.expu.reappointt) +  M6- (INTi.Acadi.reappointt) 
+P7 . (INTi.loosent .reappointt) +  Ms- (expit.Acadi.reappointt)
+/19. (expit.loosent .reappointt) +  Mio- (Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
(INTi.expit.Acadi.loosent) +  ft- (INTi.expu.Acadi.reappointt)
+ f t . (7NTi.expit .loosent .reappointt) +  04. (7NTi.Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
+ 0 5. (expu.Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
+<-i- (INTi.expa.Acadi.loosent .reappointt)
+ y ~ \t .Timet +  +  'S^K j-C O M j +  i/» +  rju (3.10)
t r  j
When we estimate the effect, two of the interaction terms are automatically dropped 
because of dependency among the independent variables; the dropped variables are fully 
explained by other variables in the regression. Given the number of interaction terms, this 
is perhaps not surprising. The variables dropped by Stata (the econometrics package we 
use) are (INTi.expit.Acadi.reappointt) and (INTi.Acadi) meaning that f t  and 02 will not 
be separately identified. This means that we are unable to accurately identify the separate 
effects of experience on different types of internal members. However, as we would expect 
from our natural experiment, and as suggested by the results in Table 3.11 above, the 
reappointment period only affects external member behavior. We, therefore, use the 
estimates of this equation to examine their behavior only and present the “experience 
effect” results in Table 3.12.
The results when reappointment is possible mirror those of the estimations reported 
in Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 above. We reject the hypothesis that the experience effect 
is the same across different types of external members when reappointment is possible 
(F (3 ,983) =  0.38, Prob > F = 0.7638). However, the results change markedly when 
we look at the behavior when reappointment was not possible (Columns (3) and (4)).
In particular, the behavior of all externals is much more similar; we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that all external types experience the same experience effect (F(3,983) =
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Table 3.12: Estimates of “Experience-Effect” by External Type: Combined Career Con­
cerns and Asymmetric Preferences Regression from Natural Experiment
reappointit =  1 reappointit =  0
Members Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
External Tighten Non-academic 0.00 0.84 -0.05 0.29
External Tighten Academic -0.02 0.41 -0.03 0.47
External Loosen Non-academic 0.03 0.27 -0.04 0.10
External Loosen Academic -0.18 0.00 -0.08 0.01
3.58, Prob > F  = 0.0136).
These results suggest that it is only in the presence of career concerns that the interest 
rate cycle plays a role. In terms of distinguishing between the two potential explanations, 
it seems that career concerns play a larger role. In fact, it may be that the extent of career 
concerns is influenced by the cycle; it is easier to appear anti-inflation by keeping interest 
rates higher in a downturn. However, to examine the reasons for such interactions we 
would need to develop a model that explicitly considers career concerns and the economic 
cycle.
3.9 Conclusion
MPC members communicate their views (signals) about the state of the world, and 
they also have different views about the economic structure. Our model provides two 
justifications for appointing different types of committee members. First, if different 
members have different dimensions of expertise, then mixing them together can improve 
the outcome for the committee designer. Second, where the designer cannot observe 
member beliefs about the economic structure, drawing members from two distributions 
which are likely to lie at extremes of the distribution of possible views of the economy 
is more likely to generate a moderate median voter. The first benefit can be attained 
through a simple advisory role, whereas the second relies on external members having a 
vote.
We find that internals and externals only vote for different interest rates after a 
period of time on the committee. This is an important finding; if members are failing 
to moderate each other’s views initially, then it fails to justify appointing externals in a 
voting capacity. We explore what might drive this behavior; we find evidence of career 
concerns as some external members vote differently in an attempt to be reappointed. 
Career concerns not only reduce the benefits of appointing members with different views 
about the economic structure, but, if there is less learning about the economic shocks,
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then the information sharing may be impeded also.
The systematic difference between internals and externals should be particularly sur­
prising given the fact that internals are often appointed from very similar backgrounds 
to externals and, therefore, the two groups differ only in the sense that the internals 
are appointed to the staff of the Bank of England, taking on management roles in the 
day-to-day running of the Bank.
Our results suggest that career concerns may play a role in MPC voting (though they 
obviously cannot prove the existence of career concerns). This finding is of independent 
interest because papers such as Levy (2007) and Sibert (2003) have stressed the theo­
retical consequences of career concerns in committee voting, and Meade and Stasavage
(2008) have uncovered patterns in the voting record of the FOMC that they interpret 
as identifying career concerns. These papers largely focus on voting differences when 
deliberation and voting is either transparent or secretive. These dimensions do not vary 
with regard to the MPC and yet we find evidence supporting career concerns.
As our model shows, the voting behavior of the Bank of England’s MPC indicates 
that the gains to a mixed committee may be reduced or even made negative. The finding 
is particularly striking as the MPC is, otherwise, close to our ideal committee in terms 
of set-up; if optimal behavior fails on this committee, it is more likely to fail on other 
committees where differences in preferences are more acceptable. Exploring the benefits 
of a mixed committee in the context of career concerns is required in order to better 
understand the decision to appoint external experts to a committee. Nonetheless, the 
conclusion of this chapter is that mixed committees are not a panacea to ensuring optimal 
monetary policy decisions.
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3.A  Proofs
3 .A .1  P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t i o n  3 .1
P ro o f. The optimal strategy for each member i is to maximize (3.1) conditional on I it,
the information set of member i at time t. In the proof, we suppress In for notational
simplicity; the expectations should be understood to be taken with respect to In- We 
decompose (3.1) in the following manner:
£  [(tT* -  7T*)2] =  E [ 7 T 2t \ -27T*£[7rt] +  (7T*)2
=  y  M  +  E  [irt]2 -  2n*E [7Tt ] +  (7r * ) 2
= y  M  +  (E  [7rt] -  7r*)2 ,
where
E  [7r<] =  g (r) +  an +  On
and
V  [7Tt] =  E  [V [nt \ a t , 0]] +  V  [E [tt, | a t , 0]] =  <r2 +  V  [at + 6 ).
The interest rate only affects 12 kt], not V [ttt] =. Clearly, utility is highest when 
rt =  r*t , where r*t satisfies
g (r*t) +  ait +  6 it =  n*.
Also, since g is strictly increasing, utility is strictly increasing when rt < r*t and strictly 
decreasing when rt > r*t . So, expected utility is continuous and single peaked.
Member i is indifferent between a given rt and rt when ait =  a*t, where
V-lt + 0 i t - g  i n )  9 (ft) -  a*t oiu
which implies
_ 9 ( n ) - g ( u )  s  ,011,
ait — 2 it'
Since preferences are single-peaked with the bliss point depending positively on an, 
member i votes for rt for all ait < a*t and for rt for all ait > a*t . From (3.11) one can 
see that a*t is decreasing in 0 it. m
3 .A .2 P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t i o n  3 .2
Proof. Suppose the game is in period 1 , and that there is an equilibrium in which ©fx 
and Oh are non-empty. Moreover, without loss of generality, suppose that 6 1 < 02- For 
this equilibrium to exist, it must be that case that member l ’s expected utility is higher
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) s'll'from withholding than disclosing Vdn G © n ,sn  G ©]
Using standard results in Bayesian decision theory (Greene 2003, p.871-2), one can 
construct two separate beliefs for member 2 :
and
a 21 = E I dn, 5n, ^21 j S21
— A i d n  +  A 2S11 - f  \ z d 2 1  +  A 4S 21;
a 21  ~ E  a i  | d n  €  © n , s n  G © n , d 2 i , S 2 i 
=  AiE  d n  | d n  G © n ,  d2i +  A2 -F [ s n  I S11 G © n ,  S21 ]
+A3d21 +  A4S21.
In these equations, the A terms are linear weights that depend on the variance terms 
of the underlying signals. a'2l is member 2 ’s belief on a when he observes member l ’s 
signals, and a 21 is his belief when he does not, in which case he knows that they lie in 
the sets ©fx and ©n-
Define © ff =  j  d n  | d n  G © f1? ^dn — inf © f ^  > e J , and define © 5 5  analogously. For 
the rest of the proof, we suppose that e is small enough so that
E
E
-21 >  d n  Vd2 i , Vdn G © 1 1  , and  
[-511 I -5ll G © 1!, <521 ] >  -511 Vs2l ,V s n  G © n -
dn | dn £ ©ii) d;
Now, fix some dn G ©n and s'n G ©n- One can define the following sets:
R\ — |  ^21,521^ I 0^ 21 < a 21 }
^ 2  =  |  ^d2i,S21  ^ | <^ 21 — a 21->a '21 < a 21 }
i? 3  — ^ ^ 2 1 , 5 2 1 ^  | OL2\  — Q!2 1 ’ Q:21 ^  ^ 11  ^
R a — |  (d2i, s2i^-5 1 <^ 21 ^  aln }
These sets are all non-empty since a'2l < a 21 whenever d n  G ©* and s'n G © n -  
For some fixed d n  G © ff and s'n G ©Jf, let
U 1 H i  ^d2i ,5 2 i^  , r 21 ^21 ,5 2 1 ^
be the expected utility of member 1 when member 2 has drawn (d2i, 521^  , member 1
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votes for rn , and member 2 votes for r2\. The payoff for member 1 from withholding his 
information from member 2 in the proposed equilibrium is
E  ^ U 1 jrn  (d 2 i, S2i^ ,r 1 | ^d2i > S2i^ G i?i j  Pr [ ^ 21, s2i)  G Ri 
4
+ ^11 ^ 21? S21  ^ , Ti I ^ 21, S21 )^ G -Ri |  Pr ^ 21,% )  ^
i—2
while his payoff from disclosing information is 
2
rn c^?2i, S21) ,Ii | ^ 2 1  > 52i  ^ £ Rt |  Pr ^21,^21^ G-R*
2= 1
4
+  rn  ^ 21, $21  ^ > r i I (^ 2 1 7 S21) G R* |  Pr ^d2i> G-R*
2=3
which is strictly larger his payoff from withholding since
U 1 rn  (S 2 1 ,s 2^ j , r 1 > U1 rn  (d2i , s 2i)
whenever ^d2i , s 2i)  € i?2 - Thus, there cannot exist an equilibrium in the first period in 
which member 1 withholds information. Similar arguments show that there also cannot 
exist an equilibrium in which member 2 withholds information in the first period. Thus, 
the equilibrium of the communication game in the first period features full disclosure.
Now consider the communication game in period 2 . Since all information in period 
1 continues to be public information, the game is isomorphic to the game in period 1 . 
Therefore, the equilibrium of the period 2 communication game is also full disclosure. 
Repeating this argument ad infinitum gives the result. ■
3 .A .3 P ro o f o f  P roposition  3.3
Proof. In the proof, all expectations taken at time t are understood to depend on {7fT}*=1 
as well as the variables explicitly noted. Suppose that 6 i = 6 d for all possible appointees. 
Let
and
R-t   1 st\ t —1
Rt = < {dT,s T} \=l
E  [ (rrt -  7T* )2 | {dT,s r }*=1 ,r*] > 
E [ ( 7Tt -  TT*)2 I {dT, st Yt = 1  , rt }
E [ (n t -  t t *)2 | { d r , 5 r }*r = i , f t  ]  >
E[{TTt ~TT* ) 2 | K ,S T}r=1,£t] j 
Now, the expected utility of the committee designer at time t computed in the first
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period is equal to
E  [ ( tt* -  7r * ) 2] =
E[(7Tt -ir*)2 I { d r , 5 r }J .=1 X
Pr [rt =  rt | {dT, sr }t=i € ] +
£7 [ ( t t *  - t t * ) 2 | {dT,s TYT==1 e R t ,r t ] x 
Pr [rt = f t | {dT, sT} ‘ =1 G ]
E  [ (7Tt — 7T*)2 I {dT,s r }tr=1 G # t , r t ] x
Pr [rt = rt \ {dT, sT}>=i G R t] +
E  [ ( 7r< - 7 T * ) 2 I { d T , S r } t = i  ^  x
Pr [rt =  f t | {dr , S rlU i G
> Pr [{dT, sT}v=i G ] +
> Pr [{dT,s TYT = 1  G Rt]
Expected utility reaches a maximum when there is at least one member for whom 7  ^—► 00  
and one member for whom 7 ? —» 0 0  because in this case Pr [ rt = f t | {dr , sT)v=i G Rt ] —► 
0 and Pr \ rt = r t \ {dT, sT}*_i £ Rt] —> 0. This follows from the fact that members share 
their private information with each other prior to voting. The result follows from the 
continuity of E  [ ( 71* — 7r*)2] in 0*, 7 f ,  and 7 ?. ■
3 .A .4 P ro o f o f  P rop osition  3.5
Proof. Let at be the members’ shared belief about at at time t. By (3.11) 
Pr Vu ^  r2t] = Pr 9 in)  - g ( L t) ^   ^ 9 in)  -  9 f a )  ,  ------- < at < ---------   h 7 i t  ~  u 2t
Since at has a continuous distribution for all t , a sufficient condition for the result to hold
pis 7I t  ~  u 2t 0 .
By standard results in Bayesian decision theory, the conditional distributions of 6  | 
{dT, sT, 7tt -iYt=i f°r both members are normal with means On and d2t■ Let / /  (0 ) and 
(0 ) be the associated probability density functions.
Now, since both members’ prior distributions on 0 assign positive probability to all 
subsets of R, they are absolutely continuous with respect to each other; so, one can apply 
Proposition 1 in Kalai and Lehrer (1994), which implies
f 1
1 - e  > J4 - > 1 +  e 
”  ft _
for large enough t  for all e > 0. Since (0) are unimodal, (3.12) implies that
(3.12)
6 \t — 6 2 1 <
5 for all 5 > 0 for large enough t. So, 0 , establishing the result.
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